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Chapter 1
Introduction and summary
Envy is a powerful human emotion. Anthropologists and sociologists recognize
envy as a possible driving force of individual behavior and it is not just by chance
that envy is one of the seven deadly sins in Christianity. In the field of economics,
envy translates to the idea of relative standing concerns or social comparisons:
Individuals might care not only about their absolute consumption but also about
their position relative to others.1 Economic models incorporating social compar-
isons deviate from traditional models in which individuals care purely about abso-
lute consumption. If relative standing matters, important questions arise: What
changes with respect to traditional economic models? What are the implications of
social comparisons in economics and how important are these? Not least, should
we question the wisdom of many economic policy recommendations from models
that ignore social comparisons, as Frank (2005, p.137) suggests?
Evidence shows that social comparison does matter and that it is essential to
understand its implications for the field of economics.2 The motivation of the
present thesis is to deepen our understanding of social comparisons with a focus
on social comparisons under uncertainty. While individuals are commonly exposed
to uncertainty, to date, few empirical studies addressed social comparisons in an
uncertain enviroment. Evidence on the interaction of information and social com-
parisons, and also for behavioral implications, is still rare. This is remarkable
as Albert O. Hirschman discussed information-related effects and social compar-
isons as early as 1973. In a seminal contribution, Hirschman (1973) introduced
1More precisely, relative standing concerns imply that individuals dislike being behind but
gain satisfaction from being ahead of others. Thus, individuals could be described as envious
when behind and as gloating when ahead of others.
2Evidence on relative standing concerns will be discussed in detail in Section 1.1 of this
chapter. See Clark and D’Ambrosio (2015) for a recent overview.
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the “tunnel effect,”and analyzed situations when informational effects counter-
vail social comparison effects.3 The interplay of informational effects and social
comparisons described by the tunnel effect is an important theme throughout the
present thesis and motivates chapters 2 and 3. As a natural next step the question
of implications for decisions under uncertainty arises. Consequently, Chapter 4
addresses effects of social comparisons on risk taking.
The main contribution of the present thesis is experimental and empirical ev-
idence of the effects of social comparisons under uncertainty. The methodolo-
gies used to generate results are theory-guided controlled laboratory experiments
and an empirical investigation applying a global survey dataset that incorporates
macro- and microeconomic variables. Generally, the empirical investigation of so-
cial comparisons under uncertainty is intrinsically challenging. Essential variables
for an analysis are often not observable in the field or are at risk of being de-
fectively measured. For these reasons, controlled laboratory experiments are a
suitable method to derive clean and causal evidence on fundamental effects. The
controlled environment allows me to precisely measure variables such as the income
and expectations of individuals, the reference group’s income, and the information
that individuals learn about the reference group. The outcome of experiments
should be understood as positive results that are complementary to other method-
ologies such as classical empirical methods.
Before I continue with the detailed analyses in the following chapters, this intro-
ductory chapter proceeds with a discussion of social comparisons and demonstrates
its manifold implications in economics. Section 1.2 discusses social comparisons
under uncertainty with subsections on information-related effects and risk taking.
Section 1.4 continues with methodological aspects of an experimental method to
investigate social comparisons. Section 1.5 provides an outline of the present thesis
and a summary of the main contributions.
1.1 Social comparisons in economics
The role of social preferences has provoked a large body of literature in economics
in recent decades.4 Social preferences are understood to be a form of individual
preferences that depend not only on the personal material payoff (consumption)
3The “tunnel effect” is named after a tunnel anecdote in Hirschman’s (1973) article and will
be discussed in more detail in Section 1.2 of this chapter.
4For an overview see, for instance, Fehr and Schmidt (2006).
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but also on resources that are allocated to others (Fehr and Schmidt 2006).5 These
types of preferences have been widely studied in different forms, such as altruism
(e.g., Andreoni and Miller 2002) or inequity aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt
1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000).6 Social comparisons are maybe the oldest type
of social preferences that have been studied in the field of economics, with early
contributions reaching back as far as Veblen (1899).7 Outside the economic profes-
sion people would most commonly refer to social comparisons as envy. Probably
most people would agree that envy is a powerful human emotion, and thus, we
might expect behavioral implications, one way or another. Consider the following
thought experiment for a demonstration of how social comparisons may lead to
different outcomes compared to a traditional economic model that is based purely
on absolute consumption.8
Imagine you could choose for your grandchild to live in either society A or B. Both
societies are identical but for the levels of income (per annum). Importantly, both
societies exhibit identical price levels. You are supposed to choose the society in
which your grandchild would be most content. Which society would you choose:
• Society A: Your grandchild’s income is 54,000 EUR; the average income in
the society is 60,000 EUR.
• Society B: Your grandchild’s income is 54,000 EUR; the average income in
the society is 48,000 EUR.
Traditional models that assume absolute consumption-based preferences predict
that people should be indifferent between both societies. However, most people
would choose society B. In fact, when I presented this hypothetical question to a
sample of 239 participants of an economic laboratory experiment, 84 percent of the
5Note that social preferences, as they are defined here, are not necessarily in contradiction to
neoclassical economics (Binmore and Shaked 2010).
6Besides models of social preferences further “other-regarding preferences” theories found
much attention in economics. These models include interdependent preferences and intention-
based reciprocity (see, for instance, Sobel 2005).
7I use the terms social comparisons, comparison considerations, relative standing concerns,
and income comparisons interchangeably throughout the present thesis.
8This experiment is inspired by Alpizar et al. (2005). Earlier hypothetical experiments of a
similar nature have been conducted by, for instance, Tversky and Griffen (1991) and Zeckhauser
(1991). Also Frank (1985a) addresses his reader with a similar thought experiment about living
in hypothetical societies.
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students chose society B over society A.9 The case becomes even more clear when
I asked the same sample of participants slightly adjusted versions of this question.
For these questions I adjust the income level for the grandchild in society B while
everything else remains unchanged. Figure 1.1 shows that about 60 percent of the
participants would still prefer society B, even though their grandchild would earn
less than in society A (#2 in Figure 1.1). Thus, in this hypothetical example, a
majority of participants seem to be willing to forgo absolute income in return for
a better relative position. In a following question, 31 percent of the participants
would still prefer society B, even when their grandchild would not only earn less
than in society A but also less than the average in society B (#3 in Figure 1.1).
Apparently, these participants find the (negative but still) higher relative income
position in society B more important than the higher absolute income level in
society A. Unambigious preferences for society A, with about 99 percent of partic-
ipants choosing A over B, emerge only when the absolute and the relative income
positions are both worse in society B (#4 in Figure 1.1).
The purpose of this short experiment is to demonstrate that social compar-
isons matter for individuals and may offer relevant implications.10 Such implica-
tions have been widely discussed in the economic literature. In one of the earlier
contributions, Duesenberry (1949) discusses how household consumption can be
affected by the expenditure of the household’s neighbors. Galbraith (1958) even
argues that most consumer demands are determined by society rather than by
innate needs only. One well-discussed implication of social comparisons is that
an increase in one’s own position imposes a negative externality on others. When
one individual improves her, for instance, income position then all who compare
themselves with her will experience a loss in utility due to the deterioration in the
relative position. Frank (1985a) refers to a “positional treadmill” for the situation
when all spend effort to gain advantage but remain in the same relative position
because of everybody’s struggle to get ahead. However, social comparisons can
also provide positive externalities that benefit the society. If social comparisons
foster competition among certain groups, such as entrepreneurs or scientists, the
9The data were collected at the econlab of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public
Finance. The hypothetical questions were presented to participants of an economic experiment
in the post-experimental questionnaire, following the main part of the experiment.
10While this hypothetical experiment focuses on income, social comparisons do not need to
be restricted to income. Consumption (e.g., Veblen 1899), leisure (e.g., Frijters and Leigh 2008)
or other socioeconomic domains (e.g., Mujcic and Frijters 2015) may also serve as a medium for
comparison concerns. Observable domains may serve as a medium to signal wealth. For instance,
Glazer and Konrad (1996) show that one motive for donating to charity can be the desire to
demonstrate wealth.
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Figure 1.1: Would you choose society A or B for your grandchild?
Note: Answers of 239 participants to four versions of the question of whether they would choose
for their hypothetical grandchild to rather live in the hypothetical society A or B. In all versions of
the question the income levels in society A remain fixed at 54,000 EUR for the own hypothetical
grandchild and at 60,000 EUR as the average income level. The income level of the hypothetical
grandchild changes between societies 1 B to 4 B. In all cases, the price level is assumed to be
identical in societies A and B.
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result can be higher effort and output (Congleton 1989).11,12
These possible external effects of social comparisons offer implications in the
field of public finance. For instance, income taxes can be less distortive if indi-
viduals exhibit social comparisons with respect to income (Layard 1980). Boskin
and Sheshinski (1978) demonstrate in an optimal taxation framework that rela-
tive income concerns lead to higher optimal marginal tax rates. Aronsson and
Johansson-Stenman (2008) show in a framework with nonlinear income taxation
and provision of public goods that social comparisons imply higher marginal in-
come tax rates compared to the conventional case.13,14 Furthermore, when some
goods, such as luxury goods, are more prone to social comparisons than other
goods, taxes on such “status goods” are less distortive (Konrad 1990).15 Konrad
(1992) shows in a neoclassical growth model that social comparisons with respect
to wealth can lead to an overaccumulation of capital and, ceteris paribus, a capital
income tax and a wealth tax can be welfare-improving. Dupor and Liu (2003)
demonstrate that social comparisons can lead to overconsumption. Ng (1987b)
discusses that the level of public expenditure can be too low due to social com-
parisons. From an international perspective, social comparisons can lead to an
underprovision of national and global public goods in case of social comparisons
toward other domestic residents and residents in foreign countries (Aronsson and
Johansson-Stenman 2014).16
The discussion on the implications of social comparisons, such as the “posi-
11Congleton (1989) refers to some individuals that engage in “status games,”such as capital-
ists that compete in accumulating capital. Social comparisons are operative in these “status
games” and fosters competition. Athletes and the mass entertainment of sport events provide
another example. Congleton (1989) emphasizes that good institutions could make use of social
comparisons to benefit the society.
12Weimann et al. (2015) provide a recent discussion on the role of social comparison concerns
for society. They argue that, on balance, social comparisons are probably beneficial for society
because of the intensifying effect on beneficial competition.
13Wendner and Goulder (2008) investigate linear optimal taxation and optimal provision of
public goods when individuals exhibit social comparisons. Similarly, they find that social com-
parisons lead to a lower excess burden of consumption taxes and labor taxes compared to purely
absolute consumption based preferences.
14Aronsson et al. (2016) have analyzed the implications of social comparisons for optimal cap-
ital and labor income taxation in a small open economy (i.e., mobile capital), using an overlap-
ping generations framework. They find that optimal tax rules change considerably when savings
abroad cannot be observed. Among other results, capital income taxation becomes ineffective
and tax rules for marginal labor income become rather complex.
15Some luxury goods may even be taxed without any excess burden. Ng (1987a) refers to
such goods as “diamond goods.”Konrad (1990) discusses factors that complicate the taxation of
luxury goods such as changes of the “status-property” of goods over time.
16Social comparisons can also provide a motive for a countercyclical tax policy over the business
cycle, from a macroeconomic perspective (Ljungqvist and Uhlig 2000).
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tional treadmill,” imposes the question: Why would individuals behave in such
a way? What could explain individuals experiencing social comparison concerns?
Many economists have pointed out that social concerns may well be rational from
an individual point of view, when a higher relative position helps to achieve other
important objectives (e.g., Hirsch 1976, Sen 1983). For instance, Frank (1985b)
explains that high observable consumption (relative to others) might signal past
success and high labor income to employers and business partners, and therefore
increase the chances of finding a new or better job. Konrad (1990) offers a socio-
biological explanation for social comparisons. Preferences for the relative position
of individuals can be the outcome of the evolutionary process. If a better relative
position in observable factors helps to signal the unobservable quality as a partner
for reproduction, then striving for the best relative position becomes a successful
strategy to pass on genes. As a possibly successful strategy in the evolutionary pro-
cess, comparison concerns may have become a part of human preferences. Samuel-
son (2004) gives a related but alternative explanation of how social comparisons
can be the optimal outcome of the evolutionary process. He shows that relative
consumption preferences can be an evolutionary solution to induce more effective
individual behavior in an uncertain environment. In hunter-gatherer times con-
sumption levels of others could have contained important information. Relative
comparison preferences can trigger reactions and induce individuals to respond to
such information more effectively.17
Evidence in line with the comparison concerns of individuals is well-documented
in the economic literature (e.g., Clark et al. 2008).18 A large body of empiri-
cal studies analyze subjective well-being and the effect of other people’s income
changes (e.g., Clark and Oswald 1996, Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005, Luttmer 2005,
McBride 2001). The Easterlin paradox (Easterlin 1974) provided an initial impe-
tus for this literature and stimulated much debate (e.g., Stevenson and Wolfers
2008).19 Generally, these studies document a negative relationship between sub-
17Rayo and Becker (2007) make a related argument. They model happiness as a biological
“measurement instrument” of individuals to evaluate different choices. In their theory, the
“measurement instrument” works more accurately when individuals apply relative measures (i.e.,
relative to past experiences and relative to others). Therefore, they argue, the relative measure-
ment has been successful in the evolutionary process of genetic multiplication and became part
of individuals’ preferences.
18For a recent overview of the literature see Clark and D’Ambrosio (2015).
19The Easterlin paradox was motivated by deviating correlations between GDP and subjective
well-being in cross-sectional and time-series analyses. It states that at any point in time richer
individuals are happier than poorer individuals, but as per capita GDP increases over time, av-
erage subjective well-being does not increase. For a recent discussion see, for instance, Weimann
et al. (2015).
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jective well-being and the income of a defined reference group. A different strand
of the literature provides evidence of social comparisons using survey-experimental
studies (e.g., Alpizar et al. 2005, Carlsson et al. 2007, Johansson-Stenman et al.
2002, and Solnick and Hemenway 2005). The hypothetical experiment discussed
above is an example of these types of survey-experiments. Further evidence of
social comparisons provide studies that rely on revealed preference approaches,
including laboratory experiments (e.g., Bolton 1991) and, more recently, natural
experiments (e.g., Kuhn et al. 2011).20
1.2 Social comparison and informational effects
After a glance at the extensive empirical literature on social comparisons, it seems
remarkable that social comparisons under uncertainty has received comparably less
attention. After all, income is to a large part dependent on future developments.
Consequently, social comparisons often occur in an uncertain environment. Indeed,
Samuelson (2004) even argues that uncertainty and the information value of the
consumption of others could be the very reason why social comparisons evolved in
individual preferences. Following this reasoning, investigating social comparisons
under uncertainty seems relevant and promising.
The first to discuss the relevance of informational effects when income is un-
certain was Albert O. Hirschman (1973). His theoretical analysis builds on the
intuitive idea that observing the income of others can be informative about the
own future income prospects. Hirschman pointed out that such informational ef-
fects can even outweigh social comparison concerns and illustrated his idea in a
well-known anecdote:
“Suppose that I drive through a two-lane tunnel, both lanes going in the same
direction, and run into a serious traffic jam. No car moves in either lane as
far as I can see (which is not very far). I am in the left lane and feel dejected.
After a while the cars in the right lane begin to move. Naturally, my spirits lift
considerably, for I know that the jam has been broken and that my lane’s turn to
move will surely come any moment now. Even though I still sit still, I feel much
better off than before because of the expectation that I shall soon be on the move,”
20Furthermore, Kirchsteiger (1994) theoretically shows that individuals’ behavior in the ul-
timatum game could be explained by envious players (i.e., social comparisons) and strategic
concerns. The ultimatum game was first introduced by Gu¨th et al. (1982) and inspired much
research due to its simplicity and the striking deviations from predictions based on traditional
economic theory.
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(Hirschman 1973, p.545).
Named after this anecdote, Hirschman refers to the “tunnel effect” for the situa-
tions when positive informational effects outweigh social comparisons and, there-
fore, individuals experience an increase in satisfaction when they observe the in-
come advances of others.21
In its nature, this interaction of informational and social comparison effects
is quite general and might apply in many situations of social comparisons. One
interesting application is in the area of public finance. When Hirschman wrote his
1973 paper he focused on the implications of the tunnel effect for the tolerance
toward inequality in societies. Consider a growing economy and the exploding
income of certain groups of a society, while a majority of people remain stuck
in utter poverty. As a result of the advances of some while the broad mass of
people face poverty, one might suspect that social cohesion, possibly even peace,
is at risk. Hirschman (1973) explains that, quite contrary to this first suspicion, a
majority of people might be quite satisfied with such a development – because of
the tunnel effect. The hope of the poor majority to receive a piece of the cake, and
possibly become rich themselves (or their children), renders them satisfied. Put
more technically, the poor people in this example believe in a positive correlation
between their future income and the increasing income of the privileged groups
in their society. Of course, when their hope is disappointed, and they lose their
belief in the positive correlation of incomes, social cohesion will finally be at risk, as
Hirschman (1973) points out. Then, social comparisons will dominate and produce
anger at losing in relative terms compared to the rich minority.
For Hirschman, a scholar with a strong interest in development economics,
the transitional economies of developing countries was the starting point of his
analysis. However, the idea of the tunnel effect carries over to the more general
case of preferences for redistribution. Redistribution is more common for developed
countries and varies considerably across these countries (Alesina et al. 2004). One
important factor for the preferences for redistribution, and thus also redistributive
taxation, is the social mobility in a society (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005).22 If
21Hirschman also points to an interesting dynamic aspect. He continues his anecdote by stating
that the initial satisfaction may eventually give way to anger when his hope for progression in
his lane is disappointed. When the cars in the own lane remain stuck while others pass by, the
disappointed hope may induce illegal and even violent reactions of individuals, such as illegal
double line crossings to squeeze onto the other lane.
22Social mobility is also an important issue in the currently effervescent debate on inequality.
A high social mobility implies that we may worry less about advances in the income and wealth
of the very rich because every individual has a chance of becoming rich. For a recent discussion
of arguments that govern the debate on inequality, see, for instance, Piketty (2015).
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a society exhibits high social mobility and poor people expect that they or their
children have a fair chance to become high-income earners, they may favor a
moderate level of redistribution. Put differently, they experience a tradeoff between
higher potential future (net) income and higher current income in the form of
redistributive transfers from the government. Social mobility ensures that poor
people believe (to some extent) in a positive correlation between the top-earners’
income and their future income – in line with Hirschman’s informational effects.
One important assumption for this reasoning is that once redistributive policies
are implemented then these are long-lasting. Be´nabou and Ok (2001) formalize
this idea of prospects of upward mobility (POUM). They show that prospects
of upward mobility lead indeed to a lower demand for redistribution compared
to the classical “workhorse” political economic model of Meltzer and Richards
(1981).23 One important aspect is that it is the perceived rather than the actual
social mobility that affects preferences for redistribution. Alesina et al. (2004) find
evidence that differences in (perceived) social mobility can explain differences in
preferences for redistribution between the United States and European countries.
The latter redistribute considerably more than the United States. Kopczuk et al.
(2010) and Chetty et al. (2014a, 2014b) provide evidence that the more optimistic
view of people in the United States on social mobility is only partially justified.
While social mobility has been stable over the last decades for the average citizen
in the United States, social mobility deteriorated for men and shows a considerable
heterogeneity among different regions of the United States.24,25
While the discussion on the prospects of upward mobility relates to positive
informational effects a` la Hirschman, informational effects can also work the other
way around. The declining incomes of others can provide a bad signal for prospects
of future income. Increasing unemployment rates and declining aggregate income
in a recession could be one example. Furthermore, the correlation between incomes
is not always unambiguously positive. In an overall stagnant economy with no
economic growth, the increasing income of others could imply that people expect
less for themselves. In this case, the increasing income of other people can imply
that they receive more of a fixed amount of resources, while less remains available
23Be´nabou and Ok (2001) show that certain conditions are necessary for their results. These
include that individuals are not too risk averse, that expected income is a concave function of
today’s income and a skewed distribution of random shocks to income.
24Some regions in the United States offer levels of social mobility that are persistently lower
than in most other developed countries (Chetty et al. 2014).
25Kopczuk et al. (2010) analyze data that reach back to the 1950s. While social mobility
deteriorated for men, it increased for women during this time period.
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for oneself. In either of these two cases, individuals may fear decreases in income
that could lead to a more favorable attitude toward redistribution.26 Finally,
income uncertainty can generally provide an insurance motive for redistributive
taxation (Varian 1980).
The evidence on informational effects a` la Hirschman usually relies on survey
data. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) find that individuals who expect their eco-
nomic situation to improve show a weaker support for redistribution. Senik (2004,
2008) investigates self-reported life satisfaction. She finds a positive reaction of
satisfaction if the income of a defined reference group increases that is in line with
the tunnel effect. Clark et al. (2009) consider job satisfaction. They match Danish
employer-employee data with survey data and find a positive correlation between
job satisfaction and the income of colleagues. These studies are an important
starting point but suffer from identification problems. Chapter 2 of the present
thesis contributes to the literature by providing clean and causal evidence on in-
formational and comparison effects from a controlled laboratory experiment.27
1.3 Implications for risk taking behavior
When we think about social comparisons under uncertainty, an important question
is: What are the implications for decisions under uncertainty? Individual decisions
under uncertainty are one of the most studied subject in economics. However, the
impact of the social context on risk taking is not well-understood so far and the
literature addressing risk taking in a social context is still in its infancy (Traut-
mann and Vieider 2012, Fafchamps et al. 2015). Research that contributes to
a deepening of our knowledge in this matter is relevant as most decisions under
uncertainty involve a social context. Managerial decisions in a firm or decisions
involving risk in the family are only two examples. In the financial industry com-
monly available rankings for investment funds provide a context for comparisons
and potential social influences on investment decisions.28
“Social context” can refer to many things that could affect risk taking in several
26In line with this reasoning, the fear of a decreasing income and socially falling behind can be
particularly relevant for highly developed, sluggish-growth countries, such as Germany. Indeed,
discussions about a declining middle class and higher risk for falling behind in the public debate
in Germany provide anecdotal evidence that this might be the case. See, for instance, the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (online), “In der Abstiegsgesellschaft” (“In the descent society”),
published on June 15th, 2016.
27See Section 1.4 for a discussion on the potential identification problems of studies that analyze
social comparisons in the field.
28Investment funds ratings are published by, for instance, Forbes and Morningstar.
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ways.29 The present thesis focuses on the effects of relative standing comparisons
on decisions under uncertainty. The first to discuss relative standing comparisons
and risk taking were Robson (1992) and Konrad and Lommerud (1993). Robson
(1992) models social comparisons as individuals who are concerned about their
rank in the income distribution. In Robson’s (1992) model individual utility can
be concave in wealth itself but convex over some range due to an additional social
comparisons part in the utility function. Robson shows that social comparisons
can explain that individuals simultaneously purchase insurance and participate in
lotteries.30 This observation, that individuals play high-risk lotteries but still buy
insurance, cannot easily be explained in a standard expected utility framework and
puzzled economists for many decades. Social comparisons provide an alternative
and a maybe more natural explanation for this phenomenon than Friedman and
Savage’s (1948)’s idea of an utility function that is “concave-convex-concave” in
consumption.
Konrad and Lommerud (1993) model social comparisons as individuals caring
about the distance in income to others. They distinguish cases of systematic (cor-
related) and non-systematic (uncorrelated) risk. Konrad and Lommerud (1993)
show that, for non-systematic risk, risk taking can be higher or lower compared to
standard expected utility as individuals can be risk averse or risk loving with re-
spect to their relative position. Thus, the utility function can become more concave
or convex when social comparisons are incorporated. They continue their analysis
showing that social comparisons lead to excessive risk taking in their model, and
thus, social comparisons provide a rationale for regulations that discourage risk
taking.
Only recently some studies have provided evidence on social comparisons and
risk taking. Because it is difficult to pursue an investigation of risk taking and
social comparisons in the field, the evidence predominantly stems from experi-
mental studies – the results are partially contradictory. For instance, Rohde and
Rohde (2011) find no convincing evidence of social comparisons affecting risk tak-
ing while Bault et al. (2008, 2011) do find evidence. Other studies find evidence
but draw deviating conclusion from their results. Linde and Sonnemans (2012)
find that subjects take less risk when they can win at most as much as a certain
payoff of a reference subject (“social loss situation”) compared to the case when
they can win at least as much as a reference subject (“social gain situation”). In
29See Trautmann and Vieider (2012) for an overview of social influence on risk taking.
30Additionally, Robson’s (1992) analysis is informative about stable equilibrium income dis-
tributions (also see Becker et al. 2005).
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contrast to Linde and Sonnemans, Schwerter (2013) finds that subjects take more
risk when they observe a higher certain payoff of others (to surpass these) com-
pared to observing a lower certain payoff of others (in order to stay ahead). The
motivation for both studies is a possible extension of loss aversion a` la Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) to the social dimension (“social loss aversion”). As a result,
Schwerter interprets his results in favor of social loss aversion, whereas Linde and
Sonnemans (2012) argue that loss aversion does not easily extend to the case of
social comparisons.
In light of the lack of distinct evidence, Chapter 4 investigates social compar-
isons and decisions under uncertainty and contributes to a better understanding
of the matter.
1.4 An experimental method for a direct analy-
sis of social comparisons
Empirical studies on social comparisons rely to a large part on subjective well-
being as a direct measure of satisfaction.31 Traditionally, many economists favor
revealed preference approaches. Revealed preference approaches rely on the ob-
served behavior of individuals that allows the researcher to learn indirectly about
an individual’s preference over different choices (Frey 2008). Social comparisons,
however, imply that utility is affected by the choices of others: When others earn
more (less) than we do, we are less (more) satisfied. The direct approach of mea-
suring utility as self-reported satisfaction allows economists to measure changes in
satisfaction after changes in the income of others. The evidence reported above
shows that the “direct approach,”based on self-reported satisfaction, turns out to
be highly useful for the analysis of social comparisons.32
Many studies on social comparisons and subjective well-being rely on survey
data from the field.33 Studying social comparisons in the field is an important
approach but gives rise to considerable difficulties. For instance, income runs at
risk of being under-declared and can be endogenous to satisfaction. It is difficult
to identify the income of a relevant reference group and to confirm to what extent
31See Section 1.1.
32The use of self-reported life satisfaction, and the “happiness” literature in general, have
received considerable methodological critique in economics. A full-fledged discussion is out of
the scope of the present thesis. For a recent discussion and overview see Weimann et al. (2015).
33Perez-Truglia (2015) provides a validation test for subjective well-being and finds that life
satisfaction is a meaningful measure.
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the reference group’s income is observable to individuals. An analysis of social
comparisons and informational effects, that operate through changes in expecta-
tions (see Section 1.2 above), complicate an investigation even further. To address
these issues, I combine a direct utility measure with the experimental methodology
by applying a self-reported measure of satisfaction in the controlled environment
of a laboratory experiment. The measure for satisfaction allows a direct analysis
of social comparison effects. Precise measures for income, income of a reference
group, and control over the information that participants receive allow a clean and
causal investigation that is hardly possible outside the laboratory.
Although this methodological approach offers the advantages of a controlled en-
vironment and direct utility measurement, one might wonder: Does self-reported
satisfaction in the laboratory provide a meaningful measure that captures well-
being? Evidence from a sample of 120 participants in a laboratory experiment
suggests that “Yes” is the answer to this question. In the experiment I endow
participants with income in the form of a “portfolio.”The portfolio value follows
a stochastic process and the final portfolio value determines a participant’s earn-
ings. In regular time intervals I measure changes in an individual’s well-being (the
self-reported satisfaction with their portfolio).34,35 To test whether self-reported
satisfaction provides meaningful results, I implement an additional, incentivized
revealed preference measure. At each point in time when participants report their
satisfaction, they additionally face the choice of receiving as their earnings the
final value of an alternative portfolio instead of the final value of their currently
observed portfolio. Participants are given no information on the optional alterna-
tive portfolio but know that this portfolio would be randomly generated by the
same stochastic process of their current portfolio.36 Overall, subjects participate
in 10 independent rounds and thus observe 10 times the development of a new
randomly generated portfolio over time.
The choice between the current portfolio and an alternative portfolio provides
34This analysis builds on a pooled subsample of the participants in treatments “Base” and
“Base-C” of Chapter 2. I analyze all 120 participants of both treatments that have the in-
centivized “choice” to receive the final value of an alternative portfolio. For a more detailed
description of the design and experimental procedures see Chapter 2.
35Satisfaction is recorded on a scale of 0 (highly dissatisfied) to 10 (highly satisfied). See
Chapter 2 for more details.
36Regardless of their choice, participants continue to observe their currently assigned portfolio.
If participants choose the unknown alternative portfolio at some point in time, they just receive
and observe the alternative portfolio before they are paid at the end of the experiment. For
payment only decisions at one point in time are randomly selected, and thus, participants can
choose the alternative or the current portfolio anew and independently of the previous choices
at each point in time.
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information on the participant’s preference toward the current portfolio. Partic-
ipants are expected to choose an alternative portfolio less (more) often if satis-
faction with respect to their current portfolio is high (low). Indeed, we observe a
positive correlation of 0.58 between the participants’ satisfaction and the incen-
tivized choice for the currently assigned portfolio.37 Furthermore, I calculate the
average satisfaction for each participant and classify observations for the situa-
tion when a participant reports above-personal-average satisfaction (“satisfied”)
and below-personal-average situations (“dissatisfied”). Figure 1.2 summarizes the
result. When participants are “satisfied” I observe in only 10.4 percent of the
decisions that participants choose the alternative portfolio. Whereas in case of
“dissatisfied” participants, I observe that participants choose the alternative port-
folio in 64.4 percent of the decisions.
This evidence shows that the self-reported satisfaction in the experiment pro-
vides results that are consistent with an incentivized revealed preference measure.
These results suggest that satisfaction is indeed a meaningful measure for the anal-
ysis in the present thesis.38 Furthermore, the direct measurement of satisfaction
in laboratory experiments can, if applied in a reasonable framework, provide a
constructive methodological extension that should be regarded as complementary
to the standard tools of experimental economists.39
1.5 Outline of the thesis and main contributions
The present thesis investigates social comparisons under uncertainty and impli-
cations for risk taking behavior. The first two chapters directly address social
comparison and informational effects while the last chapter focuses on behavioral
implications. Chapter 2 provides causal evidence of the social comparison and in-
formational effects in a theory-guided experimental investigation. Chapter 3 takes
an international perspective of social comparisons under uncertainty and relies on
subjective well-being, growth and trade data to provide evidence of social compari-
son and informational effects when applying a global dataset. Chapter 4 addresses
37I define an indicator variable (“CHOICE”) that takes a value of 1 when participants choose
their currently assigned portfolio and 0 when participants choose the alternative portfolio. The
correlation of 0.58 refers to the correlation between “CHOICE” and satisfaction.
38A further analysis in Chapter 2 shows that also the incentivized measure for the participants’
expected final portfolio value and reported satisfaction produce consistent results.
39Indeed, the direct measurement of satisfaction in laboratory experiments opens opportuni-
ties for new applications. For example, Herbst (2016) applies self-reported satisfaction in an
experimental analysis of the joy of winning in contest experiments.
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Figure 1.2: Revealed preferences and satisfaction
Note: The percentage of participants that choose a random alternative portfolio over their cur-
rent portfolio when they report being “satisfied” or “dissatisfied” with their current portfolio.
“Satisfied” refers to decisions when participants reported a higher level of satisfaction than the
personal overall-average in the experiment. “Dissatisfied” refers to decisions when participants
reported a lower level of satisfaction than the personal overall-average in the experiment.
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behavioral consequences of social comparisons on risk taking in a theory-guided
experiment. In the following I summarize each chapter and its main contribution
in more detail.
Hirschman’s (1973) seminal contribution on the tunnel effect motivates Chap-
ter 2. The tunnel effect refers to the idea that learning that others earn more may
reduce individual well-being due to social comparisons but can also be informa-
tive of the own income prospects. In an environment of uncertainty about the
own income, this chapter provides experimental evidence on the direct income-
comparison effects on well-being and informational effects from observing signals
about others’ income prospects. The clean and causal evidence on informational
and social comparison effects from a controlled laboratory experiment contributes
to the empirical literature on the tunnel effect. Previous studies, that rely on sur-
vey data, exhibit a higher external validity but face obvious identification problems
due to unobserved or possibly defectively measured variables. The more precise
and causal evidence from the experimental study in Chapter 2 complements the
existing literature. I find evidence both of informational effects on the expecta-
tions about the own income and for direct social comparison effects. Both types of
effects turn out to be asymmetric. Individual expectations about the own income
are adjusted downwards when observing that others are likely to earn less but
do not change significantly when observing that others are likely to earn more.
Individual satisfaction decreases when others are likely to earn more but does
not change significantly when others are likely to earn less. For the overall effect
on satisfaction, informational effects countervail direct social comparison effects if
and only if the uncertainty about the own income is sufficiently large. In situa-
tions of low uncertainty the social comparison effects of learning about the income
prospects of others prevail.
Chapter 3 takes an international perspective on Hirschman’s tunnel effect and
investigates informational and comparison effects on a global level. Since the surge
of globalization, the internet, mass media, and other advances in communication,
individuals have become increasingly aware of the economic situation of people in
foreign countries. This has made it more likely that individuals compare their own
economic situation with that of foreigners as well as that of more local reference
groups. At the same time, globalization induces closer economic ties among coun-
tries, which could imply spillover effects from the economic performance of one
country to another, and thus potential income-prospect effects between countries.
I contribute to the existing literature by focusing on residents of foreign countries
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as a reference group. More specifically, I focus on the relationship between individ-
uals’ subjective well-being and the economic performance of reference countries.
The underlying idea is that performance measures, such as economic growth, are
readily observable and informative about the aggregate development of the eco-
nomic situation of foreign residents. I find evidence that individuals’ subjective
well-being depends on the macroeconomic performance of other countries as well
as that of their home country. Given the home country’s economic growth, an
individual’s life satisfaction is positively associated with the economic growth of
important trade partners. It is negatively associated with the economic growth of
neighboring countries that engage in relatively little trade with the home country.
Findings in Chapter 3 are consistent with individuals who care about their eco-
nomic situation relative to that of people in other countries, but who at the same
time anticipate positive spillovers from the economic performance of countries that
share an important economic tie with their home country.
Chapter 4 investigates individual behavior under uncertainty and social com-
parisons. Decisions involving risk, similar to most other things that we do, usually
take place in a social context. Individuals face decisions on pursuing personal ed-
ucation, choosing an occupation, making savings or financial investment decisions
while being aware of the situation of others. To understand risk taking behavior
in such situations it is important to understand the implications of social compar-
isons. In light of the broad scope of application, remarkably few studies consider
risk taking and social comparisons. Furthermore, the results that these studies
generate are often contradictory. Chapter 4 contributes to the literature by inves-
tigating the effect of social comparisons on risk taking in an experimental study,
with a focus on the case of income-rank comparisons. At first sight, implications
on risk taking when individuals care about their rank in income are not obvious.
Chapter 4 derives theoretical predictions showing that the properties of the re-
spective probability distribution of a lottery are crucial factors. The model shows
that, compared to standard expected utility theory, income-rank comparisons lead
to less (more) risk taking in case of lotteries with more downside (upside) probabil-
ity mass. The empirical results of the experimental investigation provide evidence
of income comparisons affecting risk taking decisions. In line with our theoretical
predictions, individuals take significantly less risk in situations of lotteries with
more downside probability mass. I do not find a significant effect for lotteries with
more upside probability mass. Individuals who face a reference subject of the same
gender exhibit a larger comparison effect on risk taking. I interpret this finding as
18
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evidence for Festinger’s (1954) idea that individuals prefer to compare themselves
to more rather than to less similar other individuals.
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Chapter 2
A glance into the tunnel:
Experimental evidence on income
comparisons under uncertainty
2.1 Introduction
When individuals care about relative standing, observing changes in the income of
others will affect their utility.1 At the same time, however, individuals may make
inferences about their own future income prospects from observing that others’
earnings increase or decrease. If positive experiences of others cause an upward
adjustment of the beliefs about the own income prospects, the informational value
of observing advances of others can countervail the direct effect on subjective well-
being caused by relative-standing concerns and affect the individual tolerance for
income inequality. Using data from a controlled laboratory experiment we separate
the direct comparison effect from the purely informational effect of learning about
others’ income and examine their importance for subjective well-being. Overall,
our findings suggest that individuals are more reactive to “bad news” than to “good
news,” both in how they adjust their expectations about the own income prospects
and in how subjective well-being is affected. In environments with sufficiently
strong uncertainty about the own income prospects, informational effects on the
expectations of own future income may offset direct income-comparison effects
caused by concerns for relative standing.
The information-driven effect of increases in well-being following advances of
1This chapter is based on joint work with Florian Morath, University of Frankfurt. See Lang
and Morath (2015).
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others has received less attention in the literature and was first discussed in a
seminal paper by Hirschman (1973). Hirschman claims that the positive informa-
tional value of observing that earnings of peers increase may even outweigh the
negative effect driven by relative-standing concerns, illustrating such a situation
with a tunnel anecdote: Suppose your are in a tunnel, being stuck in a traffic jam.
As far as you can see, nothing is moving and you are dejected. All of a sudden,
in the lane next to you the cars start to move. Even though still being stuck in
your lane, you may feel relieved as the traffic jam seems to be broken. While your
relative position is deteriorating the positive signal about the possibly dissolving
traffic jam leaves you, altogether, more satisfied than you have been before.
Hirschman (1973) concludes that information-driven effects can be important
determinants for attitudes towards inequality and redistribution. When future (life-
time) income is uncertain learning about others’ experiences may lead to individ-
uals adjusting their perceptions of income mobility within their society, thereby
affecting attitudes towards redistribution. Our experimental results not only pro-
vide support in favor of the importance of experiences of peers; it also hints at a
potential asymmetry in the process of how individuals update their beliefs about
the mobility process.2 We find that a higher weight is given to signals that in-
dicate the potential of downward mobility. This asymmetry may directly affect
reactions of individual well-being to inequality and the demand for redistributive
policies; more broadly, individual perceptions of social mobility (rather than actual
mobility) may shape general political attitudes and social cohesion.
Some empirical approaches have been undertaken to study Hirschman’s “tun-
nel effect,” usually relying on survey data. Using data for Russia, Ravallion and
Lokshin (2000) provide evidence that individuals who expect their economic sit-
uation to improve show a weaker support for redistribution. Studies by Senik
(2004, 2008) find evidence that personal life satisfaction may react positively to
an increase in the income of a reference group. Clark et al. (2009) match Danish
employer-employee data with survey data and find supportive evidence for a pos-
itive correlation between job satisfaction and the income of colleagues. Whereas
empirical evidence for the joint occurrence of comparison considerations and infor-
mational effects from the field is a natural and important starting point, studies
2Individual perceptions of social mobility can be influenced by many factors such as past
experience, parental background or the social environment and need not necessarily mirror the
actual mobility rates; see, for instance, Alesina et al. (2004) on differences in beliefs about social
mobility as an explanation for differences in views on inequality between the United States and
Europe.
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based on field data generally suffer from eminent problems. First, the measurement
of the relevant variables can be defective in several ways. For instance, income runs
at risk to be under-declared, measures of individuals’ expectations about future
income prospects are usually crude in survey data and income can be endogenous
to satisfaction.3 Furthermore, it is difficult to identify the income of a relevant
reference group and to confirm to what extent (or whether at all) the reference
group’s income is observable.4 Many problems in the field can be addressed in
the laboratory. The controlled environment allows us to observe the income of
participants and of a clearly defined reference group. We can directly measure
individual satisfaction levels and the beliefs about their income prospects, control-
ling for the information received about the income-generating process. This more
detailed and causal identification enables us to directly analyze adjustments in be-
liefs as a consequence of additional information, rather than focusing on changes
in satisfaction that are supposed to be caused by changes in beliefs. Thus, we can
separate the income-comparison and belief-based effects resulting in Hirschman’s
(1973) “tunnel effect.”
In the experiment we endow participants with income in form of a “portfolio.”
The portfolio value follows a stochastic process and the final portfolio value de-
termines a subject’s income. Hence, subjects are ex ante uncertain about their
income and about the income of others but receive additional information about
the final portfolio value (their income) in the course of the experiment. In reg-
ular time intervals we measure changes in the subject’s beliefs about their final
income and in individual well-being (the self-reported satisfaction with their port-
folio). To isolate purely belief-based effects of receiving additional signals about
the underlying income-generating process (“information effects”) we compare be-
liefs of a control group that only observes their own portfolio to a treatment group
(treatment “P2-Info”) that observes the exact same own portfolio but, in addi-
tion, another portfolio which may have informational value for the own income
but is not assigned to any other participant of the experiment. To measure direct
“income-comparison effects” we use observations from this P2-Info treatment as
control group and compare the self-reported satisfaction levels to another treat-
ment group (treatment “P2-Income”) in which subjects are matched in groups of
two and observe each other’s income-generating process. Thus, holding constant
3For instance, satisfied people might be extraverted and possibly more successful in their job.
4Some of the problems are addressed in one or another way in the studies cited above. Nev-
ertheless, it remains generally true that a completely clean identification is inaccessible in the
field.
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the information that subjects may use to infer about their own income prospects
(i.e., portfolio values) we provide precise information about another subject’s likely
income and estimate its effect on self-reported satisfaction. The main experimental
treatments keep the informativeness of additional signals uncertain by not provid-
ing precise information about the income-generating process; instead, subjects are
shown a distribution of possible income realizations. In additional control treat-
ments we vary the subjects’ priors by keeping them completely uncertain about
the distribution of final incomes.
We find evidence both for “information effects” on the beliefs about the own
income and for direct “income-comparison effects.” Both types of effects turn out
to be asymmetric. On the one hand, expectations about the own income only re-
act significantly when participants observe additional portfolios with lower values,
in which case subjects lower their beliefs. On the other hand, relative-standing
concerns most strongly affect satisfaction in situations where individuals observe
that others are likely to earn more, in which case subjects report lower satisfac-
tion levels. Belief-based effects and income-comparison effects offset each other in
how they affect well-being when the uncertainty about individual incomes is sub-
stantial and, hence, information-driven effects are important; in situations of low
uncertainty the income-comparison effects of learning about the income prospects
of others prevail.
The discussion on relative-income comparisons dates back to Veblen (1899) and
Duesenberry (1949) and there is a vast literature on the importance of relative-
income considerations for economic outcomes.5 More specifically, a substantial
amount of evidence documents a negative relationship between subjective well-
being and the income of a defined reference group (see, e.g., Van de Stadt et al.
1985; Clark and Oswald 1996; McBride 2001; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005; Luttmer
2005; Senik 2009; Clark and Senik 2010). Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Ramos (2014)
survey the literature on the relation between inequality and subjective well-being.
Consistent with the ideas of Duesenberry (1949), studies by Ferrer-i-Carbonell
(2005), Senik (2009) and Clark and Senik (2010) find that the relative-income
considerations are asymmetric, meaning that people compare mostly upwards.
We contribute to this empirical literature in two respects. First, we focus on
income-comparison considerations under uncertainty, controlling for informational
effects that become important in an uncertain environment. Second, we provide
5For early contributions see, for instance, Leibenstein (1950), Easterlin (1974, 1995), Boskin
and Sheshinski (1978), Frank (1984, 1985a, 1985b), Konrad (1992), and Konrad and Lommerud
(1993). Clark et al. (2008) review the literature on income comparisons and well-being.
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experimental evidence in a novel and, as we believe, particularly simple setting, in
which we show that seemingly minor institutional changes (individuals learn about
the income prospects of another participant, instead of only observing a second
portfolio which is not payoff-relevant for any other participant) in an otherwise
exactly similar situation induces significant income-comparison effects.
Under uncertain future and, hence, lifetime earnings income comparisons in-
volve directly the perception of social mobility. Be´nabou and Ok (2001) rationalize
and provide conditions for the “prospect of upward mobility” (POUM) hypoth-
esis that a majority of individuals may expect to become richer than average in
the future.6 Their work on the POUM hypothesis, explaining the lack of sup-
port for high levels of redistributive taxation, assumes that individuals know the
income-generating mobility process. Our experiment investigates expectations of
future income in an environment where the income-generating process and, hence,
the informativeness of learning about others’ income prospects for the own future
income is uncertain. We believe this is particular interesting because outside the
laboratory people might observe income signals about the income of others; how-
ever, the underlying correlation between future incomes is in most cases uncertain.
In this respect, our paper also relates to Piketty (1995) who takes into account
that individuals may exhibit heterogeneous beliefs about upward mobility and fo-
cuses on learning about the relative importance of individual effort as compared
to parental background.7 Our results for the asymmetry of how subjects take
into account additional information may be interpreted as subjects being mostly
concerned about downward mobility.
Finally, our paper relates to the literature on expectations formation (e.g.
Schmalensee 1976; Dwyer et al. 1993; Hey 1994; Hommes 2011; Ro¨theli 2011;
Beshears et al. 2013). However, we are not primarily interested in the expecta-
tions individuals form about a time series (in our setting, their income prospects).
6This and further explanations for why in democracies the low-income majority does not
implement high levels of redistribution are discussed by Putterman (1997); see also Fong (2001)
on beliefs about distributive justice and Luttmer and Singhal (2011) on the role of cultural
background. For empirical studies on the relation between perceptions of social mobility and
preferences for redistribution see Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), Corneo and Gru¨ner (2002),
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Guillaud (2013), and Cojocaru (2014). Checchi and Filippin
(2004), Krawczyk (2010), Konrad and Morath (2013) and Durante et al. (2014) experimentally
investigate preferences for redistributive taxation under different income mobility regimes.
7Our setting takes individual incomes as fully exogenous and predetermined and abstracts
from questions of the sources of inequality, which have been extensively discussed in the literature
on redistributive preferences. For seminal contributions on the role of beliefs about the sources of
inequality for redistributive outcomes see Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Be´nabou and Tirole
(2006).
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Our experiment focuses on how subjects adjust their expectations when they ob-
serve another individual’s income prospects. We deliberately refrain from inducing
the individuals to believe in a particular correlation structure but investigate how
individual beliefs react to signals about a second mobility process, in situations
where the underlying income-generating process is unknown.
2.2 Theoretical framework
2.2.1 Information and income-comparison concerns
Consider a model with two individuals. Individual i ∈ {1, 2} realizes future income
denoted by yi ∈ R+. We assume that individual i cares about relative standing
and, hence, both about his own income and about the income of individual j 6= i.
The preferences of i are described by the utility function
ui (yi, yj) = yi − λiyj,
where the parameter λi ≥ 0 reflects i’s concerns about relative standing.
Future income of the individuals is uncertain. Individual i observes a signal
si ∈ R about the own future income yi as well as a signal sj ∈ R about the other
individual’s future income yj. Denote by Ei (yk) individual i’s expectation about
yk. Then, i’s expected utility conditional on the signals (si, sj) is equal to
Ei [ui (yi, yj)| (si, sj)] = Ei [yi| (si, sj)]− λiEi [yj| (si, sj)] .
We assume i’s beliefs about yk to be strictly increasing in the signal sk, that
is,
(2.1)
∂Ei [yk| (s1, s2)]
∂sk
> 0, k = 1, 2.
Moreover, i’s beliefs about the own income yi may also depend on what i observes
about j’s income, that is, on sj. (Similarly, i’s expectation about yj may depend
on the signal si about the own income.) Thus, changes in sj affect i’s expected
utility through changes in his expectations of his own and the other individual’s
income:
(2.2)
∂Ei [ui (yi, yj)| (si, sj)]
∂sj
=
∂Ei [yi| (si, sj)]
∂sj
− λi∂Ei [yj| (si, sj)]
∂sj
.
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The second term of the derivative in (2.2) is negative if λi > 0 and (2.1) holds. A
higher signal sj about j’s income has a direct negative effect on i’s expected utility
whenever i has concerns about relative standing: A higher expected income of j
makes i worse off in relative terms. We call this direct effect an “income-comparison
effect.” The first term in (2.2) depends on how i interprets information about j’s
income regarding his own future income. If i expects own future income yi and
the other individual’s future income yj to be positively correlated then the first
term of the derivative in (2.2) may be positive, that is,
(2.3)
∂Ei [yi| (si, sj)]
∂sj
> 0.
In this case, there is an “information effect” on own expected income that counter-
vails the direct negative effect on Ei (ui) from observing a higher signal sj. Positive
signals about the income of others can increase i’s expected utility if these signals
convey positive information about the own income. If (2.3) holds, the total effect
in (2.2) can be positive or negative, depending on whether the “information ef-
fect” or the “income-comparison effect” dominates. The experimental treatments
described next isolate the two effects and test them separately.
2.2.2 Experimental treatments
The experiment consists of three treatments, which are implemented in a between-
subjects design. In each of the treatments, participant i is assigned a “portfolio” Pi
whose value follows a stochastic process. Participant i observes the value yi (t) ∈ R
of portfolio Pi at points in time t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T . The value yi (0) is identical for all
portfolios/participants; the final value yi (T ) is ex ante uncertain and determines
i’s income in the experiment. Hence, the values yi (t) at t < T represent signals
about i’s income.
Portfolios are generated by a random walk with drift, with yi (0) = 300 and
(2.4) yi (t) = yi (t− 1) + αi + βεi (t) .
The final period is T = 100 and the drift parameter αi is randomly drawn (with
equal probabilities) from the set {−1.5, 0, 1.5} in order to obtain different types
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of portfolios (low-value, medium-value, and high-value portfolios).8 The subjects
observe the dynamic process of the portfolio on the screen in a diagram (with the
time dimension on the horizontal axis and the portfolio value on the vertical axis;
for a screenshot see Figure 2.5 in the appendix).
The participants are not informed about the exact stochastic process that gov-
erns the portfolios. Instead, the experimental instructions contain a graph which
shows a large number of portfolios generated by the stochastic process in (2.4)
(compare Appendix 2.C). This ensures that subjects have a comparable prior
about the income-generating process and about the probability distribution of
final incomes, and it reduces the within-treatment variation, without imposing too
much structure or exploiting differences in computational skills.
The participants’ task is to repeatedly answer questions on their beliefs about
the final portfolio value yi (T ) and on their satisfaction with the assigned port-
folio.9 The first main task is to give an estimate of the final value yi (T ) of the
income-generating process; this task is incentivized. The second main question
asks directly for an individual’s satisfaction with the assigned portfolio, on a scale
from 0 (highly unsatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied). This question serves as a self-
reported measure of utility.10
As a plausibility check for the self-reported satisfaction we also include a control
question in which subjects have the choice to receive as their earnings the final
value of an alternative portfolio to be randomly generated by the same process.
Subjects should be more likely to choose this option if they are less satisfied with
their current portfolio; we can test whether their choice is correlated with the
self-reported satisfaction.11
8The shocks εi (t) are independent draws from a standard normal distribution, and the pa-
rameter β is a constant to scale the shock εi (t) (we set β = 10).
9For the exact description of the task see the experimental instructions in Appendix 2.C.
10Although this might be a bit imprecise we use the terms satisfaction, subjective well-being
and utility interchangeably. For our experiment we rely on the general conclusion in the literature
that self-reported satisfaction or subjective well-being is a meaningful measure (for a recent
survey see Weimann et al. 2015). For a discussion on action-revealed preferences and satisfaction
judgments see Frey and Stutzer (2002).
11We include this control question in two variants: In about one half of the sessions of each
treatment, if the option to have the individual earnings determined by another randomly gener-
ated portfolio is chosen, the subject is assigned and shown the new portfolio at the end of the
experiment. In the other half of the sessions, subjects are only asked “hypothetically” whether
they would prefer to be assigned another portfolio. In both cases, subjects answer all questions
on beliefs and satisfaction with respect to the originally assigned portfolio Pi (even if they prefer
the value of another portfolio as their final earnings). We use these two variants to control for
possible interference of the control question (the possibility to receive the final value of another
portfolio) with the self-reported measure of satisfaction. Note already that these two different
types of sessions are very similar in terms of results obtained.
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Treatment BASE In the baseline treatment, each subject observes only
the value yi (t) of the own portfolio Pi at points in time t = 0, 1, ..., T . The Base
treatment will be used to establish a benchmark for the individuals’ beliefs about
the own final portfolio value (i.e., income) in the absence of information about
other individuals’ income.
Treatment P2-INFO In the P2-Info treatment, subject i observes the
value yi (t) of the own portfolio Pi and, in addition, the value yj (t) of a second
portfolio Pj at points in time t = 0, 1, ..., T . This second portfolio has no payoff
relevance for any other individual; it is common knowledge that it is not assigned
to any other participant of the experiment. Using the Base treatment as a coun-
terfactual, this intermediate treatment P2-Info isolates the effect of additional
information (yj (t)) on an individual’s beliefs about the own income (“informa-
tion effect”), in a situation in which this information is not directly informative
about the income of another participant of the experiment.
Treatment P2-INCOME The P2-Income treatment differs from the P2-
Info treatment only in that the second portfolio Pj is assigned to another par-
ticipant of the experiment (which is common knowledge). More precisely, two
participants i and j of the experiment are randomly matched and both observe
the values yi (t) and yj (t) at points in time t = 0, 1, ..., T (but not the other partic-
ipant’s choices). Using treatment P2-Info as a counterfactual, the P2-Income
treatment isolates the effect of observing the income prospects of others on own
satisfaction (“income-comparison effect”). Since we use the same sets of portfolios
across treatments (for more details see below), the comparison of P2-Income to
P2-Info controls for any informational effect that observing portfolio j may have
on i’s beliefs about the own income (and, hence, on satisfaction with the own
portfolio). In other words, we separate the “income-comparison effect” from the
“information effect” derived in Section 2.2.1.12
12By making others’ income prospects more salient the “income-comparison effect” is also
based on additional information. We refer to “information effect” in the context of effects on
beliefs about the own income; the “income-comparison effect” relates to the channel which works
through specific information about another participant’s expected income and, hence, potential
income inequality.
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2.2.3 Experimental procedures
Each of the three treatments Base, P2-Info, and P2-Income consists of ten
structurally identical but independent rounds indexed by r ∈ {1, ..., 10}. Hence,
participant i observes a sequence of ten own portfolios; in the treatments P2-
Info and P2-Income i observes also ten additional portfolios in total. In the
P2-Income treatment, the participants are randomly matched in groups of two
in each of the ten rounds.13
To allow for perfect counterfactuals we assign the portfolios such that a subset
of players across all treatments observes an identical sequence of portfolios (own
portfolios and potentially co-players’ portfolios) in rounds r = 1, ..., 10.14 There-
fore, the treatment comparisons control for portfolio history effects, that is, for
information about portfolio values in previous rounds and in a given round (up to
t).
In each round r, participant i answers the questions on satisfaction and beliefs
about yi,r (T ) at points in time t ∈ {T/5, 2T/5, 3T/5, 4T/5} where at later points
t individuals have observed more signals and uncertainty about yi,r (T ) is reduced.
At each point in time t, the subjects can give their answers on beliefs and satis-
faction independently of their previous answers. At the end of the experiment the
computer randomly selects one round rˆ out of the ten rounds; then the computer
randomly selects one point in time tˆ of this round at which the questions have been
answered. The participants’ choices at this selected point in time tˆ determine their
earnings in the experiment as follows: First, subjects receive a payment for their
estimate y˜i,rˆ(tˆ) of their final portfolio value in round rˆ; this payment increases in
the precision of the estimate.15 Second, each subject receives the final value yi,rˆ (T )
(in experimental currency) of the portfolio assigned in the selected round.16 The
13The participants do not interact or observe other participants’ decisions. We implement
random re-matching to assure that income comparison refers to the current round and to avoid
that subjects take into account information about the assigned co-player’s earnings in previous
rounds.
14We randomly selected 20 portfolios to be used in all treatments (see Appendix 2.B.4), which
are assigned such that subsamples of participants in each treatment observe the exact same ten
“own” portfolios over the ten rounds. Moreover, in P2-Info and P2-Income all participants of a
subsample observe the exact same ten additional portfolios. We generated six random sequences
in which these portfolios are shown to the subjects; subjects are then randomly assigned to one of
these sequences. When selecting the 20 portfolios we made sure that each possible combination
of the drift parameters (αi, αj) occurs at least once (recall that αk ∈ {−1.5, 0, 1.5}) to ensure
some variation in terms of the observed portfolio pairs; otherwise, the portfolio selection was
completely random.
15The payoff (in experimental currency) for an estimate y˜i,rˆ(tˆ) is max{250 −
0.1
(
yi,rˆ (T )− y˜i,rˆ(tˆ)
)2
, 25}.
16In sessions with the control question offering the choice to receive as a payment the final
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payment received in experimental currency units (ECU) is converted to Euros at
a rate of 25 ECU = 1 Euro. Third, subjects receive a lump-sum payment of 2
Euros for reporting their satisfaction and a show-up fee of 4 Euros.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experiment software
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and run at the University of Munich. Each treatment
consisted of four sessions with 24 subjects each; the participants were students from
all different fields of study and were recruited using the software ORSEE (Greiner
2004); for an overview of the treatments and summary statistics see Tables 2.4
and 2.5 in the appendix. After having completed the main experiment, subjects
answered a set of post-experimental questions on individual characteristics and
attitudes. At this point, we conducted a set of incentivized post-experimental
tasks, including a question on risk aversion (Dohmen et al. 2011) and tasks to
measure distributional preferences (Balafoutas et al. 2012), loss aversion (Fehr and
Goette 2007) and ambiguity aversion. One of the incentivized post-experimental
tasks was randomly selected for payment on top of the earnings from the main
experiment. On average subjects earned 29 Euros in total and a session lasted for
approximately 90 minutes.
2.2.4 Predictions
Individuals form beliefs about their final portfolio value based on information
received during the experiment; these beliefs affect an individual’s expected utility
(satisfaction). Using pairwise treatment comparisons we analyze how information
about others affects individual beliefs and what this may imply when individuals
have concerns for relative standing.
The first prediction focuses on the effect of additional information (a second
observed portfolio) on individuals’ beliefs about the own income. Individual port-
folios are drawn independently; thus, if subjects knew the exact income-generating
process, individual beliefs about the own final income should be independent of any
additional information about other portfolios and, hence, not be different in the
treatments Base and P2-Info. In the experiment, even though subjects do not
value of a new randomly generated portfolio, a subject receives either the final value of the
assigned portfolio or the final value of a new portfolio, depending on his choice at the selected
point in time tˆ. Recall that even if a subject opts for a new portfolio at some point in time, he
nevertheless observes the initially assigned portfolio of the current round until T and answers all
questions on this initially assigned portfolio. Just at the end of the experiment a subject will get
to see the alternative portfolio in case he chose an alternative portfolio at the randomly selected
point in time tˆ.
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learn the exact income-generating process, they are shown a “probability distri-
bution” of possible portfolio values (see the graph in the instructions in Appendix
2.C). This approach closely maps a situation in which individuals hold a common
prior about the income-generating process. However, even though it is common
knowledge that the portfolios are independently and randomly assigned, subjects
may still perceive the additional information in P2-Info as informative and adapt
their beliefs according to the additional signals received. If the individuals expect
some common (but unknown) trend in the income-generating processes observed,
this yields the following testable prediction which is in line with Hirschman (1973).
Prediction 2.1 (“Information effect”) (i) In the P2-Info treatment, observ-
ing an additional portfolio Pj with value yj (t) < yi (t) lowers individual i’s beliefs
about yi (T ), compared to the control group in the Base treatment.
(ii) In the P2-Info treatment, observing an additional portfolio Pj with value
yj (t) > yi (t) increases individual i’s beliefs about yi (T ), compared to the control
group in the Base treatment.
By comparing the individuals’ beliefs about the final portfolio value in P2-Info
and in Base we test Prediction 2.1 against the alternative hypothesis that indi-
viduals interpret the additional information on a second portfolio as uninformative
for their own final income. Taking the own current portfolio value as a benchmark
we analyze the cases of yj,r (t) < yi,r (t) and yj,r (t) > yi,r (t) separately to allow for
an asymmetric effect of observing a second portfolio with higher and with lower
value, respectively. Since a subset of individuals across treatments observe the
same portfolios, the comparison of P2-Info to Base controls for the information
received about the own portfolio in the respective round and in previous rounds.
Second, holding constant the information that subjects receive about the own
income, observing signals about another individual’s income prospects may have
a direct effect on own satisfaction whenever individuals care about their relative
income.
Prediction 2.2 (“Income-comparison effect”) (i) In the P2-Income treat-
ment, observing information about individual j’s income lowers individual i’s sat-
isfaction whenever yj (t) > yi (t), compared to the control group in the P2-Info
treatment.
(ii) In the P2-Income treatment, observing information about individual j’s in-
come increases individual i’s satisfaction whenever yj (t) < yi (t), compared to the
control group in the P2-Info treatment.
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Controlling for the “information effect” on beliefs about the own income, aver-
age satisfaction should be lower when individuals observe that another participant
has a relatively high current portfolio value and is, hence, likely to have a higher
income (Prediction 2.2(i)); average satisfaction should be higher when observing
that others are worse off (Prediction 2.2(ii)). If, instead, individuals do not care
about income comparison then average satisfaction in P2-Income and in P2-Info
should be the same (both for yj (t) > yi (t) and for yj (t) < yi (t)) since the infor-
mation received about the own income is identical in both treatments. Again, we
will test whether there is an asymmetric effect on own satisfaction when observing
higher and lower income of others, respectively.
To summarize, a comparison of P2-Info and Base identifies the purely in-
formational value that observing additional signals about the income-generating
process may have for the expectations about the own income (i.e., the term
∂Ei [yi| (si, sj)] /∂sj in (2.2)), in situations in which status concerns do not di-
rectly take effect. A comparison of P2-Income and P2-Info reveals whether sig-
nals about the actual income of others affect an individual’s satisfaction (the term
λi∂Ei [yj| (si, sj)] /∂sj in (2.2)), controlling for the effect on Ei [yi| (si, sj)]. By con-
struction, the direct effect on satisfaction is zero in the P2-Info treatment where
the additional portfolio observed is not payoff-relevant for any other participant.
However, even in the P2-Info treatment individuals may draw conclusions on
the income of others when observing an additional portfolio, for instance, because
they believe that the second portfolio is generally informative regarding the port-
folios that other participants may be assigned to. In this case, satisfaction might
already be affected by additional information in P2-Info; therefore, the com-
parison of P2-Income and P2-Info may underestimate the “income-comparison
effect” of observing to be ahead or behind in terms of expected income relative to
the assigned co-player.
2.3 Results
In a nutshell the empirical results show that when subjects observe bad addi-
tional information (a second portfolio with lower current value), they lower their
expectations about their own income prospects. Observing good additional in-
formation has, however, no statistically measurable effect on beliefs about own
income. Moreover, observing signals that indicate a lower expected income than
others has a negative effect on individual satisfaction, while observing signals that
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indicate a higher expected income than others has no statistically measurable ef-
fect on satisfaction. Combining these effects shows that information-based effects
and direct income-comparison effects may offset each other when the uncertainty
about the income is large; their joint effect on satisfaction is statistically indistin-
guishable from zero in early points in time within a round. But as the uncertainty
is reduced, income-comparison effects dominate the value of information about the
others’ experiences for the own income prospects such that, in total, satisfaction
goes down when observing that others most likely earn more.
Before we derive these results in more detail it is important to note that the
self-reported measures for beliefs and satisfaction are sensitive to changes in the in-
formation observed and react as predicted to the parameters of the experiment. For
instance, stated beliefs and satisfaction levels shift upwards under higher (though
unknown) trends of the income-generating process (compare the histograms in
Figure 2.4 of Appendix 2.A; the resulting cumulative distribution functions can
be ranked in terms of first-order stochastic dominance). Similarly, stated beliefs
and satisfaction are significantly positively correlated (the correlation coefficient
is 0.71). The same is true (i) for stated beliefs and the current or the final (not yet
known) portfolio value (correlation coefficients are 0.88 and 0.70, respectively) and
(ii) for stated satisfaction and the current or the final portfolio value (correlation
coefficients are 0.78 and 0.65, respectively). The correlation of stated beliefs and
the final portfolio value becomes stronger as the points in time t, in which the
portfolio is observed, approach the end point T of a round (the correlation coef-
ficient increases from 0.43 to 0.93): As to be expected, the beliefs become more
accurate when the uncertainty decreases.17 Finally, we can use as a plausibility
check the incentivized control question on the option to receive as income the final
value of a new, randomly drawn portfolio. Here, subjects are more likely to pre-
fer the final value of their current portfolio as their income if (i) their beliefs are
higher (the correlation coefficient of this choice and reported beliefs is 0.63) and
(ii) their reported satisfaction is higher (the correlation coefficient of this choice
17For the subsequent analysis we exclude 4 (out of 288) subjects which either always stated
“implausible” beliefs below 10 (presumably used a wrong scale given the fact that final portfolio
values were between 81 and 585) or always reported the exact same number for their satisfaction.
While for the latter subjects it is conceptually less clear whether or not these subjects should be
excluded, our results are robust to including them. Since we did not want to bias the subjects’
priors by showing them specific portfolios, we could not implement pre-tests before the main
experiment. In general, however, the subjects’ choices together with their answers to the post-
experimental questions indicate that the vast majority of subjects understood the experimental
tasks.
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Figure 2.1: Identification strategy
and satisfaction is 0.62).18
2.3.1 Information effects
First we are interested in the effect of information about another income-generating
process on the beliefs about the own end-of-period portfolio value (Prediction 2.1).
To assess the effect of observing additional signals in the form of an additional
portfolio it is crucial to perfectly control for all the information about the own
portfolio. We compare the beliefs in the P2-Info treatment to the beliefs in the
Base treatment in which reference groups of subjects observe the exact same own
portfolios as in P2-Info but no additional portfolio within a round. Moreover, we
separate the “information effect” for situations in which subjects observe (i) “good
additional information” (the second portfolio has a higher current value, that is,
18More precisely, for satisfaction, the correlation coefficient is 0.60 if the choice to be assigned a
new portfolio at the end of the experiment is binding and is 0.64 if the choice of a new portfolio is
only “hypothetical” and not actually implemented (and thus has no payoff consequence). Recall
that each of these variants of the control question was used in about half of the sessions.
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Figure 2.2: Change in average beliefs (in experimental currency) from Base to
P2-Info.
yj (t) > yi (t)) and (ii) “bad additional information” (the second portfolio has a
lower current value, that is, yj (t) < yi (t)). Figure 2.1 illustrates our identification
strategy of comparing beliefs in P2-Info (middle column) to those in Base (left
column), for a given own portfolio.
We start with a simple comparison of average stated beliefs in treatments Base
and P2-Info; see also Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.A for descriptive statistics. Split-
ting the observations into situations of good and bad additional information,19
Figure 2.2 suggests partial evidence for Prediction 2.1: While bad additional in-
formation lowers average beliefs in P2-Info compared to Base, good additional
information shows no evident effect on average beliefs. In the following we will fur-
ther investigate and confirm this observed asymmetry in the reaction to additional
information.
To test Prediction 2.1 on the effect of additional information we estimate a
crossed-effects linear regression model on the sample of the observations from Base
and P2-Info.20 Using as dependent variable subject i’s beliefs beliefi,r (t) about
19Observations in Base are split accordingly (even though the second portfolio is not observed)
such that the treatment group in P2-Info and the control group in Base observe the exact same
own current portfolio values (income prospects), both under good and under bad additional
information.
20The crossed-effects model allows us to specify random effects on the subject level and addi-
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the own end-of-period portfolio value as reported at point in time t of round r,
our main specification is given by
(2.5) beliefi,r(t) = β0 + β1yi,r(t) + β2P2-INFO + β3Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t)
+ β4Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) × P2-INFO + γXi,r (t) + εi,r(t).
The main variables of interest are the treatment variable P2-INFO (which is
equal to one for observations from the P2-Info treatment and zero otherwise)
and the indicator variable Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) which is equal to one in situations of good
additional information (if the second portfolio j has a higher current value than
subject i’s portfolio) and equal to zero otherwise.21 Moreover, we interact the
dummy P2-INFO with the indicator Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t), and we include the observed
own current portfolio value yi,r(t) as explanatory variable as well as a vector Xi,r (t)
of additional control variables.22 Thus, in equation (2.5), β2 measures the effect
of bad information (the treatment effect if Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) = 0) and β2 + β4 measures
the effect of good information (the treatment effect if Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) = 1). The main
estimation results are summarized in Table 2.1.
In specification 1 of Table 2.1, the estimated coefficient of P2-INFO is −11.74
and significant at the 5%-level (p-value < 0.041). Hence, observing a second
portfolio with a lower value significantly lowers the subjects’ beliefs in the P2-
Info treatment, compared to the reference group (with identical own portfolios)
in Base. Second, the sum of the coefficients of Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) × P2-INFO and P2-
INFO is negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero (p-value > 0.199);
observing a second portfolio with a higher value does not yield a statistically
measurable effect on stated beliefs.23 Finally, the current value of the own portfolio
tional random effects on the portfolio level. The random effects on the subject level account for
time-constant subject-specific effects. Random effects on the portfolio level allow us to reduce
potential portfolio noise in the error term. Note that all results are qualitatively robust to using
a simple random-effects regression model or a pooled OLS model with clustered standard errors
on subject and session level.
21The case of the exact same current portfolio values (yj,r (t) = yi,r (t), t > 0) never occurs in
the data.
22We include fixed effects for the round r of the experiment, for the point in time t within
a round and for the sequence in which subject i observes the assigned 10 portfolios as well
as session fixed effects. Moreover, some specifications further include controls such as gender,
age and a dummy for business-related fields of study as well as individual-specific characteristics
elicited in an extended post-experimental questionnaire (including measures for risk aversion, loss
aversion, ambiguity aversion, distributional preferences and self-reported measures for optimism
and patience).
23Note that the negative coefficient of Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) results from the fact that the comparison
group in the Base treatment has a relatively low own current portfolio value whenever yj,r(t) >
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(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b
belief belief belief belief belief
yi,r(t)
0.848∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.848∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.814∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.900∗∗∗
(0.026)
0.867∗∗∗
(0.024)
P2-INFO
-11.74∗∗
(5.740)
-10.55∗
(5.972)
-8.336
(5.885)
-1.418
(7.041)
-9.426
(7.318)
Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t)
-6.762∗∗∗
(2.114)
-6.764∗∗∗
(2.114)
Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t)×P2-INFO
4.364∗∗
(2.063)
4.364∗∗
(2.063)
∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)
-12.99∗∗∗
(2.928)
-7.45
(5.712)
-19.59∗∗∗
(5.541)
∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INFO
4.021∗∗
(1.947)
-4.954
(5.017)
8.613∗
(4.731)
Constant
82.13∗∗∗
(7.515)
82.76∗∗∗
(7.571)
89.66∗∗∗
(8.015)
51.19∗∗∗
(11.21)
86.02∗∗∗
(10.32)
Individual
controls
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time and session
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7600 7600 7600 3800 3800
aSubsample of good additional information (∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) > 0).
bSubsample of bad additional information (∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) < 0).
Note: Crossed-effects regression model with random effects on subject and portfolio level. Ob-
servations from treatments BASE and P2-INFO. Dependent variable: beliefs. Standard errors in
parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. “Individual controls” include gender, age, whether
the field of study is business related, risk aversion, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, distribu-
tional preferences, optimism and patience. “Time and session fixed effects” include round fixed
effects, point-in-time fixed effects, fixed effects for the sequence in which the selected portfolios
are shown, and session fixed effects.
Table 2.1: Information effects: Regression results.
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(yi,r (t)) has strong explanatory power with a positive coefficient that is close to
one, which also confirms the validity of the measure of beliefs. Even though the
estimated coefficient of P2-INFO and the corresponding significance level decrease
slightly (p-value< 0.077), these findings are confirmed in specification 2 which adds
individual-specific control variables elicited after the main part of the experiment.
As a natural extension beyond the binary case of good or bad additional in-
formation, specifications 3 to 5 include as explanatory variable the difference be-
tween the current value of the second portfolio and the own current portfolio value
(yj,r (t)−yi,r (t)). Hence, positive (negative) values of this difference indicate good
(bad) additional information and higher values indicate better additional signals.
We normalize this difference in order to separate effects of additional information
from time trends within a round (since all portfolios start with the same value, the
range of yj,r (t)− yi,r (t) is usually increasing in t; at the same time, uncertainty is
reduced) and define the normalized difference by ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t).
24 Now, the treat-
ment effect of observing an additional portfolio is captured by the coefficients of
P2-INFO and the interaction term ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) × P2-INFO. In specification
3, the estimated coefficient of P2-INFO is −8.336 and indicates that beliefs are,
for average portfolios, slightly lower in P2-Info than in Base. Moreover, higher
values of the second portfolio compared to the own current portfolio value have a
significantly positive effect on beliefs in P2-Info, again compared to the reference
group in Base (the estimated coefficient of the interaction term ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-
INFO is positive and significant at the 5%-level).25 Separating the sample into
subsamples of good additional information (where ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) is positive) and bad
additional information (where ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) is negative) shows that the observed
effect of additional information (in specification 3) is driven by bad information
and is, again, asymmetric: There is no statistically measurable treatment effect in
case of good additional information (specification 4) but a significant treatment
yi,r(t). In other words, situations in which good additional information is observed are, at
the same time, situations in which the own portfolio value and hence beliefs are relatively low
(compare also rows 1 and 2 in Figure 2.1). The significantly positive coefficient of the interaction
term Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) × P2-INFO confirms a treatment difference of Base and P2-Info with
respect to comparisons of situations where the second portfolio would be relatively low and high,
respectively.
24More precisely, we divide yj,r (t) − yi,r (t) by the maximum value of |yj,r (t) − yi,r (t) | over
all portfolio combinations (i, j) at point in time t; thus, ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) takes values between −1
and 1 at each point in time t. Alternatively, the normalization could use the median or mean of
the absolute distance over all portfolios, which yields qualitatively very similar results.
25An F -test shows that coefficients of P2-INFO and ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) × P2-INFO are jointly
significant at the 5% level (p-value is 0.04).
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effect in case of bad additional information (specification 5).26
While specifications 3 to 5 assume a linear effect of the difference ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t),
we can alternatively extend the interaction model of specifications 1 and 2 of Table
2.1 to disaggregate the effect of observing a second portfolio on beliefs. If we use
dummy variables to separate cases of “very good,” “rather good,” “rather bad,”
and “very bad” information based on quartiles of the difference yj,r(t) − yi,r(t),
we find that lower additional signals lead to lower beliefs (see Tables 2.8 and 2.9
in Appendix 2.B for the estimation results). This effect appears to be monotonic
going from very good to very bad additional information and is strongest when
observing very bad additional information.
Result 2.1 Additional signals of uncertain informativeness affect the beliefs about
the own income prospects. Bad additional information (signals yj (t) < yi (t)) leads
to a downward adjustment of beliefs while good additional information (signals
yj (t) > yi (t)) has no statistically significant effect on beliefs.
Generally we find that subjects react to additional information even when they
“know” the probability distribution of their own income and when the informa-
tiveness of additional information is uncertain. This uncertain informativeness of
additional information is an important feature of our experiment, as we do not
“frame” subjects into one or the other direction by inducing them to believe in
some particular correlation structure. Nevertheless, we find an effect of additional
information but only in specific situations: Subjects lower their beliefs about their
own income prospects after observing additional portfolios with relatively low val-
ues. But when observing additional portfolios with relatively high values subjects
do not adjust their beliefs in a statistically measurable way. In light of the detailed
information provided on the distribution of possible portfolios (compare the graph
in the experimental instructions in Appendix 2.C) and the uncertain informative-
ness of the additional signals the results appear to be even stronger. Responses are
likely to be more pronounced when subjects know the correlations between future
incomes with certainty.
2.3.2 Income-comparison effects
In this section we analyze how satisfaction is affected when subjects observe sig-
nals about another subject’s income prospects (Prediction 2.2). By comparing the
26This holds for both treatment variables of interest as well as their joint effect; the p-value of an
F test on the joint significance of the estimated coefficients of P2-INFO and ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-
INFO is 0.53 in specification 4 and 0.03 in specification 5.
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Figure 2.3: Change in satisfaction from treatment P2-Info to P2-Income.
P2-Income treatment to the P2-Info treatment, we can perfectly control for all
signals that could be directly informative for the own income.27 Figure 2.1 illus-
trates our identification strategy using the treatments P2-Info (middle column)
and P2-Income (right column), which now distinguishes between situations in
which subjects are behind in terms of relative income (yj,r (t) > yi,r (t)) and situ-
ations in which subjects are ahead in terms of relative income (yj,r (t) < yi,r (t)),
that is, between unfavorable and favorable income comparisons.
For a first overview of the data, consider the change in simple means of re-
ported satisfaction when comparing the P2-Income treatment to the reference
observations in the P2-Info treatment.28 As Figure 2.3 indicates, we find partial
evidence for Prediction 2.2: When subjects are behind in the sense that they have
a lower current portfolio value (yj,r (t) > yi,r (t)), their satisfaction is lower than
in the comparison group of P2-Info, while being ahead (yj,r (t) < yi,r (t)) has no
evident effect on average satisfaction.
To further investigate this result we estimate a crossed-effects linear regres-
sion model similar to Section 2.3.1, on the sample of the observations from the
27Recall that the only difference of the two treatments is that the second portfolio observed
in P2-Income is directly payoff-relevant for another subject and should therefore have an effect
on satisfaction, while it should have no effect (or a weaker effect) in P2-Info where it is not
payoff-relevant for any other subject.
28See also Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.A for descriptive statistics.
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treatments P2-Info and P2-Income:29,30
(2.6) satisfactioni,r(t) = βo + β1beliefi,r(t) + β2yi,r(t) + β3P2-INCOME
+ β4Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) + β5Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) × P2-INCOME + βXi,r + εi,r(t)
The dependent variable satisfactioni,r(t) represents subject i’s reported satis-
faction at point in time t of round r. Our main variables of interest are the
treatment dummy P2-INCOME (which indicates observations stemming from
the P2-Income treatment) and the interaction of P2-INCOME with the indica-
tor variable Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t), which now indicates that subject i is behind in terms of
current portfolio value (yj,r(t) > yi,r(t)). Just as in estimation equation (2.5) for
the information effect, additional explanatory variables are the current own port-
folio value yi,r(t) and the set Xi,r(t) of controls (time and session fixed effects and
individual-specific controls). Moreover, we include the reported beliefs beliefi,r (t)
as explanatory variable. In equation (2.6), the coefficient β3 reflects the treatment
effect of being ahead (when Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) = 0) compared to the reference group in
P2-Info, and the sum β3 +β5 corresponds to the treatment effect of being behind
(when Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) = 1), again compared to the reference group in P2-Info.
In specification 1 of Table 2.2, the estimated coefficient of P2-INCOME is
−0.179 and insignificant (p-value > 0.48); hence, we conclude that being ahead
has no statistically measurable effect on satisfaction. The treatment effect of being
behind measured by the sum of the coefficients of P2-INCOME and its interaction
term with Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) has the expected negative sign (−0.415) and is borderline
significant (p-value < 0.105). When adding individual-specific controls from the
post-experimental questionnaire as in specification 2, the treatment effect of being
behind becomes slightly stronger (−0.447) and significant at the 10% level (p-value
< 0.074); the treatment effect of being ahead remains insignificant.31 Moreover,
29Note that we pool the observations from the sessions with the two different versions of the
incentivized control question for the measure of satisfaction (the choice to receive as income the
final value of another portfolio; compare Section 2.2.2), as the results obtained are very similar.
See Table 2.7 in the appendix for estimations that separate these two types of sessions.
30The reasoning for using a crossed effects model is identical to the previous subsection. All
results of this section are qualitatively robust to using a simple random-effects regression model,
a random-effects Tobit model or a pooled OLS model with two-dimensional clustered standard
errors on subjects and session level. As satisfaction is an ordinal concept we also apply a random-
effects ordered probit model. In line with the findings of Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004)
we find that the results are qualitatively robust.
31The significantly negative coefficient of Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) reflects the fact that, within P2-Info, a
subject’s own portfolio is comparably low in situations of yj,r(t) > yi,r(t); hence, also satisfaction
is low. Since the interaction term of P2-Income with Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) is significantly negative, this
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(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b
satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction
yi,r(t)
0.017∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.017∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.014∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.021∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.023∗∗∗
(0.001)
belief i,r(t)
0.004∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.004∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.004∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.003∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
P2-INCOME
-0.179
(0.256)
-0.207
(0.247)
-0.321
(0.245)
-0.277
(0.282)
-0.221
(0.261)
Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t)
-0.863∗∗∗
(0.066)
-0.862∗∗∗
(0.066)
Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t)
×P2-INCOME
-0.236∗∗∗
(0.065)
-0.236∗∗∗
(0.065)
∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)
-1.338∗∗∗
(0.094)
-0.846∗∗∗
(0.169)
-0.462∗∗
(0.19)
∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)
×P2-INCOME
-0.244∗∗∗
(0.062)
-0.338∗∗
(0.143)
-0.054
(0.153)
Constant
-0.825∗∗∗
(0.289)
-0.808∗∗∗
(0.281)
-0.305
(0.307)
-2.784∗∗∗
(0.467)
-2.869∗∗∗
(0.409)
Individual
controls
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time and session
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7600 7600 7600 3800 3800
aSubsample of being behind (∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) > 0).
bSubsample of being ahead (∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) < 0).
Note: Crossed-effects regression model with random effects on subject and portfolio level. Obser-
vations from treatments P2-INFO and P2-INCOME. Dependent variable: satisfaction. Standard
errors in parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. “Individual controls” include gender, age,
whether the field of study is business related, risk aversion, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion,
distributional preferences, optimism and patience. “Time and session fixed effects” include round
fixed effects, point-in-time fixed effects, fixed effects for the sequence in which the selected port-
folios are shown, and session fixed effects.
Table 2.2: Income-comparison effects: Regression results.
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the current value of the own portfolio (yi,r(t)) and the beliefs about the own end-of-
period portfolio value (beliefi,r (t)) have strong explanatory power throughout all
specifications with positive coefficients that are significant at the 1% level. Hence,
even after controlling for the current portfolio value differences in beliefs about the
final income translate into differences in satisfaction levels.
In line with Section 2.3.1 above we can extend the binary case of being ahead
or behind and directly investigate the treatment effect of the difference between
the two observed portfolio values (the variable ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)).
32 In specification 3,
the estimated coefficient of the indicator variable P2-INCOME is −0.321; hence,
for average portfolios the stated satisfaction is slightly lower in P2-Income than
in P2-Info. More importantly, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term
∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) × P2-INCOME is −0.244 and significant at the 1% level: An in-
creasing difference between the current portfolio values of subjects j and i leads to
significantly lower satisfaction levels of subject i, compared to the reference group
in P2-Info where the exact same portfolios are observed but the second portfolio
is not assigned to another subject.33 Specifications 4 and 5 confirm that the effect
of changes in the difference of portfolio values is mainly driven by situations where
subjects are behind: In the subsample of observations where subjects face unfavor-
able inequality (∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) > 0; specification 4) we observe a strong treatment
effect; we observe, however, no statistically significant treatment effect in the sub-
sample of observations where subjects face favorable inequality (∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) < 0;
specification 5).34
As in Section 2.3.1 we can also extend the interaction model in specifications
1 and 2 of Table 2.2 to disaggregate the income-comparison effect into cases of
being “far behind,” “behind,” “ahead,” and “far ahead” (see Tables 2.10 and 2.11
in Appendix 2.B for the estimation results). The treatment effect of P2-Income
appears to be monotonic, and is strongest when subjects are “far behind,” which,
given the remaining uncertainty about the final income, makes it most likely that
effect becomes significantly more pronounced within the P2-Income treatment, in line with the
result of the negative treatment effect of being behind.
32We again normalize the difference yj,r(t) − yi,r(t) using the maximum observed difference
at a given point in time (see Section 2.3.1) in order to separate the effect of a higher difference
in portfolio values from time-related effects of an increasing difference yj,r(t) − yi,r(t) within a
round. Note again that normalizing the difference by the mean or the median yields very similar
results.
33An F -test shows that the coefficients of P2-INCOME and ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) × P2-INCOME
are jointly significant at the 1% level (p-value is 0.000).
34In specifications 4 and 5, the F -tests on joint significance of P2-INCOME and
∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) × P2-INCOME yield p-values of 0.018 and 0.692, respectively.
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the final income will be lower.
Result 2.2 Observing signals about the income prospects of others affects indi-
vidual satisfaction. Being behind (signals yj (t) > yi (t)) has a negative effect on
satisfaction while being ahead (signals yj (t) < yi (t)) has no statistically significant
effect on satisfaction.
Since subjects in the control group of P2-Info observe the exact same port-
folios, the treatment effect of observing another subject’s portfolio value yj (t)
controls for the own portfolio history as well as for any information on the own
portfolio value which subjects derive from observing a second portfolio. However,
already in P2-Info subjects may interpret the second observed portfolio as a signal
of, for instance, the likely income of the remaining participants of the experiment.
Thus, the estimated treatment effect based on the difference between P2-Info
and P2-Income may be seen as a lower bound for the direct income-comparison
effect.35
It is interesting to note that we find asymmetric results for additional infor-
mation on beliefs (Result 2.1) and for relative-income considerations (Result 2.2).
These asymmetries, however, appear exactly in the opposite way. Beliefs are most
strongly affected when subjects observe a lower additional portfolio (that is, re-
ceive bad additional information), while satisfaction is most strongly affected when
subjects observe a higher additional portfolio of another subject (that is, are be-
hind). One possible interpretation could be that in either case subjects respond to
the “bad prospect” rather than to the “good prospect.” Put differently, while bad
signals about the expected personal income and bad signals about the expected
relative standing trigger significant reactions, good signals do not or less so.
2.3.3 Combining informational and income-comparison ef-
fects
Our experimental design does not only separate purely informational effects and
income-comparison effects when observing signals about the income of others; it
also allows to look at the interplay of the two potentially countervailing effects:
35Note that we can check this possibility by comparing reported satisfaction in the P2-Info
treatment to satisfaction in the Base treatment. Running the specifications of Table 2.2 on
observations from treatments BASE and P2-Info yields, however, no significant difference in
satisfaction levels, independent of whether the second portfolio observed has a higher or lower
current portfolio value. Details are available on request.
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Taking both effects together, do good signals about others’ experiences lead to
higher or lower satisfaction levels in situations where the own income is uncertain?
Does the total effect depend on the degree of uncertainty and is, hence, different
in early points in time as compared to late points in time where in the latter there
is less uncertainty and income differences have become stable?
To investigate the total effect of observing signals about the income of others
we can directly compare satisfaction levels in the P2-Income treatment and in
the Base treatment, combining both informational effects and income-comparison
effects.36 For this purpose we use the same estimation strategy as in the previous
section (see, for instance, specification 3 of Table 2.2).37 We separate possible
effects in early points in time within a round from effects in later points in time
to allow for changes in the combined effect over time when the uncertainty about
income naturally decreases. The first two columns of Table 2.3 present the main re-
sults for the combined treatment effects on satisfaction levels based on the sample
of observations from Base and P2-Income; specification 1 only includes obser-
vations from the first two points in time t within a round for which satisfaction
levels were elicited (situations of high uncertainty), while specification 2 is based
on observations from the last two points in time t within a round where the un-
certainty about the own and the relative income is reduced. (Recall that there
are four such points in time in total within a round.) The main variables of inter-
est are the treatment dummy P2-INCOME and its interaction with the variable
∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t), which again denotes the (normalized) difference between subject j’s
and subject i’s current portfolio value and takes values between −1 and 1. The
coefficient of this interaction term reveals whether subjects in the treatment group
P2-Income react differently to changes in the difference yj,r(t)−yi,r(t), compared
to the control group in Base (where subjects do not observe the second portfolio
but have been assigned the exact same own portfolios).
36The point becomes clear when considering Figure 2.1 once again. We simply move directly
from the very left to the very right column of Figure 2.1 and thereby combine effects that
additional signals may have on the expecations about the own income and about the relative
income in one step.
37We do not include beliefs as explanatory variable since we are explicitly interested in the
total effect which combines both purely informational effects and income-comparison effects.
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Total effect Income-comparison effect Information effect
Base vs. P2-Income P2-Info vs. P2-Income Base vs. P2-Info
Early t Late t Early t Late t Early t Late t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction belief belief
yi,r(t)
0.016∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.023∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.016∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.022∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.815∗∗∗
(0.045)
0.906∗∗∗
(0.018)
P2-INCOME
-0.077
(0.277)
-0.170
(0.253)
-0.171
(0.263)
-0.374
(0.235)
∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)
-1.183∗∗∗
(0.193)
-0.496∗∗∗
(0.160)
-1.177∗∗∗
(0.194)
-0.811∗∗∗
(0.165)
-20.65∗∗∗
(7.067)
-1.584
(3.345)
∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INCOME
-0.149
(0.097)
-0.402∗∗∗
(0.073)
-0.298∗∗∗
(0.100)
-0.250∗∗∗
(0.074)
P2-INFO
-11.27
(7.695)
-5.30
(4.789)
∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INFO
6.109
(3.932)
2.989
(1.947)
Constant
-0.072
(0.476)
-1.940∗∗∗
(0.389)
-0.103
(0.476)
-1.673∗∗∗
(0.409)
92.42∗∗∗
(15.89)
51.77∗∗∗
(7.285)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time and session fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3760 3760 3800 3800 3800 3800
Note: Crossed-effects regression model with random effects on subject and portfolio level. Dependent variables: satisfaction in specifications 1 to 4 and
beliefs in specifications 5 and 6. Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. “Individual controls” include gender, age, whether
the field of study is business related, risk aversion, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, distributional preferences, optimism and patience. “Time and
session fixed effects” include round fixed effects, point-in-time fixed effects, fixed effects for the sequence in which the selected portfolios are shown,
and session fixed effects.
Table 2.3: Total effect: Regression results.
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In specification 1 of Table 2.3, neither of the estimated coefficients of the two
treatment variables is significantly different from zero.38 Hence, in early points
in time, satisfaction is not affected by the information about another subject’s
income. This changes, however, in later points in time: In specification 2, the
estimated coefficient of the interaction term ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INCOME becomes
larger in magnitude and significant at the 1% level.39 To summarize, initially
subjects do not become unhappier if they observe that another subject has been
assigned a portfolio that outperforms their own portfolio; over time, however, this
changes and satisfaction strongly reacts to differences in income prospects. Note
that the latter effect is, again, mostly driven by situations in which subjects are
behind in terms of relative income.
Two apparent and mutually non-exclusive interpretations for this finding, which
is in line with Hirschman’s prediction, are the following. First, in early points in
time, potential inequality is rather unstable since the final income is still uncer-
tain; even if the other subject’s current portfolio value is higher, there is still some
probability that this can be reversed. In later points in time, however, persisting
differences in current portfolio values translate, with high likelihood, into inequal-
ity of final incomes. Second, the uncertainty about the own income in early points
in time makes purely informational effects of observing another portfolio more
important; as discussed in Section 2.2.1, however, such information effects can
countervail the income-comparison effects. When the own final income becomes
much less uncertain (as in late points in time), we would also expect those informa-
tion effects to be much weaker and dominated by the income-comparison effects.
To address the first interpretation, specifications 3 and 4 of Table 2.3 analyze
how the isolated income-comparison effect (the treatment effect of P2-Income
compared to P2-Info) changes over time. In contrast to the combined effect in
specifications 1 and 2, the income-comparison effect turns out to be significant
already in early points in time and is quite stable over time.40 Even in situations
with high uncertainty, satisfaction significantly reacts to increased inequality, given
that we control for the informational effects on own expected income using P2-
38An F -test shows that the coefficients of P2-INCOME and ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) × P2-INCOME
are jointly insignificant (p-value 0.299).
39An F -test shows that the coefficients of P2-INCOME and ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) × P2-INCOME
are jointly significant at the 1% level (p-value is 0.000). Note that qualitatively very similar
results on the dynamics are obtained when running estimations separately for each point in
time.
40For both specifications 3 and 4, the coefficients of P2-INCOME and ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) × P2-
INCOME are jointly significant at the 1% level.
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Info as control group. Looking at the dynamics of the information effects as in
specifications 5 and 6 yields, however, some support for Hirschman’s idea: The
isolated information effect (the treatment effect of P2-Info on beliefs about the
own income, compared to Base) is stronger in early points in time and fades
out in late points in time.41 In particular in early points in time, beliefs tend to
be higher when the difference yj,r(t) − yi,r(t) goes up (compare the coefficient of
∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INFO); higher beliefs, however, increase a subject’s satisfaction
(compare Table 2.2). Thus, the fact that the combined effect is indistinguishable
from zero in early points in time may be interpreted as the information effect off-
setting the income-comparison effect if and only if there is substantial uncertainty
about the income prospects.42
Result 2.3 The combined (information and income-comparison) effect is statis-
tically indistinguishable from zero at early points in time where the two effects of
observing additional information may offset each other. At late points in time, the
relative-income effect dominates such that satisfaction decreases when observing to
be behind in expected income (yj (t) > yi (t)).
2.3.4 Information effect under increased uncertainty
Our main analysis on the effects of observing additional signals about the income
distribution so far focuses on a scenario in which, at the beginning of the exper-
iment, the individuals receive rather detailed information on the distribution of
final portfolio values. An advantage of this setup is that the subjects start with a
common prior and that learning dynamics become less important. This allows us
to separate effects of additional information on the beliefs about the distribution
of incomes and on the beliefs about the own income. At the same time, however,
the value of additional information is weakened when detailed information about
41The coefficients of P2-INFO and ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) × P2-INFO are jointly marginally signif-
icant in specification 5 (p-value 0.103) and insignificant in specification 6 (p-value 0.166). Note
also that the effect of information in early points time (specification 5 of Table 2.3) is more
sizable than the effect for the complete sample (specification 3 of Table 2.1) but less precisely
estimated due to the smaller sample size.
42These findings on the dynamics are confirmed when using the indicator variable Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t)
for being ahead or behind (and good or bad information, respectively) to identify treatment
effects, just as in specification 2 of Tables 2.1 and 2.2. As the only difference in terms of results
obtained, the income-comparison effect (the treatment effect of P2-Income on satisfaction, as
compared to P2-Info) becomes stronger in later points in time. The latter may be caused by
the fact that the indicator variable Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) treats small and large inequalities in the same
way, but observed income inequalities are larger at later points in time.
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the income distribution is available at the beginning of the experiment. In ad-
dition, the “information effect” may generally be different in situations in which
individuals face a considerably higher degree of uncertainty.
In further control sessions, we vary the information that subjects receive about
the income distribution. More precisely, while the experimental instructions of
main treatments display a “cloud” of possible portfolio developments (compare
the graph in Appendix 2.C) from which the subjects can conclude on the income
distribution, we do not provide this information in the control sessions. Hence,
for subjects in the control sessions the experimental instructions contain no infor-
mation at all about the income-generating process or the probability distribution
of final portfolio values. Apart from this change in the information about the in-
come distribution provided to the subjects, the resulting treatments called Base-C
and P2-Info-C (“control”) follow the exact same rules as the original Base and
P2-Info treatments and are based on the same set of portfolios.43 Therefore,
“information effects” can be identified just as in the main analysis.
Before turning to the treatment comparisons of Base-C and P2-Info-C within
the control sessions under increased uncertainty we briefly compare the subjects’
stated beliefs in the control sessions to the data of the original sessions analyzed
in the previous sections. For the very early observations (that is, the first points
in time where beliefs are elicited) stated beliefs are less accurate in the control
sessions than in the original sessions. This holds, however, only for the very early
observations in the first round and is stronger in the Base treatment (where
subjects observe their own portfolio only) than in the P2-Info treatment (where
subjects also observe a second portfolio).44 Already from the end of the first round
on and in all future rounds, the stated beliefs in Base (P2-Info) are very similar
in the original and in the control sessions. Overall, the data suggests that at the
beginning of the control sessions subjects underestimate the variance of the final
income distribution but rather expect their income to take some average value.45
43For the experimental instructions in the control sessions we use the exact same instructions
as in the original treatments, except that we remove the last paragraph including the figure that
shows the “cloud” of possible portfolios (compare Appendix 2.C). We run 3 sessions for the Base-
C treatment and 4 sessions for the P2-Info-C treatment (168 subjects with 40 observations per
subject in total).
44More precisely, for the first point in time where beliefs are elicited (where the uncertainty in
the control sessions is likely to be most important), the correlation of the stated beliefs with the
final portfolio value is only 0.26 in Base-C (compared to 0.44 in the original Base treatment).
While this difference might already seem small, it becomes even smaller when comparing P2-
Info-C to P2-Info (0.34 compared to 0.50), and it fades out the more observations from later
rounds are included.
45In fact, in all sessions we observe that subjects on average underestimate the value of portfo-
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The subjects’ beliefs seem, however, to adjust very quickly towards the stated
beliefs in the original sessions.
Taking this finding on learning dynamics into account we can estimate the “in-
formation effect” in the control sessions based on the same identification strategy
as in Section 2.3.1. The estimation results are summarized in Table 2.6 in Appendix
2.A and are based on samples of observations from the treatments Base-C and
P2-Info-C, contrasting the information effect in early rounds and early points in
time t within a round to the effect in later rounds where the subjects have already
received a number of signals about the income distribution.46 When including only
observations from the early rounds, the effects of additional information (the coef-
ficients of P2-INFO and of the interaction term ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INFO jointly)
are very imprecisely measured and not significantly different from zero. In later
rounds, however, the signs of the estimated coefficients change and the observed
effects approach the results from the original sessions reported in Section 2.3.1: Fo-
cusing on the effect of bad additional information and taking into account that the
normalized difference ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) reaches a value −1 for the “worst” information
observed we find a highly insignificant effect between −3.45 and 12.15 in rounds 1
and 2 (see specification 1 of Table 2.6) that shifts, still insignificant, to an effect in
the range between −4.05 and −0.98 in rounds 1 to 5 (see specification 2 of Table
2.6). For rounds 6 to 10, the estimated effect of bad additional information is
between −14.53 to −10.25 (see specification 2 of Table 2.6; the coefficients of P2-
INFO and the interaction term ∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INFO are jointly significant at
the 10% level). In the latter case, the estimated effects in the control sessions are
very similar to the results obtained for situations in which subjects are endowed
with a rather exact common prior about the income distribution (compare, for
instance, specification 3 of Table 2.1 and specification 5 of Table 2.3).47 Again,
the information effect is driven by bad additional information and is insignificant
lios with a positive trend and overestimate the value of portfolios with a negative trend; this effect
is, however, strongest in early observations of the control sessions with increased uncertainty.
46Note that we again exclude one subject (out of 168) whose beliefs are “implausible” in the
sense that the responses were always below 10 points. Note also that due to unintentional
heterogeneity in the composition of the sessions the set of observations of the control sessions
is not perfectly balanced in the sense that the number of subjects who observe the exact same
portfolio is not exactly the same in Base-C and in P2-Info-C. In the estimations we control
for this issue with portfolio-specific random effects; moreover, estimations on subsamples which
are perfectly balanced confirm the findings on the information effect discussed below.
47Using the entire sample of the additional control treatments (see in specification 4 of Table
2.6), however, we do not measure a statistically significant effect of additional (good or bad)
information, which is not surprising given the learning dynamics presented in specifications 1 to
3.
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in case of good additional information.48
Result 2.4 Under higher uncertainty about the income distribution we do not
measure a significant effect of observing additional information in early rounds. In
later rounds, subjects’ beliefs are significantly lower when observing bad additional
information (yj (t) < yi (t)), while there is no significant effect on the subjects’
beliefs when observing good additional information (yj (t) > yi (t)).
The control sessions confirm the finding that subjects may react differently to
“bad news” and to “good news,” even in situations with higher uncertainty where
much less information about the income distribution is available. For this asym-
metric information effect to be measurable, it seems important that subjects have
some idea of how the income distribution may look like. For early observations
where subjects do not know anything about the income distribution, additional
signals may have several and countervailing effects, affecting both the posterior
about the income distribution as well as the expectation about the own income.49
While the learning dynamics are interesting per se, the results of the control ses-
sions with higher uncertainty can also be seen as a robustness check of our main
results.
2.4 Conclusion
Guided by Hirschman’s idea of the “tunnel effect” we analyze direct income-
comparison effects and indirect belief-based information effects when individuals
observe signals about the income of others, in an environment characterized by
uncertainty about the own income prospects. The empirical results of our exper-
iment show that when individuals observe bad additional information (others are
48When identifying the treatment effect of additional information based on the indicator vari-
able Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) for good additional information (as in specification 2 of Table 2.1) we find very
similar results: In early rounds there is no significant treatment effect of additional information
(neither for good nor for bad information). In later rounds, however, we find the asymmetric
effect that only bad additional information significantly (and negatively) affects stated beliefs.
These results and estimations on separate subsamples for good and bad additional information
applying the specifications in Table 2.6 are available on request.
49As an illustration, suppose that subjects believe that the income distribution is concentrated
around a value very close to the initial value y (0) (that is, they underestimate the variance of
portfolios). If a subject has a portfolio with a currently positive trend and observes a second
portfolio with negative trend, this may provide information on the variance of final incomes and
may, hence, lead to higher beliefs about the own final portfolio value. Such an effect would
counteract the negative effect of “bad news” observed in the original sessions where the variance
of the income distribution is basically known due to information provided in the instructions.
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likely to earn less), they lower their beliefs about their own income. Observing
good additional information (others are likely to earn more) has, however, no sta-
tistically measurable effect on beliefs about the own income. Moreover, observing
signals that indicate a lower expected income relative to others has a negative
effect on individual well-being, while observing signals that indicate a higher ex-
pected income relative to others has no statistically measurable effect on individual
well-being. Hence, we find asymmetric effects of information and of comparison
considerations. For the combined “income-comparison effect” and “information ef-
fect” we find that under high uncertainty about final incomes both countervailing
effects offset each other, leading to a statistical zero total effect. But as uncer-
tainty decreases over time income-comparison effects dominate the informational
effects such that individuals report significantly lower satisfaction when observ-
ing that others are ahead. Thus, our evidence suggests in line with Hirschman’s
idea that informational and comparison effects are simultaneously at work, with
the dynamics being crucial: The countervailing forces of informational effects are
particularly relevant in early points in time, when additional information first ar-
rives and uncertainty is still substantial. At a later stage, stable inequalities and
a lower informational value of additional signals about others’ experiences lead to
a situation in which income-comparison considerations clearly prevail. Since we
intentionally leave individuals uncertain about the informativeness of additional
signals our findings on informational effects can be interpreted as rather strong and
might be expected to dominate in environments in which the income-generating
processes are clearly correlated.
Maybe surprisingly, we find asymmetric effects both for informational effects on
the beliefs about the own income and for income-comparison effects. We interpret
this finding as subjects being more reactive to “bad news” than to “good news.”
This offers interesting implications for attitudes toward redistribution and for the
acceptance of income inequality. First, and maybe most straightforward to see, an
asymmetric “income-comparison effect” implies that individuals experience a lower
tolerance for inequality (ceteris paribus) and favor more redistribution. Catching
up to richer individuals will be more important than the possible disutility re-
sulting from other individuals catching up in terms of income relative to oneself.
Consequently, redistributing from richer to poorer individuals compared to one-
self would be perceived as favorable. Second, when signals of upside potentials in
future income are less recognized, but signals of downside potentials lead to an
updating of the own expectations, this will increase the support for redistributive
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policies. Raising taxes on high incomes will be seen less critical, as individuals
are less sensitive to signals that indicate good income prospects for themselves.
On the other hand, as individuals are sensitive to potentially bad signals about
the own income prospects individuals will consider social assistance programs in
support of low income levels as relatively more important, reinforcing Varian’s
(1980) argument of “redistributive taxation as social insurance.” Therefore, the
asymmetries in the information-based and in the direct income-comparison effects
imply that individuals experience a lower tolerance for inequality and favor more
redistribution.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Experimental treatments
Treatments Base P2-Info P2-Income Base-C P2-Info-C
# sessions 4 4 4 3 4
# participants 96 96 96 72 96
# obs. per
participant
40 40 40 40 40
Note: In BASE, subjects only observe their own portfolio; in P2-INFO, subjects observe their
own portfolio and an additional portfolio which is not payoff relevant for any participant; in
P2-INCOME, subjects observe their own portfolio and the portfolio of another participant. The
control treatments BASE-C and P2-INFO-C are identical to treatments BASE and P2-INFO,
except that subjects receive no information about the distribution of final portfolio values (see
Section 2.3.4).
Table 2.4: Summary of the experimental treatments.
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2.A.2 Descriptive statistics
BASE P2-INFO P2-INCOME Total
Mean Mean Mean Mean S.D. Max Min
Male 0.47 0.37 0.34 0.39 0.49 1 0
Age 23.8 22.8 22.8 23.1 4.2 52 17
Econ 0.33 0.29 0.40 0.34 0.47 1 0
Belief 309.2 306.4 308.9 308.2 101.5 902 0
Bad Add. Info. 359.4 354.1 359.3 357.6 85.5 902 0
Good Add. Info. 258.9 258.7 258.6 258.7 91.7 750 1
Satisfaction 4.57 4.49 4.39 4.49 2.69 10 0
Behind 3.37 3.25 3.02 3.21 2.32 10 0
Ahead 5.78 5.73 5.75 5.76 2.42 10 0
Note: “Male” takes on a value of 1 for male subjects. “Econ” takes on a value of 1 for subjects
that study in business-related fields such as economics. “Bad Add. Info.” refers to situations
when subjectes observe an additional portfolio of a lower value than their own portfolio (bad
additional information). “Good Add. Info.” refers to situations when subjectes observe an
additional portfolio of a higher value than their own portfolio (good additional information).
“Behind” refers to the case of being behind in relative-income. “Ahead” refers to situations of
being ahead in relative-income.
Table 2.5: Summary statistics for the main treatments.
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2.A.3 Histograms of stated beliefs and satisfaction levels
Figure 2.4: Distributions of measured beliefs and satisfaction for different portfolio
types (with positive, zero, and negative drift of the stochastic portfolio-generating
process).
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2.A.4 Screenshot of the experimental task
Figure 2.5: Screenshot of the experiment (for the question on beliefs in the Base treatment).
58
Appendix
2.A.5 Estimation results for the sessions with increased
uncertainty
Round 1 to 2 Round 1 to 5 Round 6 to 10 Round 1 to 10
Early t Early t Early t All t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
belief belief belief belief
yi,r(t)
0.867∗∗∗
(0.071)
0.861∗∗∗
(0.039)
1.009∗∗∗
(0.038)
0.871∗∗∗
(0.017)
P2-INFO
-3.450
(17.64)
-4.049
(11.07)
-12.39∗∗
(5.819)
-5.758
(5.809)
∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)
-10.41
(12.30)
-22.83∗∗∗
(7.430)
-0.448
(6.334)
-1.277
(3.076)
∆yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)
×P2-INFO
-15.60
(12.97)
-3.072
(7.954)
2.140
(4.584)
-3.156
(2.230)
Constant
54.45
(42.39)
66.44∗∗∗
(25.60)
0.599
(16.88)
55.31∗∗∗
(13.09)
Individual
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time and session
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 668 1670 1670 6680
Note: Crossed-effects regression model with random effects on subject and portfolio level. De-
pendent variables: beliefs. Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. “Indi-
vidual controls” include gender, age, whether the field of study is business related, risk aversion,
loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, distributional preferences, optimism and patience. “Time and
session fixed effects” include round fixed effects, point-in-time fixed effects, fixed effects for the
sequence in which the selected portfolios are shown, and session fixed effects.
Table 2.6: Information effects under increased uncertainty: Regression results.
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2.B Supplementary material
2.B.1 Income-comparison effects for the two variants of
the control question
CQ CQH Pooled
(1) (2) (3)
satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction
yi,r(t)
0.016∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.018∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.017∗∗∗
(0.001)
beliefi,r(t)
0.005∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.004∗∗∗
(0.000)
P2-INCOME
-0.077
(0.260)
-0.175
(0.246)
-0.207
(0.247)
Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t)
-0.889∗∗∗
(0.088)
-0.780∗∗∗
(0.097)
-0.862∗∗∗
(0.065)
P2-INCOME×Iyj,r(t)>yi,r(t) -0.221
∗∗∗
(0.087)
-0.256∗∗∗
(0.098)
-0.236∗∗∗
(0.065)
Constant
-0.825∗∗∗
(0.350)
-0.808∗∗∗
(0.343)
-1.254∗∗∗
(0.281)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Time and session fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 3840 3760 7600
Note: Crossed-effects regression model with random effects on subject and portfolio level. Obser-
vations from treatments P2-INFO and P2-INCOME. Dependent variable: satisfaction. Standard
errors in parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. The sample of observations depends on
the variant of the control question. In “CQ” the subjects had the choice to have their earnings
to be determined by the final value of another, randomly drawn portfolio; in “CQH” this control
question was only asked “hypothetically” and was not actually implemented. “Pooled” refers
to the full sample based on both variants of the control question. “Individual controls” include
gender, age, whether the field of study is business-related, risk aversion, loss aversion, ambiguity
aversion, distributional preferences, optimism and patience. “Time and session fixed effects”
include round fixed effects, point-in-time fixed effects, fixed effects for the sequence in which the
selected portfolios are shown, and session fixed effects.
Table 2.7: Income-comparison effects: Separate regression results depending on
the variant of the control question used in the experiment.
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2.B.2 Information effects: Additional results
(1) (2)
belief belief
yi,r(t)
0.841∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.841∗∗∗
(0.013)
P2-INFO
-13.02∗∗
(5.936)
-11.83∗
(6.160)
Q2yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)
-1.090
(2.691)
-1.098
(2.691)
Q3yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)
-8.497∗∗∗
(3.173)
-8.495∗∗∗
(3.173)
Q4yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)
-13.28∗∗∗
(3.546)
-13.29∗∗∗
(3.546)
Q2yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) × P2-INFO
2.033
(2.980)
2.63
(2.980)
Q3yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) × P2-INFO
6.006∗∗
(2.947)
6.007∗∗
(2.947)
Q4yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) × P2-INFO
6.044∗∗
(3.033)
6.077∗∗
(3.033)
Constant
86.15∗∗∗
(8.000)
86.76∗∗∗
(8.051)
Individual controls No Yes
Time and session fixed effects Yes Yes
N 7600 7600
Note: Crossed-effects regression model with random effects on subject and portfolio level. Ob-
servations from treatments BASE and P2-INFO. Dependent variable: beliefs. Standard errors
in parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. The variables Q2yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) to Q4yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)
are indicator variables for quartiles of the difference yj,r (t) − yi,r (t) at a given point in time
t; Q2yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INFO to Q4yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INFO are the respective interaction terms
with the treatment dummy P2-INFO. Baseline category is Q1yj,r(t)−yi,r(t). Specification 2 adds
“Individual controls”: gender, age, whether the field of study is business-related, risk aversion,
loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, distributional preferences, optimism and patience. “Time and
session fixed effects” include round fixed effects, point-in-time fixed effects, fixed effects for the
sequence in which the selected portfolios are shown, and session fixed effects.
Table 2.8: Information effects: Disaggregated interaction model.
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Additional information
Effect
(p-value)
Tested hypothesis
Very Bad
(yj,r(t) << yi,r(t))
-13.02∗∗
(0.028)
H0: P2-INFO= 0
Bad
(yj,r(t) < yi,r(t))
-10.987
(0.063)
H0: P2-INFO+Q2yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INFO= 0
Good
(yj,r(t) > yi,r(t))
-7.014
(0.239)
H0: P2-INFO+Q3yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INFO= 0
Very Good
(yj,r(t) >> yi,r(t))
-6.976
(0.240)
H0: P2-INFO+Q4yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INFO= 0
Note: The effect of additional information as estimated in specification 1 of Table 2.8.
∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. For the baseline category (Q1yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)), the treatment effect
of additional information is given by the coefficient of P2-INFO. For the remaining quartiles,
the treatment effect of additional information is given by the sum of the coefficients of P2-INFO
and its interaction term with the indicator variable for the respective quartile (in the table,
P2-INFO and Q2yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INFO to Q4yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INFO refer to the coefficients
of the variables as estimated in specification 1 of Table 2.8).
Table 2.9: Disaggregated information effects: Hypothesis tests for good and bad
additional information.
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2.B.3 Income-comparison effects: Additional results
(1) (2)
satisfaction satisfaction
yi,r(t)
0.016∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.016∗∗∗
(0.001)
beliefi,r(t)
0.004∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.004∗∗∗
(0.000)
P2-INCOME
-0.170
(0.260)
-0.196
(0.252)
Q2yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)
-0.367∗∗∗
(0.084)
-0.366∗∗∗
(0.084)
Q3yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)
-1.344∗∗∗
(0.100)
-1.343∗∗∗
(0.100)
Q4yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)
-1.622∗∗∗
(0.111)
-1.620∗∗∗
(0.111)
Q2yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INCOME
0.000
(0.093)
-0.002
(0.093)
Q3yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INCOME
-0.161∗
(0.092)
-0.161∗
(0.092)
Q4yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INCOME
-0.345∗∗∗
(0.095)
-0.347∗∗∗
(0.095)
Constant
-0.155
(0.314)
-0.146
(0.308)
Individual controls No Yes
Time and session fixed effects Yes Yes
N 7600 7600
Note: Crossed-effects regression model with random effects on subject and portfolio level.
Observations from treatments P2-INFO and P2-INCOME. Dependent variable: satisfaction.
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. The variables Q2yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)
to Q4yj,r(t)−yi,r(t) are indicator variables for quartiles of the difference yj,r (t) − yi,r (t) at
a given point in time t; Q2yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INCOME to Q4yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INCOME are
the respective interaction terms with the treatment dummy P2-INCOME. Baseline category is
Q1yj,r(t)−yi,r(t). Specification 2 adds “Individual controls”: gender, age, whether the field of
study is business-related, risk aversion, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, distributional pref-
erences, optimism and patience. “Time and session fixed effects” include round fixed effects,
point-in-time fixed effects, fixed effects for the sequence in which the selected portfolios are
shown, and session fixed effects.
Table 2.10: Income-comparison effects: Disaggregated interaction model.
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Income-comparison
Effect
(p-value)
Tested hypothesis
Far ahead
(yj,r(t) << yi,r(t))
-0.170
(0.512)
H0: P2-INCOME= 0
Ahead
(yj,r(t) < yi,r(t))
-0.170
(0.511)
H0: P2-INCOME+Q2yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INCOME= 0
Behind
(yj,r(t) > yi,r(t))
-0.331
(0.203)
H0: P2-INCOME+Q3yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INCOME= 0
Far behind
(yj,r(t) >> yi,r(t))
-0.515∗∗
(0.048)
H0: P2-INCOME+Q4yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INCOME= 0
Note: The effect of observing another participant’s portfolio as estimated in specification (1)
of Table 2.10. ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. For the baseline category (Q1yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)), the
treatment effect of observing another participant’s portfolio is given by the coefficient of P2-
INCOME. For the remaining quartiles, the treatment effect of observing another participant’s
portfolio is given by the sum of the coefficients of P2-INCOME and its interaction term with the
indicator variable for the respective quartile (in the table, P2-INCOME and Q2yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-
INFO to Q4yj,r(t)−yi,r(t)×P2-INCOME refer to the coefficients of the variables as estimated in
specification (1) of Table 2.10).
Table 2.11: Disaggregated income-comparison effect: Hypothesis tests for being
behind and being ahead.
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2.B.4 Set of portfolios assigned in the experiment
Figure 2.6: Portfolios
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2.C Experimental instructions
Welcome to the Experiment!1
Please read these instructions carefully and completely. Thoroughly understanding the
instructions will help you to earn more money.
Your earnings in the experiment are measured in Talers. At the end of the experiment we
will convert the Talers you earned into Euros and pay you accordingly. The conversion
rate is: 25 Talers = 1 Euro. In addition, each participant receives a show-up fee of 4
Euros.
We ensure your anonymity throughout the experiment. Please keep in mind that you
are not allowed to communicate with other participants during the experiment. If you
do not obey this rule you will be asked to leave the laboratory without getting paid.
Whenever you have a question, please raise your hand and we will help you.
Your Task:
In the experiment, each participant is assigned a portfolio whose current value you will
observe in a graph on your screen. You can think of your “portfolio” as a part of
your earnings you receive at the end of the experiment. Portfolios are generated by
the computer according to a random process. A graph at the end of these instructions
illustrates possible portfolio processes.
You will randomly be assigned into groups of two. However, you will not know which of
the other participants is assigned to you as your co-player. Each participant will observe
the current value of the own portfolio and of the co-player’s portfolio over time. The
starting value of all portfolios is 300 Talers and the final portfolio value (a whole number
larger than zero) represents the major part of your earnings of the experiment.
The dynamic change in portfolio values will stop in regular interval and you will be
asked the following questions on your screen:
1. How satisfied are you with your current portfolio on a scale from 0 (highly dissat-
isfied) to 10 (highly satisfied)?
2. What do you think: what will be the final value of your current portfolio (in
Talers)?
1The experiment was conducted in German. This appendix contains a translated version of
the instructions for the P2-Income treatment.
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3. Please choose one of the following two options:
(a) I prefer to be paid the final value of my current portfolio.
(b) I prefer to be paid the final value of a new portfolio, which is randomly gen-
erated and assigned to me at the end of the experiment.
You and your co-player answer repeatedly and independently the same 3 questions. At
each point in time you can choose your answers anew and fully independently of your
previous answers. Your answers will not be displayed to your co-player.
Until the final portfolio value is reached you and your co-player keep the assigned port-
folios and each answer the three questions with respect to the current portfolio. This
also applies in case your answer to question 3 is to receive as a payment the final value
of a new, randomly assigned portfolio.
Procedure:
Overall, you will repeat this task 10 times. Consequently, you will observe 10 such
portfolio processes. These 10 rounds are completely independent of each other: In each
round the participants will be randomly re-matched in groups of two and each time
you and your new co-player will each be randomly and independently assigned a new
portfolio.
At the end of the experiment, in a first step, the computer will randomly select one
of the 10 rounds. For the selected round the computer will select exactly one point in
time at which you answered the three questions described above. Your payment will be
determined by your answers at this selected point in time and includes three components:
• For your answer with respect to your satisfaction you receive 50 Talers, indepen-
dent of the value you entered.
• The better your estimate of the final portfolio value at the selected point in time
matches the actual final portfolio value in the selected round, the more money you
receive:
– If you predicted precisely the realized final portfolio value, you receive 250 Talers.
– The exact formula to calculate your payment is:
Payment (in Talers) = 250 – 1
10
(estimate − actual final value)2;
at least, however, 25 Talers.
• You receive the final value of your portfolio as a payment:
– If you chose Option 3(a) at the selected point in time, you will receive the final
67
Chapter 2. A glance into the tunnel
value of the portfolio assigned in the selected round.
– If you chose Option 3(b) at the selected point in time, a new portfolio will be
randomly assigned to you and you will receive the final value of this new portfolio
as a payment.
– Note: In case you receive the final value of a new, randomly selected portfolio
you will see the complete portfolio process at the end of the experiment on your
screen.
In total your payment consists of the final portfolio value (in Talers), of the Talers earned
when predicting the final portfolio value, and of the Talers you receive for your answers
with respect to your satisfaction. These Talers are converted into Euros and paid to you
in cash. After the experiment we ask you to provide some more information; as a matter
of course, all of your provided information will only be used anonymized.
Thank you very much for showing up and good luck!
The following graph illustrates possible portfolio realizations. The starting value of all
portfolios is 300 Talers. On the horizontal axis the points in time are indicated (4 in
total) when you will be asked to answer the three questions explained above.
Figure 2.7: Example
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Hirschman’s tunnel effect goes
abroad: International dimensions
of social comparison and
subjective well-being
3.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a steady stream of economic crises around the world.1
The resolution of such crises more often than not involve international transfers to
prevent the economic collapse of particularly severely hit countries. Politicians and
pundits who argue in support for such transfers typically appeal to national self
interest: it would adversely affect the own population if the crisis-struck country
is not saved from destitution.2 Such argument relies on a supposedly positive
effect of other countries’ economic performance on the own population’s well-being.
However, surprisingly little is known about how people’s well-being is affected by
the economic fate of foreign populations. This is in stark contrast to what we know
1This chapter is based on joint work with Aart Gerritsen, MPI for Tax Law and Public
Finance. See Gerritsen and Lang (2016).
2For instance, during the European sovereign debt crisis, The Guardian wrote about the
“German self-interest” of bailing out other European countries to protect the Euro (September
29, 2012). The Times argued for the self-interest of Great Britain to participate in bilateral and
multilateral bailout measures for Ireland (May 15, 2012). The Independent even claimed that it
is in the self-interest for China to eventually step in and financially contribute to a resolution of
the European debt crisis (October 29, 2011). Such lines of argument have also been applied, for
instance, to support the United States’ efforts to help Mexico during the peso crisis or Japan’s
financial aid for South-East Asian countries during the Asian crisis (e.g., see The Australian,
July 22, 1997).
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about the well-being effects of more local reference groups such as neighbors, co-
workers, and the like. This paper is an attempt at rectifying this by determining
how people’s subjective well-being is affected by the economic performance of
foreign countries.
People’s attitude towards other countries’ economic performance is a priori
unclear. On the one hand, people might dislike economic progress of other nations
when they care about their own relative income position – a psychological phe-
nomenon we refer to as social comparison. On the other hand, people might like
economic progress in foreign countries if they expect it to spill over toward their
home country, thereby raising their own income prospects. In a seminal study,
Hirschman (1973) discusses both countervailing mechanisms in the context of peo-
ple’s attitude toward within-country income inequality. Situations in which the
“income-prospect” effect dominates the “social-comparison” effect have come to
be referred to as the “tunnel effect,” after an anecdote by Hirschman that involves
a person being stuck in a traffic jam in the middle of a two-lane tunnel. She feels
dispirited as neither of the two lanes are moving. However, when suddenly the cars
in the lane next to her start moving, her mood brightens as she becomes hopeful
that the traffic jam might be broken. While her relative position deteriorates as
other drivers pass by, her own prospects of moving on appear much better now,
leaving her more satisfied than before.3 In a similar way, Hirschman argues, indi-
viduals might have a higher tolerance for other people’s income increases if these
are expected to be informative of future increases in own income.
Previous empirical studies have found evidence in line with both social compar-
ison and income-prospect effects. These studies typically rely on either survey data
or lab experiments in which the reference group has a local connotation – neigh-
bors, colleagues, or other fellow lab subjects.4 But since the surge of globalization,
internet, mass media, and other advances in communication, individuals have be-
come increasingly aware of the economic situation of people in foreign countries.
3Hirschman (1973) continues his anecdote by stating that the driver’s mood might reverse
if these prospects do not materialize and only the other lane keeps moving. Soon, she and her
fellow drivers would become furious and attempt to illegally cross the double line between the
two lanes.
4Survey evidence of social-comparison effects of other people’s income on own subjective well-
being have been found by, amongst others, Easterlin (1995), Clark and Oswald (1996), McBride
(2001), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Luttmer (2005), Kingdon and
Knight (2007), Card et al. (2012). Survey evidence of the tunnel effect – or a dominant income-
prospect effect – have been established by, amongst others, Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), Senik
(2004, 2008) and Clark et al. (2009). Lang and Morath (2015) provide experimental evidence
on the tunnel effect.
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This has made it more likely that individuals compare their own economic situa-
tion with that of foreigners as well as that of more local reference groups. At the
same time, globalization induces closer economic ties among countries which could
imply spillover effects from economic performance of one country to another, and
thus, potential income-prospect effects between countries. This paper contributes
to the existing literature by focussing on foreign countries as a reference group.
More specifically, we focus on the relationship between individuals’ subjective well-
being and the economic performance – measured as economic growth rates – of
these reference countries. We do this for a repeated cross-section covering about
180,000 individuals in roughly 80 countries across 5 survey waves of the World
Values Survey.
As both social-comparison and income-prospect effects might simultaneously
be at work, it is impossible for us to empirically disentangle the two effects –
rather, we can only measure the net impact of the two countervailing effects. We
do, however, focus our analysis on different groups of reference countries based
either on criteria of economic integration or on criteria of geographical proximity.
Our hypothesis is that income-prospect effects are stronger for reference countries
that are economically more integrated with the home country. In line with this
expectation, we find that individuals’ subjective well-being is positively associated
with economic growth rates of important trade partners. On the other hand, we
find no statistically significant association between subjective well-being and the
average economic growth of neighboring countries. However, when we separate
the reference group of neighboring countries based on their economic integration
with the home country, we find a positive association between well-being and
growth rates of high-trade neighbors, and a negative association between well-being
and growth rates of low-trade neighbors. These results suggest the simultaneous
existence of both social-comparison and income-prospect effects on an international
level, and the dominance of income-prospect effects when it concerns reference
countries that are economically closely integrated with the home country.
Our paper relates to different strands of the literature on income comparisons
and subjective well-being. It is most closely related to the studies on income
comparisons mentioned above, and adds to that literature by focussing on the
international dimension of comparison effects (see the references in footnote 4).
Another related strand of the literature focusses on the effect of macroeconomic
variables on subjective well-being. These studies attempt to determine the well-
being effects of variables such as economic growth, unemployment and inflation
71
Chapter 3. Hirschman’s tunnel effect goes abroad
in the home country, but typically do not include other countries’ macroeconomic
performance in their analysis (e.g., Di Tella et al. 2001, 2003, Alesina et al. 2004,
Stevenson and Wolfers 2008, and Blanchflower et al. 2014).5 To the best of our
knowledge, Becchetti et al. (2013) is the only study that takes into account the
effects of other countries’ macroeconomic variables on subjective well-being. They
find for a sample of 15 West-European countries that subjective well-being relates
negatively to the gross national disposable income of the richest neighboring coun-
try. In contrast, we focus on a much larger sample of countries, a richer set of
reference countries, and a different macroeconomic variable – economic growth –
which we believe is more visible in the media for the general public and generally
accepted as a measure of economic performance. More importantly, we show that
income-prospect effects could play an important role and even dominate compar-
ison effects when it comes to economically integrated reference countries. Finally,
there is a small number of theoretical studies which establish that the international
comparison effects we observe bear important policy implications for the optimal
provision of public goods, as well as the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule
(Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman 2014, 2015).6
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces a simple theoretical
model to flesh out the different ways in which foreign economic growth might
impact a person’s well-being. Section 3.3 discusses our empirical strategy and
the data we use. In Section 3.4, we present the empirical results of our baseline
estimations, as well as robustness analyses. We close with concluding remarks in
Section 3.5.
3.2 Theoretical framework
We present a highly stylized two-period economic model of an individual’s utility
and his consumption decisions. The purpose of this model is to illustrate ways
in which international comparisons could affect an individual’s utility. The model
is loosely based on a combination of multiple models in Clark et al. (2008). We
assume that an individual earns income yt and consumes ct in period t ∈ {1, 2}.
We furthermore assume that he has access to capital markets and can borrow
and invest at a risk-free interest rate r. The individual’s intertemporal budget
5For an early overview of the effects of macroeconomic variables on subjective well-being see
Frey and Stutzer (2002).
6On a more local level, social comparison concerns can also have implications for the optimal
amount of accumulated capital and domestic growth (e.g., Congleton 1989, Konrad 1990, 1992).
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constraint equates the present values of income and consumption expenditures:
(3.1) c1 +
c2
1 + r
= y1 +
y2
1 + r
.
The individual derives utility from consumption in both periods. Utility is assumed
to be increasing and strictly concave in consumption. Moreover, we allow it to
depend on a consumption-reference level c¯t as well as on the individual’s own
consumption level. Lifetime utility is given by the discounted sum of period-
specific subutility:
(3.2) U ≡ u(c1 − αc¯1) + βu(c2 − αc¯2), u′(·),−u′′(·) > 0,
where α ∈ [0, 1] denotes the degree to which utility of consumption depends on
the reference level c¯t, and β ∈ [0, 1] denotes the individual’s discount factor. For
simplicity, we abstract from uncertainty and assume that income in both periods
is exogenously given. Thus, the individual’s only decision is how to smooth his
consumption over time. In the first period, the individual makes his consumption-
savings decision so as to maximize eq. (3.2), subject to eq. (3.1). This yields the
following consumption Euler equation:
(3.3) u′(c1 − αc¯1) = (1 + r)βu′(c2 − αc¯2).
Intuitively, the individual smooths his consumption in order to equalize the dis-
counted marginal utility of consumption in both periods.
There are a number of ways in which international comparisons might affect an
individual’s utility. On the one hand, higher economic growth in foreign countries
could raise individuals’ consumption reference levels in either period. That is, as
the individual observes that people in other countries are improving their own
economic situation, he might himself be less satisfied with any given level of con-
sumption. This would imply that higher economic growth abroad raises reference
levels c¯1 and c¯2. On the other hand, an increase in foreigen economic growth might
raise the individual’s future income y2. Better economic performance abroad could
eventually spill over and improve economic performance at home. International
trade would be an obvious way in which such spillover effects might materialize.
How would these two different effects of foreign economic performance affect
individual utility? First, consider an increase in reference levels: dc¯1, dc¯2 > 0. Tak-
ing derivatives of eqs. (3.1) and (3.3) with respect to consumption and reference
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levels, yields the following effects of reference levels on first-period consumption:
dc1
dc¯1
=
(
u′′(c1 − αc¯1)
u′′(c1 − αc¯1) + (1 + r)2βu′′(c2 − αc¯2)
)
α ∈ (0, α),(3.4)
dc1
dc¯2
= −
(
(1 + r)2βu′′(c2 − αc¯2)
u′′(c1 − αc¯1) + (1 + r)2βu′′(c2 − αc¯2)
)
α
1 + r
< 0.(3.5)
An increase in the first-period reference level raises the marginal utility of first-
period consumption and therefore the equilibrium level of first-period consump-
tion. However, as indicated by eq. (3.4), a unit increase in the reference level
leads to an increase in consumption that is less than α. As a result, this increase
in consumption is insufficient to fully offset the negative utility effect of the higher
reference level. Similarly, eq. (3.5) indicates that an increase in the second-period
reference level causes the individual to consume less in the first period. It follows
that an increase in either reference level always leads to a reduction in utility. This
holds for both lifetime utility, as well as first-period subutility:
(3.6)
dU
dc¯1
,
dU
dc¯2
,
du(c1 − αc¯1)
dc¯1
,
du(c1 − αc¯1)
dc¯2
< 0.
Thus, economic growth abroad could lead to a reduction in individuals’ utility if
it leads to higher consumption reference levels.
Second, consider that foreign economic growth raises future income, so that
dy2 > 0. Again taking derivatives of eqs. (3.1) and (3.3), now with respect to
consumption and future income levels, yields the following effect of future income
on first-period consumption:
(3.7)
dc1
dy2
=
(
(1 + r)2βu′′(c2 − αc¯2)
u′′(c1 − αc¯1) + (1 + r)2βu′′(c2 − αc¯2)
)
1
1 + r
∈
(
0,
1
1 + r
)
.
As the individual smooths out income shocks over time, higher future income leads
to higher consumption in both periods. It immediately follows that this causes an
increase in both lifetime utility and first-period subutility:7
(3.8)
dU
dy2
,
du(c1 − αc¯1)
dy2
> 0.
Summing up, improved macroeconomic performance abroad might affect an indi-
7Notice that people’s access to financial markets plays an important role. If people would
not be able to borrow – for instance, because they face liquidity constraints – they would be
unable to smooth out future increases in income. As a result, their first-period consumption and
subutility would remain unaffected. Future utility, as well as lifetime utility, would still increase.
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vidual’s utility negatively by raising his consumption reference level, or positively
by improving future income prospects. We will refer to the former as the social-
comparison effect and to the latter as the income-prospect effect. The net effect
is ambiguous.
It is important to stress three underlying assumptions for this result to hold.
First, individuals need to be aware of the macroeconomic performance of for-
eign countries. Second, for the negative relationship between utility and foreign
economic performance to hold, individuals need to consider foreign people as a
reference group. Third, for the positive relationship to hold, individuals need to
be aware of economic ties between countries and anticipate that better economic
performance abroad will translate into better economic performance at home. We
believe it is conceivable that all three assumptions hold in reality. In a globalized
world, and after the proliferation of mass media, it has almost become unavoidable
that people – intentionally and unintentionally – consume information about the
developments within at least some prominent neighboring countries or important
trade partners. News media regularly report on the macroeconomic performance
of the own country, often benchmarking this against the economic performance
in other countries. Nevertheless, we are not able to test these three assumptions
directly. Instead, we attempt to measure the resulting effect of foreign economic
performance on individuals’ utiliy.
3.3 Data and empirical strategy
3.3.1 Measuring utility
We use a combination of individual-level and country-level data for our empirical
analysis. Individual-level data are obtained from the World Values Survey (WVS),
which contains survey information on a large number of variables for a repeated
cross section of individuals. Using the WVS offers several advantages. First of
all, the survey has been extensively used in the literature on subjective well-being
so that results are comparable to previous studies. More importantly, the WVS
includes consistent data for a large number of countries, which we need to ob-
tain enough variation in macroeconomic performance of both individuals’ home
countries and foreign countries.
The WVS data have been collected for over a hundred countries in six waves
between 1981 and 2014. Every country-wave pair typically contains data for a
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nationally representative sample of approximately 1,000 respondents. We do not
impose any restrictions on this dataset, except when necessitated by data avail-
ability. Because of a lack of data on some of our main variables for some of the
respondents, we ultimately end up using the latest five waves of the WVS, with a
sample of approximately 160,000 to 180,000 individuals from about 80 countries,
depending on the exact specification of our empirical analysis. Because for many
countries data are not available for all waves of the WVS, we arrive at 154 unique
country-year pairs.
As discussed, we are interested in explaining individuals’ utility. We use self-
reported life satisfaction as a measure of utility. Specifically, it is measured by a
respondent’s answer to the following question:
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole
these days?
Possible answers range from 1 (‘completely dissatisfied’) to 10 (‘completely satis-
fied’).
3.3.2 Macroeconomic performance and the choice of refer-
ence country
As a measure of macroeconomic performance, for both the home country and
for reference countries, we use the growth rate of a country’s real gross domestic
product (GDP). These data are taken from the World Bank’s Development Indi-
cators database. While most studies on social comparison focus on income levels,
we believe that in an international context economic growth better captures the
concept of economic performance. Moreover, economic growth rates are a very
common and widely presented economic indicator within the media, and thus,
broadly observable for purposes of social comparison.
Even if individuals’ utility is affected by the economic performance of a ref-
erence group of countries, it is a priori unclear which foreign countries comprise
this reference group. For this reason, we use different types of reference countries,
based on either economic ties or geographical proximity. We first adopt the most
important trade partner as a reference country, defined as the foreign country
that trades most with the home country. To identify the most important trade
partner, we use bilateral trade data from the United Nations Commodity Trade
Statistics Database (COMTRADE). As a second possible reference country we fo-
cus on neighboring countries. In that case, the macroeconomic performance of the
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reference country is taken to be the average economic growth of all neighboring
countries.8
Notice that our theoretical discussion identifies two possible counteracting
channels through which foreign countries’ economic performance can affect an
individual’s utility. It might either reduce utility by increasing reference levels, or
raise utility through improved income prospects for the home country. Accord-
ingly, it is a priori unclear which of the two effects is dominant. However, we
would expect that the income-prospect effect is relatively more important if the
reference country is based on trade volumes than when it is based purely on geo-
graphical proximity. To further exploit this, we also consider neighbors with which
the home country trades relatively much and neighbors with which it trades rela-
tively little as separate reference countries. Again, we would expect the economic
growth of the former reference group to have a more positive effect on utility than
the economic growth of the latter reference group.
3.3.3 Other explanatory variables
When determining the effect of reference countries’ economic growth on individu-
als’ life satisfaction, we control for a wide range of confounding variables on both
the individual and the country level. Individual-level control variables include:
dummies for self-reported income decile; dummies for self-reported health, which
ranges from 1 (“very good”) to 5 (“very poor”); a dummy for being unemployed;
dummies for marital status; a dummy for having children; dummies for age cate-
gories (younger than 25, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64 and older than 65);
dummies for having completed secondary education and having a university de-
gree; a dummy for self-reported importance of religion in one’s life; and a dummy
for whether the subject indicates to be trusting in other people. These variables
are often used as control variables in earlier empirical studies on life satisfaction
(see, e.g., Helliwell 2003, Blanchflower and Oswald 2004, Clark and Senik 2010).
At the country level we control for the domestic unemployment rate, the infla-
tion rate based on the consumer price index, (the logarithm of) the domestic GDP
level, and the domestic growth rate of real GDP, all obtained from the World
Bank’s Development Indicators. Life satisfaction has been shown to depend on
these domestic macroeconomic variables in a number of earlier studies (see, e.g.,
Di Tella et al. 2003, Blanchflower et al. 2014). Besides these macroeconomic
8For an overview of all the countries in the sample, including their neighboring countries and
most important trade partners, see Table 3.7 in Appendix 3.A.
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variables, we also control for time- and country-fixed effects.
3.3.4 Regression equation and estimation technique
To determine the relationship between utility and foreign economic performance,
we estimate the following linear regression equation:
satisfactioni,c,t = b0 + b1 · growth refc,t + bM ·macroControlc,t(3.9)
+bm ·microControli,c,t + Dc + Dt + ei,c,t,
where satisfactioni,c,t refers to life satisfaction of individual i in country c and year
t, growth refc,t refers to the economic growth rate in year t of the reference country
for individuals in country c, macroControlc,t is a vector of macroeconomic control
variables, and microControli,c,t is a vector of individual-level control variables.
We moreover include country- and time-fixed effects, denoted by Dc and Dt. Fi-
nally, ei,c,t denotes the error term. Naturally, subjective well-being is in its nature
an ordinal concept, so that the applied linear regression model might be prone to
error. For this reason we also estimate an ordered probit model and present its
results in a section on the robustness of our results. In line with previous studies,
we find that, qualitatively, our results are not sensitive to the estimation method
we apply (cf. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004).
We report robust standard errors that account for clustering at the country
level (Moulton 1986, 1990). The coefficient b1 is our coefficient of interest, cap-
turing the effect on life satisfaction of the annual real GDP growth of a reference
country. Note that we cannot rule out that variation in the explanatory variables
is endogenous with respect to the error term. While we lack quasi-experimental
data to truly rule out endogeneity, we try to limit this problem as much as we
can by adding important confounding control variables, and by making use of the
country-time variation in our data.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Regression results
The results of estimating eq. 3.9 for various reference groups are reported in Table
3.1.9 We find for all five specifications that a person’s life satisfaction is positively
associated with domestic GDP growth. Indeed, a percentage point increase in
economic growth leads to an increase in life satisfaction of about 0.03 to 0.04.
While at first sight this may appear small, it is economically significant and in line
with results from earlier studies (e.g., Di Tella et al. 2003).10
Column (1) reports the results for the most important trade partner as reference
country. We find that GDP growth in the reference country is in that case also
positively associated with individuals’ life satisfaction. Indeed, the effect of foreign
economic growth on life satisfaction is of the same magnitude as that of domestic
economic growth. Our point estimate indicates that a percentage point increase in
foreign economic growth is associated with an increase in life satisfaction of 0.037.
This finding is in line with an income-prospect effect that is dominant over the
social-comparison effect for foreign countries that share an important economic tie
with the home country.
Column (2) reports the results when we take the average neighboring country
as the relevant reference country. We fail to discern any statistically significant
effect of the average economic growth of neighboring countries on life satisfaction.
One possible explanation for the latter finding is that the countervailing social-
comparison and income-prospect effects cancel out for neighboring countries. For
this reason, we separate the neighboring countries of each observation into two
groups. One group includes the neighboring countries that are relatively important
9Here, we only report the estimated coefficients for the variables of interest. For the full
output, see Table 3.2 in Appendix 3.A.
10We can also compare the coefficients of other macroeconomic control variables (reported in
Table 3.2) to estimates in the literature. For instance, we find in line with Rehdanz and Maddison
(2005), who also investigate a large international sample, no correlation between a country’s
unemployment rate and satisfaction. This is in contrast to other studies that do find a negative
correlation between unemployment rates and life satisfaction (e.g., Helliwell 2003, and Alesina et
al. 2004). Note that the correlation between the unemployment rate and life satisfaction could
be positive when individuals who are already unemployed suffer less from this in situations of
more widely spread unemployment (for micro evidence on such effects see, for instance, Clark
(2003), and Knabe et al. (2012)). In line with other studies, we find a negative coefficient for the
inflation rate in four out of five specifications (e.g., Di Tella et al. 2001). However, the coefficient
of inflation is only statistically significant in two out of five specifications. Finally, the (natural
log) of the level of real GDP per capita exhibits a positive coefficient in all specifications (in line
with, e.g., Di Tella et al. 2003) that is marginally significant in three out of five specifications.
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trade partners, and a second group includes those that are relatively unimportant
trade partners. Whether the neighboring country is a relatively important trade
partner or not is determined on the basis of median bilateral trade volume of
the home country with its neighboring countries. We estimate a regression that
includes the average economic growth rates for both above-median-trade neighbors
and below-median-trade neighbors. The results are reported in column (3).
In line with our expectation, the findings in column (3) indicate that life satis-
faction is positively associated with the economic growth in high-trade neighboring
countries, and negatively associated with the economic growth in low-trade neigh-
boring countries. Our point estimates suggest that a percentage point increase
in the economic growth of high-trade neighbors is associated with a 0.029-point
increase in life satisfaction, whereas a percentage point increase in the economic
growth of low-trade neighbors is associated with a 0.024-point decrease in life sat-
isfaction. This is in line with a dominant income-prospect effect for neighbors
that share an important economic tie with the home country, and a dominant
social-comparison effect for low-trade neighboring countries.
Finally, we apply as a reference growth rate the real GDP growth of the neigh-
boring country that, of all neighboring countries, exhibits either the lowest or the
highest trade volume with the home country. In column (4), we find a negative
effect for the neighbor with the lowest trade volume, consistent with a dominant
social-comparison effect. The magnitude of this effect is comparable to that for
neighbors with a below-median trade volume as reported in column (3). In col-
umn (5), we find a positive effect for the neighbor with the highest trade volume,
consistent with a dominant income-prospect effect. The magnitude of this effect
is comparable to that for neighbors with an above-median trade volume.11
11Note that the number of observations varies across specifications (1)–(5) of Table 3.1. We
lose some observations because trade volume data is missing for a number of country-year pairs,
which lowers observations for columns (1) and (3)–(5). In columns (3)–(5) we further exclude
observations that only have one neighboring country, as this would make it impossible to divide
the group of neighboring countries into sub-groups. As a robustness test, we could impute missing
data for country-year pairs by using trade volume data of earlier years. After all, there is only
limited variation in the most important trade partner over time (see Table 3.7 in Appendix 3.A).
Using these imputed data, we can estimate the same regression as reported in column (1) for
more observations. Results from doing so are in line with our findings in Table 3.1 (results are
available on request).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
GDP growth
0.039∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.025∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.042∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.046∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.0352∗∗∗
(0.009)
Max.-trade
partner growth
0.037∗∗∗
(0.011)
Neighbors’ av.
growth
0.028
(0.022)
Above-med.-trade
neighbors’ av.
growth
0.029∗∗
(0.012)
Below-med.-trade
neighbors’ av.
growth
-0.024∗
(0.012)
Max.-trade
neighbor growth
0.022∗
(0.012)
Min.-trade
neighbor growth
-0.017∗∗
(0.008)
Constant
3.271∗
(1.730)
4.423∗∗
(2.148)
3.287∗∗
(1.475)
3.409∗∗
(1.627)
3.466∗∗
(1.608)
Country-level
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level
Controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country and time
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 166526 182783 157699 157699 157699
R2 0.272 0.281 0.271 0.270 0.270
Note: Linear repeated cross-sectional regression model with country and time fixed effects. De-
pendent variable: life satisfaction. Cluster-adjusted, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in
parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. Country-level controls include: natural log of real
GDP per capita, inflation rate (consumer price index) and unemployment rate. Individual-level
controls include: controls for income, health, age, education, marital/relationship status, gender,
children, religiosity, trust in other people.
Table 3.1: International income-prospect and social-comparison effects
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3.4.2 Robustness
Our results are robust to a number of alternative model specifications. In our first
robustness analysis we make use of additional individual-level information obtained
from the World Values Survey. More specifically, one question in the survey allows
us to infer to what extent individuals care about future economic growth in their
home country. From a list of different potential aims for the country in the next
ten years – including economic growth, strong defense forces, more freedom, and a
better environment – respondents are asked which of them they would give first and
second priority. Recall that, in previous sections, we hypothesized that income-
prospect effects create a positive relationship between subjective well-being and
foreign economic growth because the individual expects this growth to spill over to
future economic growth in the home country. According to this logic, the more one
cares about future economic growth in the home country, the more important such
spillover effects should be. As a result, we expect the evidence of income-prospect
effects to be particularly strong among those individuals who indicate that they
would give high priority to future economic growth.
To test this, we create a dummy variable that equals one for individuals who
indicate that future economic growth is not a first priority for them – constituting
about 40 percent of the individuals in our dataset. We then rerun the regres-
sions from the previous subsection, but this time add a variable that interacts
this dummy with the economic growth in the reference country. The results are
reported in Table 3.3 in Appendix 3.A. In line with our expectations, we find
evidence that the income-prospect effect is especially strong among individuals
who care about future economic growth. That is, columns (1), (3), and (5) show
that the economic growth of important trade partners is positively associated with
the subjective well-being of individuals who give high priority to future economic
growth. This effect is smaller for individuals who do not give priority to future
economic growth – as indicated by the negative and statistically significant coef-
ficients for the interaction term. Furthermore note that we do not find a similar
effect for the economic growth in (low-trade) neighboring countries, as shown in
columns (2)–(4). This is what one would expect if the spillover effects from eco-
nomic growth in these countries are less important than those of important trade
partners.
If the positive well-being effect of important trade partners’ economic growth
is caused by income-prospect effects, then this effect might be most pronounced
for economies that are particularly dependent on their export sector. Individuals
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might anticipate that expected future income is more affected by the growth of
trade partners when the domestic export sector is relatively large. To elaborate on
this idea we estimate an interaction model based on the specification in column (1)
of Table 3.1. We interact GDP growth of the most important trade partner with a
dummy variable that takes the value one if the home country has a relatively small
export sector – i.e., when the proportion of exports in total GDP is smaller than the
median value across the countries in our sample. Results are reported in column
(1) of Table 3.4 in Appendix 3.A. For countries with a relatively large export
sector, we find that the effect of the economic growth of the most important trade
partner is significantly positive. Moreover, the coefficient’s point estimate, 0.051,
is larger than in the baseline specification, although this difference is statistically
insignificant. The effect for countries with a relatively small export sector appears
to be somewhat smaller, but the insignificant interaction term indicates that there
is no significantly different effect compared to countries with a large export sector.
Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that income-prospect effects are equally
strong for countries with small or large export sectors.
For about a third of the countries in our sample, the most important trade
partner is also a neighboring country. In those cases, it is possible that the positive
well-being effect of the trade partner’s economic growth is driven by commuting
individuals who work in the country of the trade partner. In this case, learning
about this country’s GDP growth might have more direct implications for the
personal income of individuals that is not directly related to the trade channel that
we discuss above. One might wonder whether the results we find in specification
(1) of Table 3.1 still hold when we focus on most important trade partners that
are not neighboring countries, for which results cannot be driven by commuting
individuals. When we estimate specification (1) in Table 3.1 for a sub-sample of
countries for which the most important trade partner is not a neighboring country,
we find that the coefficient of the reference country’s economic growth increases
slightly, but less than the respective standard error. As a result, p-values rise
to 0.15, which is above conventional significance levels. When we estimate an
interaction model to analyze whether there is a significant difference for the effect
of the most important trade partner’s GDP growth between the two sub-samples
we find no evidence of such a difference. The estimates of the interaction model
are reported in column (2) of Table 3.4 in Appendix 3.A.12
12To ensure that our results are not driven by the fact that some people in our sample are
foreign citizens, and therefore might have a direct interest in higher growth abroad, we also rerun
the regressions from the previous section on a subsample that excludes non-citizens. As they
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To test our results’ robustness to alternative estimation methods, we re-estimate
the specifications presented in the previous subsection using an ordered probit
model. As satisfaction is an ordinal concept, treating life satisfaction implicitly as
a cardinal measure in our linear regression model could be problematic. The non-
linear ordered probit model accounts for the ordinal dependent variable. Results
are reported in Table 3.5 in Appendix 3.A and show that all of our main findings
are robust to using an ordered probit model.13
Data such as the GDP growth or unemployment rates are usually published
with a time lag. Furthermore, the initially published data might well be revised
after some time. Therefore, recorded macroeconomic variables in our data might
not perfectly coincide with the data that individuals actually observed at each
point in time, leading to potential measurement error. To address this issue, we
replace the macroeconomic variables by the average of their values in the survey
year and their values in the year before. Using these averages ensures that we use
information over a longer period and possibly get closer to the actual information
that individuals observed at each point in time. As can be seen from Table 3.6
in the Appendix, results are largely robust to using such alternative explanatory
variables.14,15
Finally, we experiment with the cluster-adjusted standard errors. Most stud-
ies that combine life satisfaction data with country-level data implement cluster-
adjusted standard errors on the country-year level.16 Contrary to this, we rely
on somewhat more restrictive country-level cluster-adjusted standard errors in the
estimates presented in the previous subsection. In line with what one would ex-
pect, when we apply country-year level cluster-adjusted standard errors, we obtain
represent little more than one percent of the people in our sample, excluding them from the
analysis leaves all results virtually unaffected. Estimates are available on request.
13This is in line with Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) who find that using linear OLS or
models that assume ordinality makes little difference for estimations on life satisfaction.
14All coefficients remain very similar in sign and size. For the above-median-trade neigh-
bors’ (in specification 3) and minimum-trade neighbor (specification 4), standard errors increase
slightly so that the coefficients are no longer significant. For the most important trade neighbor
(specification 5), the coefficient increases and becomes more significant.
15One might argue that income-prospect effects are determined by forecasted rather than
actual economic growth rates of important trade partners. Unfortunately, we do not have access
to such forecasts for enough countries in our sample. Instead, we could use one-year leading
values of economic growth – assuming that future realized economic growth rates are unbiased
approximations for its earlier forecasts. When we estimate specification (1) in Table 3.1 relying
on one year leading values of the most important trade partner’s GDP growth rates, we find that
results are robust.
16For recent examples, see Becchetti et al. (2013), Blanchflower et al. (2014), and Clark et al.
(2015).
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robust and statistically more significant results than the findings reported above.17
3.5 Conclusion
We take an international perspective on the tunnel effect – first discussed by
Hirschman (1973) – and estimate the relationship between individuals’ life satis-
faction and the economic growth of reference countries. In line with the discussion
by Hirschman, we find evidence for both social-comparison and income-prospect
effects. When we focus on the most important trade partner as the reference coun-
try, we find a positive relationship between economic growth and life satisfaction.
When we consider neighboring countries instead, we find that life satisfaction re-
lates negatively to the economic growth of neighbors that exhibit relatively little
economic integration with the home country.18 At the same time, life satisfaction
relates positively to the economic growth of neighbors that are economically more
integrated with the home country. These findings suggest that income-prospect
effects dominate in case of economically integrated reference countries, while com-
parison concerns dominate for less economically integrated countries.
We started this paper with the observation that international help for crisis-
struck countries is often justified with the claim that other countries’ economic
betterment is beneficial for the own population. We find direct evidence in favor of
this claim only when it regards the economic performance of countries that are eco-
nomically relatively integrated with the own country. Our results thereby suggest
a beneficial role for economic integration that goes beyond standard international-
trade arguments. Economic integration further aligns economic interests, and it
might therefore have the potential to enhance people’s international solidarity and
the political feasibility of international cooperation.19
17Results applying country-year cluster-adjusted standard errors are available on request.
18Our results also relate to the Easterlin (1974) paradox which states that subjective well-being
remained relatively flat even though per capita income has sharply increased over the past decades
(e.g., see for a recent discussion Weimann et al. 2015). A typical explanation for this paradox
is that people derive satisfaction from their own situation relative to local reference groups –
colleagues, family members, and the like. Our evidence suggests that similar comparison effects
might also play a role on an international level. Thus, even when the home country’s GDP does
grow over time, any positive effect on subjective well-being might be neutralized by relatively
higher economic growth of (low-trade) neighbors.
19Indeed, the idea that economic integration would lead to a path of political integration is at
least as old as European cooperation, and was deliberately expressed by the founding fathers of
the European Union. See, for instance, the so called Spaak Report from April 21st, 1956. The
Spaak Report is the outcome of the experts group set up by the Messina Conference which led
to the creation of the European Economic Community, available at www.cvce.lu.
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Table 3.2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
GDP growth
0.039∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.025∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.042∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.046∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.035∗∗∗
(0.009)
Max.-trade
partner growth
0.037∗∗∗
(0.011)
Neighbors’
av. growth
0.028
(0.022)
Above-median
trade neighbors’
av. growth
0.029∗∗
(0.012)
Below-median
trade neighbors’
av. growth
-0.024∗
(0.012)
Max.-trade
neighbor growth
0.022∗
(0.012)
Min.-trade
neighbor growth
-0.017∗∗
(0.008)
Ln GDP per capita
0.398∗
(0.214)
0.410
(0.251)
0.366∗
(0.176)
0.374∗
(0.198)
0.336
(0.206)
unemployment
0.015
(0.022)
-0.020
(0.020)
0.027
(0.023)
0.023
(0.024)
0.019
(0.024)
inflation rate
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.001∗∗
(0.000)
-0.001∗∗
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.2 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
2nd income decile
0.119
(0.075)
0.177∗∗
(0.076)
0.123
(0.078)
0.126
(0.078)
0.125
(0.079)
3rd income decile
0.231∗∗∗
(0.086)
0.290∗∗∗
(0.087)
0.243∗∗∗
(0.089)
0.243∗∗∗
(0.090)
0.243∗∗∗
(0.090)
4th income decile
0.495∗∗∗
(0.090)
0.551∗∗∗
(0.096)
0.513∗∗∗
(0.094)
0.517∗∗∗
(0.094)
0.518∗∗∗
(0.094)
5th income decile
0.684∗∗∗
(0.098)
0.734∗∗∗
(0.102)
0.700∗∗∗
(0.101)
0.701∗∗∗
(0.101)
0.703∗∗∗
(0.101)
6th income decile
0.875∗∗∗
(0.104)
0.930∗∗∗
(0.109)
0.897∗∗∗
(0.107)
0.897∗∗∗
(0.108)
0.898∗∗∗
(0.108)
7th income decile
1.079∗∗∗
(0.109)
1.137∗∗∗
(0.112)
1.107∗∗∗
(0.112)
1.106∗∗∗
(0.112)
1.108∗∗∗
(0.112)
8th income decile
1.193∗∗∗
(0.121)
1.262∗∗∗
(0.123)
1.239∗∗∗
(0.123)
1.237∗∗∗
(0.124)
1.239∗∗∗
(0.123)
9th income decile
1.219∗∗∗
(0.122)
1.304∗∗∗
(0.127)
1.272∗∗∗
(0.125)
1.267∗∗∗
(0.125)
1.274∗∗∗
(0.125)
10th income decile
1.240∗∗∗
(0.136)
1.337∗∗∗
(0.141)
1.295∗∗∗
(0.144)
1.285∗∗∗
(0.143)
1.292∗∗∗
(0.143)
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.2 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
unemployed
-0.348∗∗∗
(0.045)
-0.344∗∗∗
(0.044)
-0.349∗∗∗
(0.047)
-0.349∗∗∗
(0.047)
-0.348∗∗∗
(0.047)
Good health
-0.568∗∗∗
(0.031)
-0.577∗∗∗
(0.029)
-0.564∗∗∗
(0.033)
-0.566∗∗∗
(0.033)
-0.566∗∗∗
(0.033)
Faire health
-1.215∗∗∗
(0.043)
-1.222∗∗∗
(0.040)
-1.200∗∗∗
(0.045)
-1.204∗∗∗
(0.045)
-1.204∗∗∗
(0.045)
Poor health
-2.172∗∗∗
(0.063)
-2.143∗∗∗
(0.062)
-2.151∗∗∗
(0.065)
-2.154∗∗∗
(0.065)
-2.153∗∗∗
(0.065)
Very poor health
-2.582∗∗∗
(0.112)
-2.693∗∗∗
(0.098)
-2.578∗∗∗
(0.114)
-2.598∗∗∗
(0.116)
-2.588∗∗∗
(0.112)
gender (male=1)
-0.135∗∗∗
(0.023)
-0.137∗∗∗
(0.022)
-0.135∗∗∗
(0.024)
-0.134∗∗∗
(0.024)
-0.134∗∗∗
(0.024)
married
0.311∗∗∗
(0.042)
0.306∗∗∗
(0.042)
0.310∗∗∗
(0.044)
0.309∗∗∗
(0.044)
0.308∗∗∗
(0.044)
living as married
0.190∗∗∗
(0.041)
0.172∗∗∗
(0.041)
0.186∗∗∗
(0.044)
0.184∗∗∗
(0.043)
0.187∗∗∗
(0.043)
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.2 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
Divorced
-0.189∗∗∗
(0.044)
-0.185∗∗∗
(0.046)
-0.191∗∗∗
(0.047)
-0.192∗∗∗
(0.047)
-0.191∗∗∗
(0.047)
Separated
-0.183∗∗∗
(0.049)
-0.204∗∗∗
(0.047)
-0.190∗∗∗
(0.053)
-0.192∗∗∗
(0.053)
-0.189∗∗∗
(0.053)
Widowed
-0.044
(0.056)
-0.037
(0.054)
-0.053
(0.057)
-0.053
(0.057)
-0.052
(0.057)
Children
-0.033
(0.024)
-0.032
(0.026)
-0.040
(0.025)
-0.040
(0.025)
-0.040
(0.025)
Age (25-34)
-0.233∗∗∗
(0.021)
-0.242∗∗∗
(0.021)
-0.225∗∗∗
(0.020)
-0.225∗∗∗
(0.020)
-0.225∗∗∗
(0.020)
Age (35-44)
-0.305∗∗∗
(0.034)
-0.313∗∗∗
(0.035)
-0.298∗∗∗
(0.035)
-0.299∗∗∗
(0.035)
-0.296∗∗∗
(0.034)
Age (45-54)
-0.270∗∗∗
(0.039)
-0.275∗∗∗
(0.040)
-0.268∗∗∗
(0.040)
-0.268∗∗∗
(0.040)
-0.267∗∗∗
(0.040)
Age (55-64)
-0.077∗
(0.045)
-0.077
(0.047)
-0.086∗
(0.046)
-0.087∗
(0.046)
-0.084∗
(0.046)
Age (64<)
0.215∗∗∗
(0.062)
0.204∗∗∗
(0.061)
0.195∗∗∗
(0.065)
0.194∗∗∗
(0.064)
0.198∗∗∗
(0.064)
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.2 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
Education
(university)
0.050
(0.040)
0.061
(0.038)
0.057
(0.043)
0.055
(0.043)
0.055
(0.043)
Education
(secondary)
0.006
(0.026)
0.014
(0.025)
0.007
(0.028)
0.006
(0.028)
0.008
(0.027)
Trust
0.158∗∗∗
(0.034)
0.174∗∗∗
(0.033)
0.158∗∗∗
(0.036)
0.158∗∗∗
(0.036)
0.158∗∗∗
(0.036)
Religious
0.318∗∗∗
(0.027)
0.313∗∗∗
(0.027)
0.321∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.322∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.322∗∗∗
(0.028)
Constant
3.271∗
(1.730)
4.423∗∗
(2.148)
3.287∗∗
(1.475)
3.409∗∗
(1.627)
3.466∗∗
(1.608)
Country-level
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level
Controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country and time
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 166526 182783 157699 157699 157699
R2 0.272 0.281 0.271 0.270 0.270
Note: Linear repeated cross-sectional regression model. Dependent variable: life satisfaction.
At the country level cluster-adjusted, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses,
∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. Country-level controls include: log of real GDP per capita,
inflation rate (consumer price index) and unemployment rate. Individual-level controls include:
dummies for self-reported income group (1 (lowest) to 10 (highest), base category: 1), dummies
for self-reported health (1 (“very good“) to 5 (“very poor“), base category: 1), a dummy for
being unemployed, dummies for being married, divorced, widowed, or living separated (base
category: being single), a dummy for having children, dummies for age categories (25-34, 35-44,
45-54, 55-64, 65+, base category: younger than 25), a dummy for having completed secondary
education, a dummy for having a university degree, a dummy for considering religion to be very
important in one’s life, a dummy for being trusting in other people.
Table 3.2: International income-prospect and social-comparison effects
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Table 3.3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
GDP growth
0.039∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.042∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.042∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.047∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.034∗∗∗
(0.009)
Max.-trade
partner growth
0.039∗∗∗
(0.011)
Max.-trade
partner growth
* growth-not-priority
−0.014∗∗∗
(0.004)
Neighbors’ av.growth
0.035
(0.022)
Neighbors’ av.growth
* growth-not-priority
−0.008
(0.006)
Above-med.-trade
neighbors’ av. gr.
0.034∗∗∗
(0.011)
Above-med.-trade
neighbors’ av. growth
* growth-not-priority
−0.012∗∗∗
(0.004)
Below-med.-trade
neighbors’ av.growth
-0.021∗
(0.012)
Below-med.-trade
neighbors’ av.growth
growth-not-priority
-0.001
(0.005)
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.3 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
Max.-trade
neighbor growth
0.030∗∗∗
(0.012)
Max.-trade
neighbor growth
* growth-not-priority
−0.011∗∗∗
(0.004)
Min.-trade
neighbor growth
-0.020∗∗
(0.009)
Min.-trade
neighbor growth
* growth-not-priority
-0.000
(0.004)
Growth-not-priority
0.051∗
(0.021)
0.052∗
(0.028)
0.056∗∗
(0.024)
0.009
(0.024)
0.051∗∗
(0.020)
Constant
3.162∗
(1.813)
4.378∗∗
(1.935)
3.2655∗∗
(1.443)
3.926∗∗
(1.641)
3.958∗∗
(1.602)
Country-level
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country and time
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 159585 171875 152140 152140 152140
R2 0.268 0.281 0.271 0.270 0.270
Note: Linear repeated cross-sectional regression model with country and time fixed effects. De-
pendent variable: life satisfaction. Cluster-adjusted, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
in parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. “growth-not-priority” is a dummy variable that
takes a value of 0 for individuals that consider economic growth to be an important aim for
their home country for the next ten years and 1 otherwise. Country-level controls include: the
natural log of real GDP per capita, inflation rate (consumer price index) and unemployment rate.
Individual-level controls include: controls for income, health, age, education, marital/relationship
status, gender, children, religiosity, trust in other people.
Table 3.3: Interaction model: Economic growth as priority
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Export sector
Neighboring
max. trade partner
(1) (2)
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
GDP growth
0.040∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.039∗∗∗
(0.008)
Max.-trade
partner growth
0.051∗∗
(0.024)
0.039
(0.026)
Max.-trade-partner gr
*small export
-0.021
(0.025)
Small export
0.16
(0.481)
Max.-trade-partner gr
*max.-trade-neighbor
-0.007
(0.028)
Max.-trade-neighbor
0.075
(0.143)
Constant
3.084∗∗
(1.424)
2.934
(1.923)
Country-level
controls
Yes Yes
Individual-level
Controls
Yes Yes
Country and time
fixed effects
Yes Yes
N 166526 166526
R2 0.272 0.272
Note: Linear repeated cross-sectional regression model with country and time fixed effects. De-
pendent variable: life satisfaction. Cluster-adjusted, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
in parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01.“Small export” is a dummy that takes a value
of 1 for below-median export-to-GDP ratio countries and 0 otherwise. “Max.-trade-neighbor”
is a dummy that takes a value of 1 when a country’s most important trade partner is a ge-
ographically neighboring country and 0 otherwise. Country-level controls include: log of real
GDP per capita, inflation rate (consumer price index) and unemployment rate. Individual-level
controls include: controls for income, health, age, education, marital/relationship status, gender,
children, religiosity, trust in other people.
Table 3.4: Large/small export sectors and neighboring max. trade partners
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
GDP growth
0.019∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.012∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.022∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.017∗∗∗
(0.005)
Max.-trade
partner growth
0.016∗∗∗
(0.005)
Neighbors’
av. growth
0.015
(0.011)
Above-median
trade neighbors’
av. growth
0.015∗∗
(0.006)
Below-median
trade neighbors’
av. growth
-0.010∗
(0.006)
Max.-trade
neighbor growth
0.011∗
(0.006)
Min.-trade
neighbor growth
-0.007∗
(0.004)
Country-level
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level
Controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country and time
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 166526 182783 157699 157699 157699
Note: Ordered probit repeated cross-sectional regression model with country and time dum-
mies. Dependent variable: life satisfaction. Cluster-adjusted standard errors in parentheses,
∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. Country-level controls include: log of real GDP per capita, in-
flation rate (consumer price index) and unemployment rate. Individual-level controls include:
controls for income, health, age, education, marital/relationship status, gender, children, reli-
giosity, trust in other people.
Table 3.5: Income-prospect and comparison effects: Ordered probit
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
life
satisf.
GDP growth (mlag)
0.028∗∗
(0.014)
0.031∗
(0.017)
0.023
(0.015)
0.033∗
(0.017)
0.015
(0.015)
Max.-trade partner
growth (mlag)
0.039∗∗∗
(0.012)
Neighbors’ av.
growth (mlag)
0.019
(0.024)
Above-med.-trade
neighbors’ av.
growth (mlag)
0.028
(0.017)
Below-med.-trade
neighbors’ av.
growth (mlag)
-0.024∗
(0.014)
Max.-trade neighbor
growth (mlag)
0.033∗∗
(0.014)
Min.-trade neighbor
growth (mlag)
-0.018
(0.014)
Constant
6.056∗∗∗
(2.202)
8.929∗∗∗
(3.356)
7.048∗∗∗
(2.312)
6.483∗∗∗
(2.286)
7.390∗∗∗
(2.347)
Country-level
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level
Controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country and time
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 166526 182783 157699 157699 157699
R2 0.272 0.282 0.271 0.270 0.270
Note: Linear repeated cross-sectional regression model with country and time fixed effects. De-
pendent variable: life satisfaction. Cluster-adjusted, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in
parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. Country-level controls include the mean of the cur-
rent value and first lag of: the natural log of real GDP per capita, inflation rate (consumer price
index) and unemployment rate. Individual-level controls include: controls for income, health,
age, education, marital/relationship status, gender, children, religiosity, trust in other people.
Table 3.6: Timing of macroeconomic variables: Mean current value and first lag
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Table 3.7
Country
Neighboring
countries
Country
level
obs.
Individ.
level
obs.
Waves
Max trade
partner
Algeria
Libya
Mali
Mauritania
Morocco
Niger
Tunisia
1 844 1999-2004 United States
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Iran
Turkey
2 2,734
1994-1998
2010-2014
Russia
Russia
Australia
Indonesia
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands
Vanuatu
3 3,934
1994-1998
2005-2009
2010-2014
Japan
Japan
China
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Georgia
Iran
Russia
Turkey
2 2,556
1994-1998
2010-2014
Russia
Italy
Bangladesh
India
Myanar (Burma)
2 2,395
1994-1998
1999-2004
United States
United States
Belarus
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Russia
Ukraine
2 3,063
1994-1998
2010-2014
- a
Russia
Brazil
Argentina
Bolivia
Colombia
French Guiana
Guyana
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Uruguay
Venezuela
2 2,974
1989-1993
2005-2009
United States
United States
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Country
Neighboring
countries
Country
level
obs.
Individ.
level
obs.
Waves
Max trade
partner
Bulgaria
Greece
Macedonia
Romania
Serbia
Turkey
2 1,422
1994-1998
2005-2009
Russia
Germany
Burkina Faso
Benin
Coˆte d’Ivoire
Ghana
Mali
Niger
Togo
1 645 2005-2009 Switzerland
Canada United States 2 3,402
1999-2004
2005-2009
United States
United States
Chile
Argentina
Bolivia
Peru
1 856 2010-2014 China
China
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Hong Kong
India
Japan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Mongolia
Myanmar (Burma)
Nepal
North Korea
Russia
South Korea
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Viet Nam
4 4,558
1994-1998
1999-2004
2005-2009
2010-2014
Japan
Japan
United States
United States
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Country
Neighboring
countries
Country
level
obs.
Individ.
level
obs.
Waves
Max trade
partner
Colombia
Brazil
Ecuador
Panama
Peru
Venezuela
2 4,386
1994-1998
2010-2014
United States
United States
Cyprus
Greece
Turkey
2 1,943
2005-2009
2010-2014
Greece
Greece
Dominican Rep.
Haiti
Puerto Rico
1 279 1994-1998 - a
Egypt
Israel
Jordan
Libya
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
2 4,204
1999-2004
2005-2009
United States
United States
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
1 994 1999-2004 United States
Estonia
Latvia
Russia
2 2,392
1994-1998
2010-2014
Finnland
Russia
Ethiopia
Eritrea
Djibouti
Kenya
Somalia
Sudan
1 1,126 2005-2009 China
Finland
Norway
Russia
Sweden
2 1,777
1994-1998
2005-2009
Germany
Germany
France
Andorra
Belgium
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Luxembourg
Spain
Switzerland
1 869 2005-2009 Germany
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Country
Neighboring
countries
Country
level
obs.
Individ.
level
obs.
Waves
Max trade
partner
Georgia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Russia
Turkey
1 1,396 2005-2009 Turkey
Germany
Austria
Belgium
Czech Rep.
Denmark
France
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Poland
Switzerland
2 3,199
1994-1998
2005-2009
France
France
Ghana
Burkina Faso
Coˆte d’Ivoire
Togo
2 2,592
2005-2009
2010-2014
South Africa
South Africa
Great Britain
Belgium
France
Ireland
Netherlands
1 761 2005-2009 Germany
Guatemala
Belize
El Salvador
Honduras
Mexico
1 904 1999-2004 United States
Hong Kong China 1 959 2005-2009 China
Hungary
Austria
Croatia
Romania
Serbia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Ukraine
1 941 2005-2009 Germany
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Country
Neighboring
countries
Country
level
obs.
Individ.
level
obs.
Waves
Max trade
partner
India
Bangladesh
Bhutan
China
Myanmar (Burma)
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
3 3,626
1994-1998
1999-2004
2005-2009
United States
United States
United States
Indonesia
Australia
Malaysia
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Singapore
2 2,286
1999-2004
2005-2009
Japan
Japan
Iran
Afghanistan
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Iraq
Pakistan
Turkey
Turkmenistan
2 3,644
1999-2004
2005-2009
Japan
Japan
Iraq
Iran
Jordan
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
3 4,761
1999-2004
2005-2009
2010-2014
- a
- a
- a
Italy
Austria
France
Slovenia
Switzerland
1 606 2005-2009 Germany
Japan
China
South Korea
Russia
3 3,157
1999-2004
2005-2009
2010-2014
United States
United States
China
Jordan
Egypt
Iraq
Israel
Saudi Arabia
Syria
1 995 1999-2004 Iraq
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Country
Neighboring
countries
Country
level
obs.
Individ.
level
obs.
Waves
Max trade
partner
Kazakhstan
China
Kyrgyzstan
Russia
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
1 1,497 2010-2014 China
Kyrgyzstan
China
Kazakhstan
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
2 2,368
1999-2004
2010-2014
Russia
Russia
Latvia
Belarus
Estonia
Lithuania
Russia
1 1,036 1994-1998 Russia
Lithuania
Belarus
Latvia
Poland
Russia
1 829 1994-1998 Russia
Macedonia
Albania
Bulgaria
Greece
Kosovo
Serbia
2 1,531
1994-1998
1999-2004
Germany
Germany
Malaysia
Indonesia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
2 2,416
2005-2009
2010-2014
United States
China
Mali
Algeria
Burkina Faso
Coˆte d’Ivoire
Guinea
Mauritania
Niger
Senegal
1 458 2005-2009 South Africa
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Country
Neighboring
countries
Country
level
obs.
Individ.
level
obs.
Waves
Max trade
partner
Mexico
Belize
Guatemala
United States
4 6,038
1994-1998
1999-2004
2005-2009
2010-2014
United States
United States
United States
United States
Moldova
Romania
Ukraine
3 2,706
1994-1998
1999-2004
2005-2009
Russia
Russia
Ukraine
Morocco Algeria 3 1,191
1999-2004
2005-2009
2010-2014
France
France
France
Netherlands
Belgium
Germany
Great Britain
2 2,235
2005-2009
2010-2014
Germany
Germany
New Zealand Australia 3 2,273
1994-1998
1999-2004
2010-2014
Australia
Australia
China
Nigeria
Benin
Cameroon
Chad
Niger
3 4,793
1994-1998
1999-2004
2010-2014
United States
United States
United States
Norway
Finland
Russia
Sweden
2 1,959
1994-1998
2005-2009
Great Britain
Great Britain
Pakistan
Afghanistan
India
Iran
2 1,952
1999-2004
2010-2014
- a
United Arab Emirates
Peru
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
4 4,810
1994-1998
1999-2004
2005-2009
2010-2014
United States
United States
United States
United States
Philippines
Indonesia
Malaysia
2 2,330
1999-2004
2010-2014
United States
Japan
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Country
Neighboring
countries
Country
level
obs.
Individ.
level
obs.
Waves
Max trade
partner
Poland
Belarus
Czech Rep.
Germany
Lithuania
Russia
Slovakia
Ukraine
2 1,770
2005-2009
2010-2014
Germany
Germany
Qatar
Bahrain
Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates
1 993 2010-2014 - a
Romania
Bulgaria
Hungary
Moldova
Serebia
Ukraine
3 3,878
1994-1998
2005-2009
2010-2014
Italy
Italy
Germany
Russia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
China
Estonia
Finland
Georgia
Japan
Kazakhstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Mongolia
North Korea
Norway
Poland
Ukraine
3 5,332
1994-1998
2005-2009
2010-2014
- a
Germany
China
Rwanda
Burundi
D.R. Kongo
Tanzania
Uganda
2 2,214
2005-2009
2010-2014
Kenya
Tanzania
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Country
Neighboring
countries
Country
level
obs.
Individ.
level
obs.
Waves
Max trade
partner
Saudi Arabia
Bahrain
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
United Arab Emirates
Egypt
Yemen
1 1,281 1999-2004 - a
Serbia
Albania
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Croatia
Hungary
Romania
Macedonia
Montenegro
Kosovo
2 2,052
1994-1998
1999-2004
- a
- a
Singapore
Indonesia
Malaysia
1 1,833 2010-2014 China
Slovakia
Austria
Czech Rep.
Hungary
Poland
Ukraine
1 833 1994-1998 Germany
Slovenia
Austria
Croatia
Hungary
Italy
2 1,904
2005-2009
2010-2014
Germany
Germany
South Africa
Botswana
Lesotho
Mozambique
Namibia
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
2 4,714
1994-1998
1999-2004
- a
United States
South Korea
China
Japan
North Korea
3 3,455
1999-2004
2005-2009
2010-2014
United States
China
China
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Country
Neighboring
countries
Country
level
obs.
Individ.
level
obs.
Waves
Max trade
partner
Spain
Andorra
France
Gibraltar
Portugal
4 3,670
1994-1998
1999-2004
2005-2009
2010-2014
France
France
France
France
Sweden
Denmark
Finland
Norway
3 2,850
1994-1998
2005-2009
2010-2014
Germany
Germany
Germany
Switzerland
Austria
France
Germany
Italy
Lichtenstein
2 1,875
1994-1998
2005-2009
Germany
Germany
Tanzania
Burundi
D.R. Kongo
Kenya
Malawi
Mozambique
Rwanda
Uganda
Zambia
1 831 1999-2004 Great Britain
Thailand
Cambodia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar (Burma)
1 1,354 2005-2009 Japan
Trinidad and
Tobago
Barbados
Venezuela
2 1,909
2005-2009
2010-2014
United States
United States
Turkey
Armenia
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Georgia
Greece
Iran
Iraq
Syria
4 6,702
1994-1998
1999-2004
2005-2009
2010-2014
Germany
Germany
Russia
Germany
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Country
Neighboring
countries
Country
level
obs.
Individ.
level
obs.
Waves
Max trade
partner
Uganda
D.R. Kongo
Kenya
Rwanda
Sudan
Tanzania
1 538 1999-2004 Kenya
Ukraine
Belarus
Hungary
Moldova
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
3 4,087
1994-1998
2005-2009
2010-2014
Russia
Russia
Russia
United States
Canada
Mexico
3 4,507
1994-1998
1999-2004
2010-2014
Canada
Canada
Canada
Uruguay
Argentina
Brazil
3 2,536
1994-1998
2005-2009
2010-2014
Brazil
Argentina
Brazil
Viet Nam
Cambodia
China
Laos
2 2,239
1999-2004
2005-2009
Japan
China
Zambia
Angola
Botswana
D.R. Kongo
Malawi
Mozambique
Namibia
Zimbabwe
Tanzania
1 1,063 2005-2009 South Africa
Zimbabwe
Botswana
Mozambique
Namibia
South Africa
Zambia
1 761 1999-2004 South Africa
Total 154 182,783
Note: a no COMTRADE data available
Table 3.7: Sample countries
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You are not alone: Experimental
evidence of risk taking when
social comparisons matter
4.1 Introduction
Since Veblen (1899) economists have considered income comparisons to be an
important objective for individuals that yields manifold implications in economics.
While theorists extended the analysis of income comparisons to its consequences
for taking risk (e.g., Robson 1992, Konrad and Lommerud 1993, Becker et al.
2005) less empirical evidence has since followed. We contribute to the literature by
investigating the case of income-rank comparisons in a laboratory experiment. Our
theoretical predictions show that, compared to standard expected utility theory,
income-rank comparisons lead to less (more) risk taking in case of lotteries with
more downside (upside) probability mass. Overall, we find that individuals respond
in their risk taking to comparison concerns. Individuals take less risk when lotteries
have more probability weight on the downside. However, we do not find an effect
for lotteries with more upside probability mass. Individuals respond more strongly
to comparison concerns when reference subjects are of the same sex.
The economic outcomes of others matter for individuals in many contexts (e.g.,
Sobel 2005, Fehr and Schmidt 2006). However, empirical research did not embrace
the interaction of social comparisons and decisions under uncertainty until rela-
tively recently even though decisions involving risk usually take place in a social
context.1 Individuals usually face decisions on pursuing personal education, choos-
1Early experimental papers on social concerns and risk taking investigate, for instance, pro-
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ing an occupation, making savings or financial investment decisions while being
aware of the situation of others. Consider an investor facing the decision on how
to allocate his savings to financial investment opportunities. He could invest a
major part of his funds in risky stocks or rather in a low return but safe savings
account. While his investment choice will impact his future consumption, at the
same time, his investments will have implications for his relative income position,
for instance, relative to his sparkish brother-in-law. Higher financial risk might
offer the chance to do better or fall behind in terms of income. As the investor
of this example, we are not alone in this world but we have siblings, colleagues,
friends, and neighbors. When we feel comparison concerns toward one or the other
it seems natural that we incorporate not only the implications for the absolute but
also for the relative income into our risk taking decisions.
To investigate the effect of comparisons on risk taking, we first need to take
a stand in which form comparison concerns enter the individual utility. One pos-
sibility is that individuals care about their rank in the income distribution, as
first formalized by Frank (1985b), thereby assuming that comparison concerns are
intrinsically ordinal.2 Alternatively, the distance between the own income and the
income of others might enter the utility, implying that income comparison con-
cerns are cardinal.3 While the empirical literature generally finds that individuals
care about income comparisons (see, e.g., Easterlin 1995, Clark and Oswald 1996,
McBride 2001, Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005, and Luttmer 2005) few studies refer to a
possible difference between comparison considerations based on the rank in the in-
come distribution and the distance in income to others.4 In the following, we focus
on income-rank comparisons but address preferences for the distance in incomes
in an additional treatment.
cedural fairness (e.g., Bolton et al. 2005, Krawczyk and Le Lec 2010) or the relationship of
other regarding concerns and risk attitudes (e.g., Brennan et al. 2008, Gu¨th et al. 2008). For
an overview of the literature on social concerns and risk attitudes see Trautmann and Vieider
(2012).
2Also, see Frank (2013) for applications of utility that is dependent on the rank relative to
others beyond monetary wealth or income.
3The assumption that individuals care about the distance in incomes was first formalized by
Duesenberry (1949) (see Clark et al. 2008 for an overview of the literature). Note that the choice
to apply the distance or the rank in income has an impact on the results in many theoretical
applications (Bilancini and Boncinelli 2008).
4One exception is a study by Clark et al. (2009). They find that a lower rank in the local
income distribution of a neighborhood relates negatively to subjective well-being. However,
conditional on the personal income, having richer neighbors shows a positive effect. Clark et al.
(2009) argue that having rich rather than poor neighbors provides other positive externalities
than implied by relative standing concerns. These positive externalities could explain the positive
effect of richer neighbors on subjective well-being.
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Robson (1992) and Konrad and Lommerud (1993) are the first to theoretically
analyze the impact of social comparisons on risk attitudes. The former study as-
sumes income-rank comparisons while the latter models income comparisons as
the distance between incomes. Following Robson (1992) we rely on income-rank
comparisons to derive theoretical hypotheses. Inspired by Konrad’s and Lom-
merud’s (1993) distinction hat the correlation structure of own risks with risks of
others can matter, we analyze in our baseline scenario an environment where the
risk of individuals is perfectly correlated. In an additional treatment we vary the
correlation structure and investigate the case of uncorrelated risk.
At first sight, the effect of income-rank comparisons on risk taking behavior is
not obvious and one might come up with examples concluding that income-rank
comparisons simply induce more risk taking (e.g., Frank 2008, p. 1778). We show
that the properties of the respective probability distribution of a lottery are crucial
factors. Compared to standard expected utility theory subjects are expected to
take more risk in case of lotteries with more upside probability mass but less risk
in case of more probability weight on the downside. Intuitively, individuals shift
more income to the state of the world that is more likely to materialize so that they
are more likely to be ahead in income-rank once this state does materialize. We
apply these predictions to empirically test the effect of income-rank comparisons
on risk taking.
An empirical analysis of the impact of social comparisons on individual deci-
sions is intrinsically difficult in the field. The controlled environment in the labo-
ratory allows us to focus on a clean isolation of the effect of comparison concerns
on risk taking. We can compare situations, in which we eliminate income com-
parisons to the greatest possible extent, to similar situations, in which we expect
income comparisons. In the experiment, subjects face classical portfolio choice de-
cisions where they allocate their endowment between a risky lottery and a risk-free
investment opportunity. The risky lotteries differ in terms of upside and downside
probability mass (i.e., whether a gain or loss is more likely) but offer identical ex-
pected returns. In the baseline treatment “Alone” subjects face portfolio choices
while being alone in the laboratory so that income comparisons should not be of
any immediate concern. In the reference treatment “Social” subjects enter the
laboratory in groups of two and simultaneously face the same portfolio choices as
the other participant. The change in the share of the endowment that subjects
invest into the risky lottery, comparing treatments Alone and Social, allows us to
investigate the effect of income comparisons on risk taking. Both treatments Alone
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and Social are identical except for the present second participant. Importantly,
subjects neither observe decisions nor earnings of the other participant nor do they
interact, so that we can rule out other peer effects.
We find evidence of an effect of income comparisons on risk taking. In line
with our theoretical predictions, individuals take less risk for lotteries with more
downside probability mass. However, we do not find a significant effect in the
case of more upside probability weight. We test whether this asymmetric finding
can be explained by other forms of comparison concerns, such as a preference for
the distance in incomes a` la Konrad and Lommerud (1993) or social loss aversion.
To do so we run an additional treatment in which income risk is uncorrelated
among participants. Consequently, we increase the risk for the relative income
position while we leave the risk for the personal income unchanged. In contrast
to preferences for the distance in incomes and social loss aversion we find that
the effect of comparisons on risk taking turns out to be similar but weaker in
the additional treatment. Furthermore, for all treatments holds that the effect of
comparison considerations on risk taking is predominantly present in situations
where the reference subject is of the same sex as the deciding subject. Thus,
attributes of reference subjects are a crucial piece of the picture and Festinger’s
(1954) idea of social comparisons being stronger among more similar individuals
seems to extend to the income and risk taking dimension. Independent of the
reference subject, measured effects appear to be strongest for female individuals.
We contribute to a small but growing number of experimental studies that are
inspired by social comparisons and risk taking.5 These studies generated partly
contradicting results. For instance, Rohde and Rohde (2011) do not find evidence
of social comparisons affecting risk taking. However, applying physiological mea-
sures, Bault et al. (2008) and Bault et al. (2011) find that lottery outcomes do
affect subjects differently for different lottery outcomes of others. They find that
social gains lead to stronger responses than social losses. Focusing directly on risk
taking behavior, Linde and Sonnemans (2012) find that subjects take less risk when
they can win at most as much as a certain payoff of a reference subject (social loss
situation) compared to the case when they can win at least as much as a reference
subject (social gain situation). In contrast to Linde and Sonnemans, Schwerter
5Comparison concerns are effectively a form of peer effects and our work also relates to the
literature on peer effects under uncertainty (e.g., Bougheas et al. 2013, Cooper and Rege 2011,
Viscusi et al. 2011). In this strand of the literature the work of Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2015)
is closest to us. They investigate peer effects in a binary lottery choice setting and find that the
probability to switch a previous stated lottery choice can be explained by concerns about the
observed choices of other individuals and by relative payoff concerns.
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(2013) finds that subjects take more risk when they observe a higher rather than
a lower certain payoff of others, in order to surpass or to stay ahead of others.
Consequently, Schwerter interprets his results in favor of social loss aversion while
Linde and Sonnemans argue that their findings suggest that loss aversion does not
easily extend to the case of social comparisons.6 Motivated by the insurance mar-
ket, Friedl et al. (2014) find experimental evidence that social comparisons make
insurance policies less attractive when risks are correlated. Dijk et al. (2014) fo-
cus on rank-comparisons and performance pay and apply a dynamic setting where
subjects accumulate investment returns over several rounds. They find evidence
that under-performers adjust their investments toward positively skewed assets
while over-performers adjust their investments toward negatively skewed assets.
This holds similarly for situations when subjects only observe the performance of
others, and for situations when individuals are actually paid according to their
relative performance.
The setup of this paper deviates from the previous studies in important aspects.
First, in our experiment, subjects neither observe decisions of others (as in many
peer effect studies) nor what others earn (as, for instance, in Linde and Sonnemans
2012, Schwerter 2013 or Dijk et al. 2014). The former point is important to
control for any sort of peer effect that is not related to comparison concerns,
the latter feature ensures that subjects do not adjust expectations about likely
experimental earnings when they observe earnings of others before they make
their decisions. Second, while other studies vary payoffs or lotteries of reference
subjects when social comparison concerns are at work, we identify the effect of
comparisons on risk taking by comparing situations with social comparisons to
situations without social comparisons. Third, in contrast to other studies we apply
a classical portfolio choice setting.7 Finally, while for many studies the theoretical
starting point is an extension of Kahneman’s and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory
to the social dimension, we focus on income-rank comparisons and subsequently
analyze whether other forms of social comparisons, such as social loss aversion,
can explain our results.8,9
6Recently, Grimm et al. (2015) also find evidence that individuals more often choose more
risky decisions when they are in a disadvantaged initial position relative to another party.
7In the experimental literature a portfolio choice setup to investigate risk taking was first
introduced by Gneezy and Potters (1997) and has been applied in different contexts (e.g., Sutter
2007, Charness and Gneezy 2010).
8Note that the results of the studies investigating social loss aversion do not necessarily
disagree with income-rank comparisons (e.g., Schwerter’s 2013 results seem to be in line with
income-rank-dependent preferences).
9The effect of preferences for distributional fairness (i.e., people dislike inequity) on risk taking
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4.2 Theoretical framework
4.2.1 Risk taking and income-rank comparisons
Consider a model with two individuals i ∈ {1, 2}. Individuals care about absolute
income yi ∈ R+ and the rank in income. Their utility function exhibits the
following form:
U = u (yi) + S(yi, y−i),(4.1)
with S(·) =

W if yi > y−i
0 if yi = y−i
L if yi < y−i
, where W > 0 > L.(4.2)
While the part u (yi) represents a standard (consumption) part of the utility
function S(yi, y−i) adds a positive, negative or zero utility value depending on
the relative income position to the other individual −i. Income yi depends on
the endowment E that is identical for individuals and normalized to one, and on
i’s investment decision of allocating E across a risky and a risk-free investment
opportunity. The risky investment offers a return θG > 1 with a probability pG and
a return of θB = 0 with a probability 1 − pG and is perfectly correlated for both
subjects. The risk-free investment allows individuals to store income at zero costs
(return of 1). We assume that pGθG > 1 holds at any time to keep the problem
non-trivial in the case of risk aversion. Defining ai as share of E invested into the
risky project, expected income is
(4.3) E(yi) = 1 + (pGθG − 1)ai.
As we focus on the effect of income-rank-dependent utility on risk taking de-
cisions, we abstract from strategic interaction between individuals to simplify the
analysis. Thus, we assume that individual 1 actively chooses the share of risky
investment a1, while individual 2 is passive in the sense that a2 is randomly drawn
from a continuous uniform probability distribution F (a2) with a corresponding
also attracted some interest in the literature. Recently Bolton et al. (2015) find no evidence that
social risk taking is driven by this type of preferences. Other studies that investigate social risk
taking and whose results do not fit social preferences for distributional fairness include Bereby-
Meyer and Roth (2006), Gu¨th et al. (2008), Brennan et al. (2008), Bolton and Ockenfels (2010)
and Cappelen et al. (2013).
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probability density function f(a2). The active individual faces the following max-
imization problem:
(4.4) max
a1
E[u (y1 (a1)) + S(y1 (a1) , y2 (a2))].
Abstracting from S(y1, y2) for a moment and only considering the standard
part of the utility function E[u (y1 (a1))], it is straightforward to derive an optimal
share a∗1 that depends on risk preferences when we rely on standard assumptions
with respect to u (·). Starting from a∗1 the question of interest can be reformulated
as follows: How does risk taking, i.e. the optimal choice of a1, change when
the income comparison part S(y1, y2) enters the situation? This can be done by
considering the following trade-off: adjusting a1 away from a
∗
1 causes costs related
to the standard part of the utility function, u (y1 (a1)), but offers the chance to
gather an income comparison gain (or loss) due to S(y1, y2). Starting from the
optimum without income comparisons, a∗1, we can define the costs of deviating
from a∗1 as
(4.5) C(a1) = E[u (y1 (a
∗
1))]− E[u (y1 (a1))],
where the first term on the right-hand side is a constant representing the utility
level of the standard part of the utility function given the optimal a∗1.
10 It follows
that C(a∗1) = C
′(a∗1) = 0 as a minimum, C
′(a1) > 0 if a1 > a∗1 and C
′(a1) < 0 if
a1 < a
∗
1. A sufficient condition for this cost function to be convex, C
′′(a1) > 0, is
that u (y1 (a1)) is strictly concave, and thus, that individuals are risk averse.
11,12
The maximization problem of individual 1 can be reformulated to
max
a1
pi1 = pG × [F (a1)W + (1− F (a1))L](4.6)
+ (1− pG)× [F (a1)L+ (1− F (a1))W ]− C(a1).
The income comparison gain or loss for individual 1 in (4.6) is determined by
the outcome of the risky investment and by the personal share invested into the
10Note that we define C(·) in utils rather than pecuniary certainty equivalents. Although this
approach seems a bit unconventional, it proves to be constructive for our purpose.
11For a derivation of the sufficient condition for the convexity of C(·) see Appendix 4.B.1.
12We assume from now on that individuals are risk averse in the standard part of the utility
function (i.e. u (y1 (a1)) is strictly concave).
115
Chapter 4. You are not alone
risky asset a1 relative to the other individual’s share a2. Note that both individuals
face a perfectly correlated investment project, and thus, both individuals will end
up receiving simultaneously the return θG in the good state or a return of 0 in
the bad state. Therefore, in the good state individual 1 will gain comparison
utility S1(y1 (a1) , y2 (a2)) = W iff a1 > a2 and lose utility S
1(y1 (a1) , y2 (a2)) = L
iff a1 < a2. Analog, in the bad state S
1(y1 (a1) , y2 (a2)) = L iff a1 > a2 and
S1(y1 (a1) , y2 (a2)) = W iff a1 < a2. Solving problem (4.6) yields the first-order
condition
(4.7) f(as1)[W − L][2pG − 1] = C ′(as1).
When the left-hand side of (4.7) is larger than zero, C ′(as1) must be positive, and
hence, the optimal share invested into the risky project when incorporating income-
rank comparisons (as1) must be larger than the optimal share without comparison
considerations (a∗1), i.e. we observe a
s
1 > a
∗
1 (more risk taking). Analog follows that
when the left-hand side of equation (4.7) is smaller than zero, as1 < a
∗
1 must hold
(i.e. subjects take less risk when incorporating income-rank comparisons). When
the left-hand side of (4.7) is zero as1 = a
∗
1 holds.
Considering W > 0 > L and f(a1) being a density function, it is easy to
see that the sign of the left-hand side of (4.7) is solely determined by pG. When
pG >
1
2
holds, the sign of the left-hand side of (4.7) will be positive, while in case
of pG <
1
2
the sign will be negative. For pG =
1
2
the left-hand side of (4.7) will
be zero. Intuitively, introducing income-rank comparisons will lead to more (less)
risk taking in case more probability mass is on the good (bad) possible outcome
of the risky project (i.e. more upside (downside) probability weight). Income-
rank comparison will have no effect on risk taking in case of symmetric lotteries.
Note that this holds even though we hold the expected return of the risky project
constant. The first-order condition is sufficient as C(a1) is convex and as we assume
that a2 is uniformly distributed (i.e. f(a1) in (4.7) is a constant).
Furthermore, we can consider the effect of a shift in probability weight between
the bad and the good state on equilibrium risk taking. From (4.7) we see that13
(4.8)
∂a1
∂pG
=
2f(a1)× (W − L) + (θG − 1)× u′(a1θG + (1− a1)) + u′(1− a1)
C ′′(a1)
> 0,
again relying on C(a1) being convex, W > 0 > L and f(a1) being a constant.
13Note that C ′(a1) depends directly on pG (see equation (4.11) in Appendix 4.B.1).
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Equation (4.8) shows that income-rank comparisons lead to an equilibrium share
invested into the risky project that is increasing in pG. Consequently, comparing
lotteries with more upside (downside) probability weight, the equilibrium risk tak-
ing is higher for increasing upside probability weight (increasing in pG) and lower
for decreasing downside probability weight (decreasing in (1−pG)). Put differently,
the absolute effect of income-rank comparisons on risk taking is increasing for more
asymmetrically allocated probability weight to the upside or to the downside.
4.2.2 Experimental design
The main part of the experiment consists of two treatments that are implemented
in a between-subjects design. In each treatment subjects receive an endowment of
175 experimental currency units (ECU) that they allocate between a risky project
(i.e. a lottery) and a risk-free project. ECUs invested into the risk-free project
will be paid to subjects one-to-one while the return of the lottery depends on the
outcome of independent dice rolls at the end of the experiment. A lottery pays a
return θG > 1 with some probability pG while with a probability of (1 − pG) the
lottery pays nothing.14
Before the experiment starts subjects participate in a quiz in which each sub-
ject has to answer questions to ensure a good understanding of the experiment.15
Subjects play 9 independent rounds. In each round subjects receive a new endow-
ment and face a new lottery that exhibits different probabilities pG and (1 − pG)
and different payoffs but an identical expected payoff of pG × θG (Table 4.1 shows
all lotteries).16 The risk-free project remains unchanged over all rounds.
The computer randomly selects exactly one of the 9 rounds for payment.17 At
14In the following we refer to pG as upside probability and to 1− pG as downside probability.
15More precisely, subjects observe an investment decision and have to answer questions about
implications for the payoff given certain realizations of the lottery. At the beginning of the quiz
subjects are asked to enter a number between 0 and 175 without knowing for what reason. This
stated number determines the investment decision for the example that is used during the quiz.
This twist allows us to present an example without introducing a default investment decision of
the experimenter that could possibly influence the subsequent decisions of subjects during the
main part of the experiment.
16Lotteries with different probabilities pG and (1− pG) ensure that each subject faces lotteries
with more upside and lotteries with more downside probability weight.
17In principle, participants might perceive the 9 independent rounds as one compounded lottery
even though at the end of the experiment exactly one round is randomly drawn and payoff
relevant. If so, this would introduce an effect of earlier rounds on later rounds. However, such a
behavior seems unlikely to be at work. First, in the instructions subjects are explicitly told to
consider each round as independent from the earlier rounds. Second, usually narrow bracketing is
a common behavior of individuals, and thus, we should expect that subjects treat the lotteries in
different rounds as independent lotteries (for instance, see Rabin and Weizsa¨cker 2009). Finally, to
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Lottery Probabilities
Return
(multipliers)
Exp.
Return
(multipliers)
Std.
Dev.
n
Good state
pG
Bad state
(1− pG)
Good state
θG
al×175
Bad state
θB
θG
al×175×pG
more downside
prob. mass
L1 33% 67% 3.75 0 1.25 1.77
L3 17% 83% 7.5 0 1.25 2.90
L5 8% 92% 15 0 1.25 4.15
L7 6% 94% 22.5 0 1.25 5.15
more upside
prob. mass
L2 67% 33% 1.88 0 1.25 0.56
L4 83% 17% 1.5 0 1.25 0.88
L6 92% 8% 1.36 0 1.25 0.38
L8 94% 6% 1.32 0 1.25 0.30
Symmetric
L9 50% 50% 2.5 0 1.25 1.25
Note: Each subject plays all lotteries and participates in one treatment only (between-subjects
design). Returns of lotteries are stated as the multiplier for the invested experimental currency
units (ECUs). All probabilities are explained to subjects in terms of dice roll results, and thus,
all probabilities are presented to subjects in an intuitive way. For example, consider Lottery 1
(L1): in case the experimenter rolls a 6 using a regular die (i.e. out of 1, ..., 6) the subject’s
invested ECUs will be multiplied by 3.75, converted to Euros and paid to the subject at the end
of the experiment. When the outcome is 5 or below the subject won’t receive any money from
the risky project (the invested ECUs are multiplied by zero). While we focus in our analysis on
lotteries with more upside or downside probability mass according to our theoretical predictions,
we also implement one symmetric lottery (L9) that we can use for a plausibility check.
Table 4.1: Lotteries
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the end of the experiment the lottery of the selected round appears on the screen of
the participant. The experimenter enters the room and rolls dice clearly visible for
the subject using a dice cup.18 The experimenter enters the results of the dice rolls
into the computer and payoffs are accordingly calculated by the computer.19,20
Treatment Alone In the baseline treatment Alone each session consists
of one subject so that each subject is alone in the room during the experiment.
Nothing in the instructions indicates that other participants take part in the ex-
periment. Subjects are invited with a time-lag to ensure that they never meet and
that they are alone in the laboratory. During the experiment subjects observe the
lottery for the current decision on a screen that is placed next to them but in the
middle of the room. Subjects enter their decisions into a “private” screen in front
of them.21
Treatment Social In treatment Social two subjects participate in each ses-
sion and participants are aware of the other participant.22 In the laboratory room
subjects sit in cubicles to ensure privacy. Importantly, both subjects know that in
each round they invest into the same lottery as the other subject and that the final
realization of the lottery at the end of the experiment is the same for both subjects.
Subjects observe this “social” lottery on a single screen placed in the middle of
the room. All decisions of subjects are entered into fields on their private screen
in front of them. Before the experiment starts, subjects learn that one participant
will be passive while the other will actively invest. It is commonly known that
for the passive participant the computer randomly draws an investment share a2
for the investment into the risky lottery from an unknown distribution. The com-
control for such a possible, effect we implement two groups of subjects that see the 9 independent
rounds in different sequences. As subjects only learn about lotteries of a round once a round
starts, a different sequence of rounds leaves participants with a different history of information
at the beginning of each round. Because we do not observe a significant difference between the
two groups we conclude that participants indeed treat rounds as independent situations.
18We implement physical dice rolls as this is a generally accepted, trustworthy mechanism to
implement randomness. We intend to avoid the possibility that subjects doubt the fair random-
ness implementation of a computer (that is basically a “black box”).
19The experimenter does not observe the investment decision of the subject when the dice roll
results are entered into the computer, and thus, the experimenter does not learn the experimental
income of the subjects.
20Dependent on the lottery, the experimenter rolls one die or two dice (also see Table 4.1).
21See Figure 4.3 in Appendix 4.A for an illustration of the setup.
22Subjects had to wait in front of the laboratory rooms (only for treatment Social). However, in
most cases subjects sat separated by several chairs between them and we observed no interaction
between subjects.
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puter draws a2 anew and independently for each round and displays the current
randomly drawn a2 on the private screen of the passive subject only. The other
participant decides actively on her investment share a1, i.e. how much to invest
into the risky lottery. While the active subject is aware of the passivity of the
other subject the active subject never observes the passive subject’s investments
share a2.
23 Analog, also the passive subject never observes the active participant’s
decision a1.
The design feature of assigning one subject to be passive is important to rule
out strategic interaction, but also costly due to many incentivized passive subjects
to generate observations. To make use of passive subjects we introduce a simple
measure of subjective well-being in all treatments that we can later apply to test
the effect of income-rank comparisons along this dimension. After each investment
decision (or random draw in case of passive subjects) each participant is asked for
her satisfaction with respect to the current lottery on a scale of 0 to 10. To test the
effect of income-rank comparisons using measured satisfaction we need a baseline
treatment analog to treatment Alone.
Treatment Alone Passive This treatment is identical to treament Alone
but that the single subject of each session is assigend to be passive meaning that the
computer randomly draws a from some distribution identical to the case explained
above.
4.2.3 Experimental procedures
The experiment was programmed and conducted using the experiment software z-
Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and run at the Max Planck Laboratory for Experimental
Research in Social Science (econlab) in Munich. The participating subjects are
enrolled at the Technical University of Munich and the University of Munich,
and recruited from all different fields of study using ORSEE (Greiner 2004); for
summary statistics and an overview of the treatments see tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 in
Appendix 4.A. After having completed the main experiment, subjects answer a set
of post-experimental questions on individual characteristics and attitudes. At this
point, we also conducted a set of incentivized post-experimental tasks including
a test to assess risk aversion (Holt and Laury 2002).24 During the incentivized
23For more details see the instructions presented in Appendix 4.C.
24We also implement as an alternative risk aversion measure a general risk-question (Dohmen
et al. 2011).
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post-experimental tasks participants earned on average 1.2 Euros on top of the
earnings from the main part of the experiment. Overall, participants earned on
average 14.8 Euros including a show-up fee of 6 Euros and a session approximately
lasted for 45 minutes.
4.2.4 Predictions
Pairwise comparisons between treatments allow us to investigate whether income-
rank comparison considerations affect risk taking. While subjects face identical
investment decisions in all treatments, in treatment Alone the investment decision
affects only the personal income while in treatment Social the investment decision
will also determine the relative performance (rank) compared to another partic-
ipant in the laboratory. Thus, we can test the effect of income-rank-dependent
utility analyzing the investment choice a1: Assuming that subjects care about
their rank relative to another participant they adjust the share invested into the
risky lottery, a1, when we compare situations where investment decisions have
implications for the relative income position (rank) (in treatment Social) to situa-
tions where investment decisions have solely implications for the personal income
(in treatment Alone):
Prediction 4.1 Comparing treatment Social to treatment Alone,
(i) for lotteries with more downside than upside probability mass (pG <
1
2
) subjects
invest a lower share a1 into the risky lottery (take less risk);
(ii) for lotteries with more upside than downside probability mass (pG >
1
2
) subjects
invest a higher share a1 into the risky lottery (take more risk).
Prediction 4.1 emanates from equation (4.7) of Section 4.2.1. Intuitively, the
probability to be ahead of the other participant increases when subjects adjust
their investment (relative to the situations without comparison considerations) so
that the income is higher in the state that most probably materializes.25 We test
Prediction 4.1 against the alternative hypothesis that individuals do not experience
comparison concerns, and thus, that investment is similar in all treatments.
We can further analyze implications of income-rank comparison considerations
for risk taking by considering the treatment difference between Social and Alone
for lotteries with more or less asymmetrically allocated probability mass:
25More precisely, subjects tradeoff an expected utility gain (loss) from being ahead (behind)
in rank with costs of deviating from their investment choice that would be optimal abstracting
from comparison considerations (see Section 4.2.1).
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Prediction 4.2 Comparing treatment Social to treatment Alone,
(i) for lotteries with more downside than upside probability mass subjects’ invest-
ment into the risky lottery a1 (risk taking) is decreasing in the downside probability
mass (1− pG);
(ii) for lotteries with more upside than downside probability mass subjects’ invest-
ment into the risky lottery a1 (risk taking) is increasing in the upside probability
mass pG.
Prediction 4.2 follows from equation (4.8) of Section 4.2.1 and intuitively states
that the absolute effect of income-rank comparisons on risk taking is larger when
probability weights of a lottery are more asymmetrically allocated to either the
downside or the upside. To test Prediction 4.2 we will exploit variation in the
lotteries that subjects face and analyze the treatment difference of a1 not only for
lotteries with asymmetrically allocated probability mass but also for more or less
asymmetrically allocated probability mass.
Focusing on passive subjects and measured satisfaction we can derive further
testable predictions in line with Section 4.2.1. Passive subjects cannot adjust their
investment, and thus, we can implement identical investment shares a2 for both
treatments Social and Alone Passive.26 Thus, for passive subjects, comparing
situations in which lotteries have implications for the rank in income (in treatment
Social) to situation where lotteries have solely implications for the personal income
(in treatment Alone Passive) participants should be less (more) satisfied when they
are more likely to be behind (ahead) in expected income. To assess whether one
is more likely to be ahead or behind, first, subjects need to form expectations
about a plausible probability distribution of active subjects’ investment choices
a1. Intuitively, such plausible expectations should incorporate that active subjects
take less (more) risk in situations of more risky (less risky) lotteries.27 From this
intuition, it follows that passive subjects should expect to be more likely to be
behind in income-rank when lotteries have more upside probability weight and
their randomly drawn investment share a2 is very low or when lotteries have more
downside probability weight and their investment share a2 is very high.
28 Thus,
26Recall, that a2 (a1) represents the share of risky investment for passive (active) subjects.
27This reasoning assumes that passive subjects anticipate that active subjects behave on av-
erage risk averse even for small stakes, a common behavior among individuals as a large body of
experimental literature shows. Also note that the empirical distribution of investment decisions
in this study also clearly shows that subjects behave risk averse in their investment decisions,
and thus, passive subjects are correct when expecting risk averse behavior of active subjects.
28Again, this follows from Section 4.2.1. Also note that lotteries with more probability mass on
the downside exhibit by construction higher standard deviations (are more risky) than lotteries
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in such situations passive subjects should be less satisfied in treatment Social
compared to treatment Alone Passive.
Prediction 4.3 Comparing treatment Social to treatment Alone Passive, passive
subjects are less satisfied
(i) in situations of lotteries with more upside than downside probability mass and
low a2, and
(ii) in situations of lotteries with more downside than upside probability mass and
high a2.
To test Prediction 4.3 we implement groups of passive subjects with high and
low randomly drawn a2.
29 Furthermore, we ensure that randomly drawn invest-
ment shares a2 of each group are identical between treatments Social and Alone
Passive to perfectly control for any effect of a2 on satisfaction that is unrelated to
comparison considerations.30,31
with more probability mass on the upside (see Table 4.1).
29We implement two groups of passive subjects: a “high-risk” group that receives high risk
shares and a “low-risk” group that receives low risk shares. In a first step, we recorded the empir-
ical distribution of the first 10 active subjects in treatment Alone. Second, each group of passive
subjects receives random draws from a different part of this recorded empirical distribution. The
“high-risk” group receives random draws from the right part outside the 95% confidence interval
of the empirical distribution of risk shares (i.e. relatively high a2). The “low-risk” group receives
random draws from the left part outside the 95% confidence interval of the empirical distribution
of risk shares (i.e. relatively low a2). Note that all risk-shares are determined (drawn) exactly
once for each group and each portfolio choice problem, and thus, risk shares for each group of
passive subjects are identical in both treatments, Social and Alone Passive.
30Note that analog to Prediction 4.3, one might suspect that passive subjects should be more
satisfied when being more likely to be ahead in rank when comparing treatment Social to treat-
ment Alone. One might argue that this is the case in situations of lotteries with more upside
probability weight and very high a2 and in situations of lotteries with more downside probability
weight and very low randomly drawn a2. However, the case of being ahead is generally less clear
because active subjects should react strategically to the comparison situations in treatment So-
cial (in line with Section 4.2.1). Consequently, the uncertainty of being ahead in income in such
situations is larger compared to being behind in income (as stated in Prediction 4.3) because
active subjects will adjust their investment decision a1 into the unfavorable direction for passive
subjects.
31Note that it is not precisely clear how high (low) the randomly drawn investment share a2
must be to observe Prediction 4.3. In principle, this depends on the expectations of passive
subjects: subjects should be more (less) satisfied in treatment Social compared to treatment
Alone Passive whenever they expect a2 > a1 (a2 < a1), meaning a higher (lower) risky invest-
ment than the active subject in situations of lotteries with more upside probability weight. For
lotteries with more downside probability weight passive subjects should be more (less) satisfied
in treatment Social whenever they expect a2 < a1 (a2 > a1).
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4.3 Results
In a nutshell, we find that income comparisons lead to less risk taking in case of
lotteries with more downside probability weight. For lotteries with more upside
probability weight we find no significant effect. Furthermore, the characteristics
of the reference individual are crucial for the effect of income comparisons on risk
taking. Effects are stronger when the deciding (active) subject and the reference
(passive) subject exhibit the same sex, and thus, when subjects are more similar.
Independent of the reference subject, measured effects appear to be strongest for
female subjects.
Before we continue with the main analysis it is important to note that invest-
ment choices and satisfaction are sensitive to different portfolio choice situations.
For instance, subjects invest a higher share of their endowment into the risky lot-
tery (i.e. higher risk share a1) when lotteries are less risky. Figure 4.4 in Appendix
4.A shows that subjects invest on average 59.0 percent of their endowment into
the risky lottery when lotteries have a below median standard deviation compared
to on average only 33.9 percent in case of an above median standard deviation lot-
teries.32 A negative correlation coefficient of -0.38 between the standard deviation
of lotteries and the risk share a1 confirms this result. When we consider measured
risk aversion we find a negative relationship between being more risk averse and
higher risk shares a1 with a correlation coefficient of -0.20, and thus, more risk
averse subjects invest indeed less into the risky lottery choice just as one would
expect.33
Finally, when we eyeball recorded satisfaction of passive subjects we observe
that subjects report satisfaction in a sensible way. In case of an above median
standard deviation lotteries (i.e. higher risk) passive subjects for which the com-
puter draws a high (low) risk share are generally less (more) satisfied (see the left
graph in Figure 4.5, Appendix 4.A). In case of a below median standard deviation
(i.e. lower risk) lotteries passive subjects are more (less) satisfied if they receive a
32Note that by construction all lotteries with an above (below) median standard deviation are
lotteries with more downside (upside) probability weight (see Table 4.1). However, here we focus
on risk defined as variation (std. dev.) rather than on the asymmetric allocation of probability
mass for the sake of this argument.
33We use a risk aversion measure a` la Holt and Laury (2002) that essentially applies a multiple
price list (MPL) of binary choices between lotteries. Note that this risk aversion measure is
considerably less incentivized compared to the main part of the experiment. Thus, the consistent
results support the general notion that the risk aversion measure a` la Holt and Laury works well
in the pecuniary dimension even when using comparably small stakes to incentivize subjects.
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high (low) risk share (see the right graph in Figure 4.5, Appendix 4.A).34
4.3.1 Individual risk taking
To investigate the effect of social comparisons on risk taking we consider the change
in investment (risk share) comparing treatment Alone and treatment Social. For
a first test of Prediction 4.1 we separately compare risk taking behavior for lotter-
ies with more downside and lotteries with more upside probability mass between
treatments Alone and Social.35 Our starting point is a first glance at simple av-
erages. Figure 4.1 shows for more downside probability weighted lotteries a lower
average risk share of 0.30 in treatment Social compared to an average risk share
of 0.39 in treatment Alone in line with Prediction 4.1. Thus, in case of lotter-
ies with more downside than upside probability mass subjects invest on average
about 9% less of their endowment into the risky lottery when the otherwise iden-
tical lottery is payoff relevant for another subject. The treatment difference is
significantly different when we conduct a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p-value 0.050)
or a two-sided t-test assuming unequal variances (p-value 0.067). Next, in case of
lotteries with more upside than downside probability weight, we find a lower risk
share of 0.57 in treatment Social compared to a risk share of 0.62 in treatment
Alone. This difference is not significantly different using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test
(p-value 0.250) or a two-sided t-test assuming unequal variances (p-value 0.302).
Hence, for lotteries with more upside probability mass we find the opposite sign
as Prediction 4.1 suggests but this difference is statistically indistinguishable from
zero while for lotteries with more downside probability mass we find a significant
negative effect in line with Prediction 4.1.36 Before we proceed with a regression
analysis note that independent of the treatment subjects take significantly more
risk in case of lotteries with more upside probability mass compared to lotteries
with more downside probability mass, as we would expect. By construction, the
lotteries with more downside probability mass are mean-preserving spreads of the
lotteries with more upside probability mass, and therefore, the lotteries with more
upside probability mass second-order stochastically dominate the lotteries with
34Recall that we implement two groups of passive subjects: a “high-risk” group receiving high
risk shares and a “low-risk” group receiving low risk shares (see more details in Section 4.2.4).
35Subjects also face one “symmetric” lottery (Lottery 9 in Table 4.1 has neither a probability
overweight on the upside nor on the downside) that we can analyze for a plausibility check.
In line with Section 4.2.1 we find no significant treatment effect in risk taking for Lottery 9
comparing treatment Social to Alone. This holds for simple means and for a regression analysis
(not reported, available on request).
36Also see Table 4.6 in Appendix 4.A for descriptive statistics.
125
Chapter 4. You are not alone
More downside probability mass More upside probability mass
Figure 4.1: Average share invested into risky lottery
more downside probability mass (also see Table 4.1 above).37,38
To further test Prediction 4.1 we run a random effects linear panel regression
model on the observations of treatment Alone and of active subjects in treatment
37Note that we construct lotteries with the goal to shift probability weight between the down-
side and the upside of the distribution (i.e., altering pG). For a better comparability between
lotteries, we hold the expected return constant over all lotteries by adding dispersion to the up-
side of the lotteries that have higher probability weights at the downside. While this procedure
allows us to keep the simple binary structure of lotteries in our transformations, it effectively
leads to two simultaneous changes w.r.t. to riskiness. First, risk changes by an intended change
in the placement of risk between the upside and downside of a lottery. Second, risk changes by
a “pure risk increase or decrease” in the sense of Menezes et al. (1980) (more probability mass
placed into the tails of the distribution leading to a higher variance). Menezes et al. (1980)
show that risk averters and risk preferrers that exhibit prudence (i.e., the third derivative of a
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is positive) dislike “pure downside risk”, that is a
placement of risk from the left to the right of a distribution, without altering neither the mean
nor the variance.
38Note that the lotteries with more downside probability weight exhibit the properties of ”long
shots” (a high return with a low probability and positively skewed). Empirical evidence shows
that bettors are attracted by ”long shots” and are willing to forgo expected return for a higher
positive skewness (Golec and Tamarkin 1998, Garrett and Sobel 1999). While such patterns in
field data could be explained by risk preferring individuals (Quandt 1986), experimental evidence
on the isolated effect of skewness on risk taking finds that individuals do indeed take more risk
for more positively skewed lotteries (Grossman and Eckel 2015). Grossman and Eckel (2015)
find that about 35 precent of individuals take on higher levels of risk in case of positively skewed
lotteries. This seems roughly consistent with the behavior of subjects in this experiment. We find
that about 22 percent of the subjects invest more in more risky but positively skewed lotteries
(that is more downside probability weight lotteries) than in less risky, negatively skewed lotteries
(i.e., more upside probability weight lotteries).
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Social.39 The main specification is given by40
(4.9) risksharei,n = β0 + β1Social + β2Iupside + β3Social × Iupside + βXi,n + εi,n
The dependent variable risksharei,n represents the share of endowment that
subject i invests into the risky lottery for lottery (portfolio choice) n and takes
values between 0 and 1. Iupside is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if
lottery n has more upside than downside probability mass and a value of 0 in case
of more downside than upside probability mass. Our variables of main interest
are the treatment dummy Social that takes a value of 1 for observations from
treatment Social, 0 otherwise and the interaction term Social× Iupside . Xi,n repre-
sents a vector of control variables.41 Coefficient β1 of the interaction model (4.9)
measures the treatment effect of comparison considerations (treatment Alone vs.
treatment Social) on subjects’ risk share in situations of lotteries with more down-
side probability weight (Iupside = 0). The coefficients β1 and β3 jointly measure
the treatment effect in situations of lotteries with more upside probability weight
(Iupside = 1).
In specification (1) of Table 4.2 we estimate model (4.9) without control vari-
ables.42 The coefficient of variable Social is −0.091 and significant at the 10 per-
cent level (p-value 0.054). Thus, in line with Prediction 4.1, social comparison leads
to significantly less risk taking in case of lotteries that have more downside than
upside probability weight. More precisely, subjects invest 9.1 percentage points
less of their endowment into the risky lottery. On the other hand, the joint effect of
variables Social and Social× ILeftS is −0.049 and not significantly different from
zero (p-value 0.292) as an F-test shows. Hence, the treatment effect in situations of
39We exclude subjects that inconsistently behaved in the test for risk aversion a` la Holt and
Laury (one subject in treatment Alone and 4 subjects in treatment Social). However, all results
are robust to including all subjects.
40Results are robust to using a simple pooled OLS model with clustered standard errors at
the subject level or a random effects tobit model that accounts for potential problems related to
censoring.
41We include as individual controls a measure of risk aversion a` la Holt and Laury, gender, age,
an indicator variable whether the field of study is related to business or economics, an indicator
variable whether subjects participated in laboratory experiments before, measures of patience
and impulsiveness, and a measure whether subjects tend to be envious. We also include a fixed
effect for each round of the experiment (point in time) and a control variable that controls for
the sequence of the rounds (i.e. sequence of lotteries; more precisely, we implemented two groups
that saw lotteries in two different randomized sequences; the group dummy is our control for the
sequence of lotteries).
42Note that all individual control variables are self-reported after the main experiment, and
thus, could be potentially endogenous. Therefore, it is comforting to see that our findings are
robust even without including control variables.
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All
asymmetric
lotteries
All
asymmetric
lotteries
More
asymmetric
lotteries
Less
asymmetric
lotteries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
risk share risk share risk share risk share
Social
-0.091∗
(0.047)
-0.115∗∗
(0.045)
-0.150∗∗∗
(0.058)
-0.080∗
(0.046)
Iupside
0.231∗∗∗
(0.045)
0.217∗∗∗
(0.044)
0.331∗∗∗
(0.067)
0.166∗∗∗
(0.042)
Social × Iupside 0.042
(0.060)
0.042
(0.061)
0.067
(0.090)
0.017
(0.057)
risk aversioni
-0.033∗∗∗
(0.012)
-0.039∗∗∗
(0.015)
-0.027∗∗∗
(0.013)
Constant
0.384∗∗∗
(0.034)
0.414∗∗∗
(0.115)
0.545∗∗∗
(0.136)
0.246∗
(0.145)
Individual
controls
No Yes Yes Yes
Time and sequence
fixed effects
No Yes Yes Yes
N 672 672 336 336
Clusters 84 84 84 84
Note: Random effects panel regression model. Dependent variable: share invested into the risky
lottery. Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. Specifications (1) and
(2) include all observations of asymmetric lotteries (i.e., lotteries with more upside or downside
probability mass) from treatments Alone and Social. Specification (3) includes the subsample
of more asymmetric lotteries (see L5, L6, L7, L8 in Table 4.1). Specification (4) includes the
subsample of less asymmetric lotteries (see L1, L2, L3, L4 in Table 4.1). “Individual controls”
include gender, age, whether the field of study is business related, risk aversion, impulsiveness
and patience, a measure for enviousness, a dummy whether subjects participated in laboratory
experiments before. “Time and sequence fixed effects” include period fixed effects and a group-
indicator variable for groups that observe the lotteries in different sequences.
Table 4.2: Income-rank dependent preferences: Regression results for risk-taking
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lotteries with more upside probability mass shows the opposite (negative) sign as
predicted by Prediction 4.1 but is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Finally,
the positive and highly significant coefficient of 0.231 (p-value 0.000) for variable
Iupside shows that independent of the treatment effect subjects generally take con-
siderably more risk in situations of lotteries with more upside probability mass
compared to situations of lotteries with more downside probability mass. This
is as one would expect because of the generally higher standard deviations (risk)
of lotteries with more downside probability weight.43 Specification (2) confirms
these findings where we include individual-specific socioeconomic characteristics,
variables from post-experimental tasks as well as time and sequence-of-lotteries
fixed effects. Note that the individual control risk aversioni has a coefficient of
−0.033 that is significant at the 1 percent level (p-value 0.008), and thus, more
risk-averse subjects generally invest significantly less into the risky lottery of a
portfolio choice problem as one would suspect.44
Result 4.1 Comparison considerations affect risk taking: Individuals invest less
risky in situations of lotteries with more downside than upside probability mass.
In situations of more upside than downside probability mass comparison consider-
ations do not significantly affect risk taking behavior.
To shed some light on Prediction 4.2, whether more asymmetrically allocated
probability mass affects risk-taking more (less), we estimate model (4.9) on sub-
samples of lotteries with more or less asymmetrically allocated probability mass.
In specification (3) we consider only a subset of more asymmetric lotteries (lotter-
ies L5, L7, L6, L8 of Table 4.1). More asymmetric lotteries show a more significant
and in absolute size larger treatment effect of −0.150 (p-value 0.009) in situations
of lotteries with more downside probability mass in line with Prediction 4.2. In
situations of lotteries with more upside probability mass the effect remains in-
significant.45 In specification (4) we consider a subset of less asymmetric lotteries
(lotteries L1, L3, L2, L4 of Table 4.1) and find a less significant and in absolute
43Recall that lotteries with more downside probability weight are mean preserving spreads of
lotteries with more upside probability weight by construction.
44Note that we experimented with different measures of risk aversion. In our regressions we use
a multiple price list measure a` la Holt and Laury as this measure shows the highest explanatory
power. Using the general risk-question of Dohmen et al. (2011) as a measure of risk aversion
shows the correct sign in most specifications but is only weakly or not at all significant. Thus,
our results imply that in the financial dimension an incentivized multiple price list measure seems
to be a better measure to assess risk aversion.
45In specification (3) the sum of coefficients of variables Social and Social× Iupside is insignif-
icant (p-value 0.34) using an F-test.
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size smaller effect of −0.0795 (p-value 0.086) for lotteries wiht more downside
probability mass in line with Prediction 4.2. In case of lotteries with more up-
side probability mass the effect remains again statistically indistinguishable from
zero.46
Result 4.2 The effect of comparison considerations on risk taking appears to be
larger (smaller) in absolute terms for lotteries with more downside probability mass
when probability mass is allocated even more asymmetrically. In case of lotteries
with more upside than downside probability mass neither a more nor a less asym-
metric allocation of the probability mass shows a significant effect.
A natural next step is to analyze factors that foster the effect of comparison
considerations on risk taking. An influential idea first discussed by Festinger (1954)
is that individuals compare themselves to more similar rather than to less similar
individuals, and thus, we might expect stronger comparison effects for more sim-
ilar subjects.48 During the experiment we intentionally provide a large degree of
anonymity to limit potential noise from the interaction of individuals that might
be related to subjective sympathy or other factors that are difficult to control for.
Although subjects do not interact they enter the room in which the experiment
takes place together (in treatment Social), and thereby, see the other participant of
their session before taking a seat behind their private cubicle. While it is difficult
to assess what subjects learn from this short visual impression of their reference
subject, it seems plausible that subjects at least get to know the gender of the
other participant. Thus, when we think of gender as one dimension in which sub-
jects can be more or less similar we can expect that subjects grouped with another
participant of the same gender (more similar subjects) experience a stronger com-
parison effect on risk taking than subjects grouped with another participant of a
different gender (less similar subjects). Furthermore, we can also exploit our data
to investigate a general gender effect. Many studies in the experimental literature
find that risk taking exhibits a gender related component, and thus, social com-
parison related risk taking behavior might also differ along the gender dimension,
46In specification (4) the sum of coefficients of variables Sociali and Sociali × Iupside is in-
significant (p-value 0.245) using an F-test. Thus, while we find evidence in line with Prediction
4.2 for lotteries with more downside probability mass, for lotteries with more upside probability
mass we find no statistically significant effect, consistent with our findings above.47
48Festinger (1954) refers to situations when subjects compare their own ability to the ability
of others while we are interested in an extension of his idea to income comparisons.
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independently of Festinger’s similarity idea.49,50
In specifications (1) and (2) of Table 4.3 we estimate model (4.9) as above
but focus only on subsamples of subjects that are grouped with another subject
of the same gender in treatment Social.51 In specification (1) we focus on the
treatment effect for female-female pairs. We find that the coefficient of Social is
larger in absolute terms (−0.191) and more significant (p-value 0.000) compared
to our results reported above. An F-test shows that the sum of the coefficients of
Social and Social × Iupside is not significantly different from zero. Thus, focusing
on female-female pairs provides similar but stronger results than the general spec-
ification estimated above with a significant negative effect in case of lotteries with
more downside probability weight but no significant effect for lotteries with more
upside probability weight. In specification (2) we focus on a subsample of male-
male pairs. We find an in absolute terms slightly larger coefficient for Social than
in the complete sample (−0.133) that is significant at the 5 percent level (p-value
0.046). However, in situations of lotteries with more downside probability weight
this negative effect is smaller in absolute terms compared to female-female pairs.
For lotteries with more upside probability weight we also find in the male-male
subsampel a statistical zero effect.52,53 Finally, in specifications (3) and (4) we
plainly focus on the gender of the deciding subject without considering the gender
of the reference subject. In specification (3), using a subsample of female subjects,
we find a sizable negative effect for lotteries with more downside probability mass
(coefficient of Social: −0.133) that is significant at the 1 percent level (p-value
49Many studies in the experimental literature find that women take less risk than men do (e.g.,
see Charness and Gneezy 2012). However, some studies argue that gender differences are small
and context specific (e.g., Schubert et al., 1999).
50We find that male subjects invest on averge 4.7 percent more of their endowment into the
risky lottery compared to female subjects in our experiment. This difference, however, is in-
significant.
51More precisely, in specification (1) we compare female subjects in treatment Alone to female-
female pairs in treatment Social. Analog, in specification (2) we compare male subjects in
treatment Alone to male-male pairs in treatment Social.
52In the male-male subsample the sum of the coefficients of Social and Social ∗ Iupside is
indistinguishable from zero using an F-test (p-value 0.24).
53Note, that same-gender pairs show a significantly stronger treatment effect to social compar-
isons for lotteries with more downside probability mass. In a formal test we first create a dummy
variable that takes a value of one for different-gender pairs and zero for same-gender pairs. We
interact this variable with the treatment dummy that takes a value of one for observations in
treatment Social. This interaction model is separately estimated for lotteries with more downside
and upside probability weight, in each case on observations from treatments Alone and Social.
The estimate of the interaction term is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level for
lotteries with more downside probability weight. Results are reported in Table 4.8 of Appendix
4.A.
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Female
with
Female
Male
with
Male
Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
risk share risk share risk share risk share
Social
-0.191∗∗∗
(0.043)
-0.133∗∗
(0.066)
-0.133∗∗∗
(0.050)
-0.046
(0.081)
Iupside
0.186∗∗∗
(0.064)
0.276∗∗∗
(0.063)
0.186∗∗∗
(0.064)
0.276∗∗∗
(0.063)
Social
× Iupside
0.165∗∗
(0.079)
0.041
(0.095)
0.115
(0.078)
-0.033
(0.094)
Constant
0.389∗∗∗
(0.035)
0.379∗∗∗
(0.058)
0.389∗∗∗
(0.035)
0.379∗∗∗
(0.058)
Individual
controls
No No No No
Time and sequence
fixed effects
No No No No
N 280 272 344 328
Clusters 35 34 43 41
Note: Random effects panel regression model. Dependent variable: share invested into the
risky lottery. Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. Gender-specific
subsamples. Specifications (1) and (2) apply subsamples in which grouped subjects are of the
same gender in treatment Social and of the corresponding same gender in treatment Alone
(female-female compared to female and male-male compared to male). Specifications (3) and
(4) focus simply on gender without considering the gender of the other (reference) subject in
treatment Social.
Table 4.3: Subjects of the same gender
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0.008). In situations of lotteries with more upside probability mass we find no
significant effect.54 Focusing on male subjects in specification (4) we find neither a
significant effect for lotteries with more downside (p-value 0.575) nor more upside
(p-value 0.28) probability mass. Thus, in line with the idea of Festinger (1954) we
find larger estimated effects of comparison concerns on risk taking for more similar
subjects compared to the full sample. Robust to our findings above, comparison
considerations affect risk taking in situations of lotteries with more downside prob-
ability mass but not for lotteries with more upside probability mass. Finally, our
results indicate that effects of comparisons on risk taking appear to be more pro-
nounced for female than for male subjects although a formal test does not show a
significant gender difference.55
Result 4.3 Comparison considerations affect risk taking more when the reference
subject is of the same gender.
4.3.2 Evidence from satisfaction
We can make use of observations of passive subjects by investigating measured
satisfaction. In a first step, we consider simple means to investigate Prediction
4.3. Figure 4.2 shows mean satisfaction of passive subjects in situations of lot-
teries with more downside and lotteries with more upside probability mass for
low-risk and high-risk groups.56 Recall that in situations of lotteries with more
upside probability mass and low risk share and in situations of lotteries with more
downside probability mass and high risk share passive subjects are likely to be
behind in rank compared to the active reference subject. Consequently, in these
situations theory predicts passive subjects to be less satisfied in treatment Social
compared to treatment Alone Passive. We find that subjects are indeed less satis-
fied for lotteries with more upside probability mass and low risk shares (see Figure
4.2, upper right corner), reporting by 1.70 points lower satisfaction in treatment
54An F-test for the sum of Social and Social ∗ Iupside shows again a statistical zero effect in
situations of lotteries with more upside probability mass (p-value, 0.76) for the subsample of
female subjects.
55We interact a dummy variable, that takes the value of one for male subjects and zero for
female subjects, with a treatment dummy that takes a value of one for observations in treatment
Social. We estimate this interaction model separately for lotteries with more downside and
upside probability mass, in each case on observations from treatments Alone and Social. We
cannot reject that the coefficient for the interaction term is equal to zero in neither of the two
specifications.
56Recall that we implement two groups: one that receives high and one that receives low risk
shares. See Section 4.2.4 for more details.
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Downside prob. mass & low risk Upside prob. mass & low risk
Downside prob. mass & high risk Upside prob. mass & high risk
Figure 4.2: Average satisfaction of passive subjects
Social compared to treatment Alone Passive. This difference is significant at the
5 percent level when we apply a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p-value
0.012) and significant at the 1 percent level for a two-sided t-test assuming unequal
variances (p-value. 0.0002). In all other situations, including situations of lotteries
with more downside probability mass and high risk shares (Figure 4.2, lower left
corner) we do not find a significant difference in satisfaction between treatment
Alone Passive and treatment Social. Thus, we find evidence in line with Predic-
tion 4.3 in situations of lotteries with more upside probability mass and low risk
shares but no significant effect in case of lotteries with more downside probability
mass and high risk shares.
To elaborate further on these findings we run a random effects linear panel
regression model on the observations of treatment Alone Passive and passive sub-
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jects of treatment Social.57 We estimate the following model:
(4.10) satisfactioni,n = β0 +β1Social+β2IHigh Risk +β3Social× IHigh Risk + εi,n
The dependent variable satisfactioni,n is reported satisfaction of passive sub-
ject i facing lottery n. IHigh Risk is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for
subjects receiving a high risk share from the computer (high-risk group) and 0 for
subjects receiving a low risk share (low-risk group). Our variables of main interest
are variables Social, a treatment dummy that takes a value of 1 for observations
of treatment Social, and the interaction term Social × IHigh Risk. Coefficient β1
measures the treatment effect on satisfaction for subjects receiving low risk shares
(IHigh Risk = 0) while the sum of β1 and β3 measures the treatment effect for high
risk share subjects (IHigh Risk = 1).
In specification (1) of Table 4.4 we estimate model (4.10) on the set of lotteries
with more upside probability mass (lotteries L2, L4, L6, L8 of Table 4.1). The
coefficient of Social is -1.702 and significant at the 1 percent level (p-value 0.000).
Thus, subjects are significantly less satisfied in treatment Social compared to Alone
Passive when they receive a low risk share and face more probability mass on the
upside (when they are more likely to be behind). In situations of high risk shares
we find a positive but insignificant treatment effect.58
In specification (2) we estimte the identical model on the set of lotteries with
more downside probability mass (lotteries L1, L3, L5, L7 of Table 4.1). We find
neither a significant treatment effect for high nor for low risk shares.59 The nega-
tive and significant coefficient of IHigh Risk (-2.163, p-value 0.000) shows a strong
negative reaction in satisfaction comparing high to low risk shares independent
of the treatments Social and Alone. This strong effect is only present in situa-
tions of lotteries with more downside probability mass as these lotteries exhibit
by construction a considerably higher riskiness (standard deviation) compared to
lotteries with more upside probability mass in our experiment (also see Table 4.1).
Result 4.4 Comparison considerations adversely affect satisfaction of subjects
when subjects are likely to be behind in income compared to another subject in
57Results are robust to using a pooled OLS model with clustered standard errors on subject
level. Since satisfaction is an ordinal concept we also apply a random effects ordered probit
model and find that results are robust, in line with Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004).
58The sum of the coefficients of Social and Social × IHigh Risk is positive (0.187) and not
significantly different from zero using an F-test (p-value 0.775)
59Neither the coefficient of Social (-0.491, p-value 0.294) nor the sum of coefficients of Social
and Social × IHigh Risk (-0.171, p-value 0.809) are statistically distinguishable from zero.
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Upside
probability mass
lotteries
Downside
probability mass
lotteries
(1) (2)
satisfaction satisfaction
Social
-1.702∗∗∗
(0.400)
-0.491
(0.467)
IHigh Risk
-0.656
(0.553)
-2.163∗∗∗
(0.516)
Social×
IHigh Risk
1.889∗∗
(0.768)
0.320
(0.848)
Constant
6.156∗∗∗
(0.228)
6.188∗∗∗
(0.296)
Individual
controls
No No
Time and sequence
fixed effects
No No
N 252 252
Clusters 63 63
Note: Random effects panel regression model. Dependent variable: satisfaction. Standard errors
in parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. Dependent variable: reported satisfaction of
passive subjects. The sample includes observations from treatment Alone Passive and passive
subjects from treatment Social. Specification (1) incorporates the subsample of lotteries with
more upside probability mass (lotteries L2, L4, L6, L8 of Table 4.1). Specification (2) incorporates
the subsample of lotteries with more downside probability mass (lotteries L1, L3, L5, L7 of Table
4.1).
Table 4.4: Satisfaction of passive subjects with high and low risk shares
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situations of lotteries with more upside probability mass.
It is notable that we only find an effect for being behind in expected income-
rank in situations of lotteries with more upside probability mass. One possible
explanation for this result is that passive subjects might find it more difficult to
assess the behavior of active subjects in case of lotteries with more downside prob-
ability mass compared to lotteries with more upside probability mass. The latter
lotteries exhibit by construction comparably little risk, and thus, it might appear
straightforward to predict that most active participants invest a larger share of
their endowment into the risky lottery. Thus, “low-risk group” passive subjects
might find it straightforward to predict to be behind in expected rank. On the
other hand, lotteries with more downside probability mass are considerably more
risky by construction but offer consequently more extreme returns (a “long shot”).
Passive subjects might anticipate that the extreme (low probability) returns are po-
tentially attractive for some active participants, and thus, passive subjects might
find it less straightforward to predict the behavior of active subjects.60 Conse-
quently, passive subjects might experience a higher strategic uncertainty for the
lotteries with more downside probability mass than for lotteries with more upside
probability mass that could explain the weaker results.61
4.3.3 Higher risk for the relative income position: Uncor-
related lottery returns
In Section 4.3.1 we find that comparison concerns induce less risk taking for lotter-
ies with more downside probability weight while we find no statistically significant
effect for lotteries with more upside probability weight. What explains this asym-
metric result? One possible candidate for an explanation is that subjects do not
60Note that the low probability, high return of some of the lotteries with more downside
probability mass can be considered to be substantial for a student participating in a laboratory
experiment (in the best case more than 100 EUR).
61For instance, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that individuals might overweight low
probabilities. Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) discuss that individuals face problems to handle
low probabilities and either dismiss or overestimate these. Furthermore, evidence shows that
some individuals are attracted by the “long shot” properties that are common to the lotteries
with more downside probability weight. Golec and Tamarkin (1998) and Garrett and Sobel (1999)
find that individuals are willing to forgo expected return for lotteries exhibiting such “long shot”
properties. Related to this work, evidence by Grossman and Eckel (2015) shows that individuals
take more risk in case of positively skewed lotteries, a typical property of “long shots”. Also
note that the lotteries with more downside probability mass are positively skewed. Summing up,
assessing how other subjects respond to low probability events with rather “extreme” returns
(and positively skewed probability distributions) might be particularly difficult for subjects.
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care so much about their income rank but rather about the distance in income
relative to others for their risk taking decisions, as first theoretically discussed by
Konrad and Lommerud (1993). To see why this might explain the asymmetric
result, first consider lotteries with more upside and lotteries with more downside
probability mass (see Table 4.1). By construction, lotteries with more downside
probability weight exhibit higher risk (i.e. higher standard deviations) than lot-
teries with more upside probability weight. Thus, one could also read the results
of Section 4.3.1 as follows: Comparison considerations lead to less risk taking in
situations of higher risk. This interpretation would be in line with Konrad and
Lommerud (1993) who show that comparison considerations lead to less risk tak-
ing when individuals are relatively more risk averse with regard to their relative
income position than with regard to their pure consumption.62
To investigate whether the individuals’ preferences for the distance in income
can explain our results we run a control treatment in which we increase the risk
for the relative income position while, at the same time, we keep the risk for the
personal income unchanged (treatment “Social Uncorr”).63 The idea of this treat-
ment is inspired by Konrad and Lommerud (1993) who show that the correlation
structure of risk, e.g. correlated or uncorrelated income risks, can matter. Social
Uncorr is identical to treatment Social except for that the returns of the risky
lottery are uncorrelated for subjects. More precisely, while in treatment Social
the identical dice rolls determine the return of the risky lottery for both subjects,
in treatment Social Uncorr for each subject dice are independently rolled, and
thus, the return of the risky lottery is independently determined.64 Thus, while
in treatment Social both subjects of a session receive either a positive or a zero
payoff from the risky lottery, in treatment Social Uncorr subjects can also end
up with a positive (zero) payoff from the risky lottery while the other participant
receives a zero (positive) payoff. Consequently, subjects can be relatively further
ahead or behind in income in treatment Social Uncorr than in Social, leading to
62This holds for the case of non-systematic (uncorrelated) risk in Konrad’s and Lommerud’s
(1993) theoretical study. In our main treatment the lottery payoffs are perfectly correlated for
subjects. However, different to the assumption of a symmetric investment decision in Konrad
and Lommerud (1993), risk shares for the reference (passive) subjects are randomly drawn in
our study. This introduces additional risk for the relative income position of active subjects and
effectively leads to a situation comparable to “non-systematic risk” in Konrad and Lommerud
(1993).
63We run additional 44 sessions with 88 participants. Also see Table 4.5 in Appendix 4.A.
64Subjects learn about the procedure (one-for-all or independent dice rolls) from the instruc-
tions before the experiment starts (e.g., see Appendix 4.C for the instructions of treatment
Social).
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higher risk in the social dimension.
When the distance in incomes of subjects causes our asymmetric results of
Section 4.3.1 we would expect that subjects respond to the higher risk in the social
dimension accordingly. Thus, we would expect that subjects reduce risk taking
comparing treatment Social Uncorr to treatment Social (i.e. a decrease in a1).
On the other hand, when income-rank comparisons are at work (as formalized
in Section 4.2.1) we should observe similar responses for risk taking comparing
the control treatment Social Uncorr to treatment Social and Predictions 4.1 and
4.2 should still hold.65,66 Thus, comparing treatment Social Uncorr to Social, we
expect no significant difference in a1.
We estimate a similar model as presented in equation (4.9) of Section 4.3.1 on
observations from treatment Social and Social Uncorr. In the first step, we do not
separate situations of lotteries with more upside and lotteries with more downside
probability mass (no interaction term) and focus plainly on the treatment effect.
We find no significant difference in risk taking between the treatments, suggesting
that the distance in incomes does not explain our results (see specification (1) in
Table 4.9 in Appendix 4.A.1).67 We can further investigate the treatment effect
of social comparisons by comparing the control treatment Social Uncorr to treat-
ment Alone. We apply similar specifications as presented in Table 4.2 in Section
4.3.1. Compared to the outcomes in Section 4.3.1, the effects are of the same sign,
however, of lower magnitude and indistinguishable from zero (see Table 4.10 in
Appendix 4.A.1). Furthermore, when we run estimations on subsamples based on
gender (more or less similar subjects) we find again similar results. We estimate
similar specifications as presented in Section 4.3.1 on observations from treatments
Social Uncorr and Alone. For female subjects and female-female pairs the coef-
ficients of SocialUncorr and SocialUncorr × ILeftS are of the same sign but of
slightly smaller magnitude compared to Section 4.3.1 (see Table 4.11 in Appendix
4.A.1). Comparison considerations lead to significantly lower risk taking for lotter-
ies with more downside probability mass, whereas we find no significant treatment
effect in case of lotteries with more upside probability mass. In contrast to Sec-
tion 4.3.1, we generally find no significant treatment effect for male-male gender
65See Appendix 4.B.2 for a derivation of this claim.
66This prediction holds for all cases but the corner-case a1 = a2 = 0. Recall that a2 is a
continuous random variable, and thus, a2 = 0 is a zero-probability event.
67The coefficient SocialUncorr is insignificant (specification (1), Table 4.9). Similarly, we find
no significant difference between the treatments Social Uncorr and Social when we estimate all
other specifications as presented in Table 4.2 in Section 4.3.1 (results are reported in Table 4.9
in Appendix 4.A.1).
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pairs anymore, neither for lotteries with more downside nor for lotteries with more
upside probability mass. In summary, estimations based on the control treatment
Social Uncorr provide no evidence for other forms of comparison concerns explain-
ing the asymmetric findings of Section 4.3.1. Generally, results appear to be in
line but weaker compared to Section 4.3.1.
Result 4.5 In situations of uncorrelated risky returns:
the effect of comparison considerations on risk taking is weaker. For female subjects
we find similar effects of lower magnitude compared to the situation of correlated
risky returns that are stronger when the reference subject is also female (female-
female pairs). For male subjects we find no significant comparison effect on risk
taking.
Overall, the control treatment provides results supporting the findings in Sec-
tion 4.3.1: Social comparisons induce subjects to take less risk in case of lotteries
with more downside probability mass but we find no significant effect in situations
of lotteries with more upside probability mass. Preferences for the distance of
incomes, and thus, also social loss aversion, seem not to be driving the asymmetric
responses for different lotteries. What else could explain the asymmetric result?
One possible interpretation is that subjects perceive payoffs of a similar range as
“almost” identical. As by construction possible payoff differences are considerably
smaller for lotteries with more upside probability mass compared to lotteries with
more downside probability mass, subjects might perceive these payoff differences
as negligible, and thus, we do not measure comparison effects. Put differently, to
trigger an empirically measurable reaction larger payoff differences are necessary
(as it is the case in situations of lotteries with more downside probability mass).
This interpretation is in its nature related to the idea of income-distance based
preferences in that there might be an implicit threshold in the distance of income
so that subjects feel to be ahead or behind in rank.
4.4 Conclusion
We investigate the effect of social comparisons on risk taking inspired by the the-
oretical contributions of Robson (1992) and Konrad and Lommerud (1993). Our
model predicts that income-rank-dependent preferences lead to less (more) risk
taking in situations of lotteries with more downside (upside) probability mass. We
find evidence of income comparisons affecting risk taking decisions. In line with
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our theoretical predictions, individuals take significantly less risk in situations of
lotteries with more downside probability mass. We do not find a significant effect
for lotteries with more upside probability mass. Individuals who face a reference
subject of the same gender exhibit a larger comparison effect on risk taking. We
interpret this finding as evidence for Festinger’s (1954) idea that individuals prefer
to compare themselves to more rather than to less similar subjects. Independent
of the reference subject, the measured effects appear to be strongest for female
individuals.
The asymmetric finding for lotteries with more downside and lotteries with
more upside probability mass comes as a surprise. A further control treatment
provides no evidence that other forms of income comparisons, such as the distance
in incomes or social loss aversion, can explain the asymmetric effect. Our favored
explanation is that subjects might perceive situations in which expected income
of others falls not far apart from their own expected income as “almost equal”.
In our setup, lotteries with more upside probability mass offer by construction no
large difference in the expected income of subjects, contrary to lotteries with more
downside probability mass. This comparably small difference might be too small
to trigger an empirically measurable response.
Overall, we find that social comparisons affect risk taking behavior. Our re-
sults give guidance where we should expect social comparison effects on risk taking:
Comparison effects particularly emerge for lotteries with more downside than up-
side probability mass that are commonly positively skewed. Skewed distributions
are applicable in various situations, such as in financial and insurance markets, a
natural environment for risk taking decisions.68 Furthermore, our finding of rein-
forced comparison effects for more similar individuals implies that some industries
and occupational fields are more prone to comparison effects on risk taking than
others. Effects can be expected to be stronger when managers and employees are
predominantly of the same gender, such as in the financial sector or in human
resources related positions.
68For an overview see Adcock et al. (2015).
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Treatment Alone
Treatment Social
Figure 4.3: Laboratory setup
Note: In treatment Alone participates one, in treatment Social two subjects in each session.
Subjects in treatment Social are separated by a room divider to ensure privacy, while both
subjects observe the identical “public screen” that shows the payoff-relevant portfolio choice (i.e.
subject (1) looks to her left, subject (2) to her right).
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Figure 4.4: Risk share: Above and below median std. dev. lotteries
Note: Risk share refers to the share of the endowment that subjects invest into the risky lottery,
taking values between 0 (0%) and 1 (100%).
Above median std. dev. lotteries Below median std. dev. lotteries
Figure 4.5: Satisfaction of passive subjects in situations of more or less risk
Note: Self-reported satisfaction is measured on a scale 0-10. Passive subjects are randomly
assigned into two groups: receiving high risk shares (high-risk group) or low risk shares (low-risk
group).
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Treatments Alone Social
Alone
Passive
Social
Uncorr
# Sessions 45 45 18 44
Participants
# Active 45 45 - 44
# Passive - 45 18 44
Observations per participanta
# Downside prob. lotteries 4 4 4 4
# Upside prob. lotteries 4 4 4 4
a
Subjects face additionally one symmetric (non-skewed) lottery that we use for a plausibility check.
Note: In treatments Alone and Alone Passive participates one subject in each session. In treat-
ments Social and Social Uncorr participate simultaneously one active and one passive subject
in each session. Treatments Alone, Social, Alone Passive are explained in Section 4.3.1, details
on the control treatment Social Uncorr are presented in Section 4.3.3.
Table 4.5: Summary of the experimental treatments
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Alone Social
Social
Uncorr
Total
Mean Mean Mean Mean S.D. Min Max
Risk share 0.50 0.44 0.52 0.48 0.32 0 1
Downside m. 0.39 0.30 0.38 0.61 0.31 0 1
Upside m. 0.62 0.57 0.64 0.36 0.30 0 1
Satisfaction 6.7 7.0 7.0 6.9 2.2 0 10
Downside m. 6.3 6.8 6.8 6.6 2.2 0 10
Upside m. 7.1 7.0 7.1 7.0 2.1 0 10
Male 0.49 0.45 0.64 0.53 0.50 0 1
Age 23.8 24.3 25.3 24.5 6.2 18 60
Econ 0.13 0.25 0.18 0.19 0.39 0 1
Note: Descriptive statistics for all 134 subjects that actively choose their investment. “Risk
shar” refers to the share of endowment that subjects invest into the risky lottery. It that takes
values between 0 and 1. “Male” takes a value of 1 for male subjects. Econ takes a value of 1
for subjects that study in business related fields such as economics. “Downside m.” refers to
lotteries with more downside probability mass while “upside m.” refers to lotteries with more
upside probability mass.
Table 4.6: Summary statistics of actively investing subjects
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Alone
Passive
Social
Passive
Social
Uncorr
Passive
Total
Mean Mean Mean Mean S.D. Min Max
High-risk group
Risk share 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.09 0.62 0.95
Downside m. 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.12 0.62 0.95
Upside m. 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.05 0.77 0.89
Satisfaction 4.48 4.89 4.42 4.75 2.59 0 10
Downside m. 4.03 3.85 2.09 3.44 2.40 0 9
Upside m. 5.50 5.69 6.41 5.82 2.32 1 10
Low-risk group
Risk share 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.10 0.05 0.39
Downside m. 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.07 0.13 0.30
Upside m. 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.13 0.05 0.39
Satisfaction 6.11 4.99 5.04 5.12 2.85 0 10
Downside m. 6.19 5.70 5.87 5.83 2.70 0 10
Upside m. 6.16 4.46 4.48 4.64 2.87 0 10
Male 0.78 0.50 0.59 0.58 0.49 0 1
Age 22.4 23.8 23.1 23.3 3.8 18 39
Econ 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.37 0 1
Note: Descriptive statistics for all 107 passive subjects. “Risk share” refers to the share of
endowment that is invested into the risky project (lottery). It takes values beteween 0 and
1. “Male” takes a value of 1 for male subjects. Econ takes a value of 1 for subjects that
study in business related fields such as economics. “Downside m.” refers to lotteries with more
downside probability mass while “Upside m.” refers to lotteries with more upside probability
mass. “Passive” refers to the share of risky investment being randomly drawn from a distribution.
Two groups are implemented with different distributions applying for the randomly drawn risk
share. In a first step, we record the empirical distribution of risk shares for each lottery of the
first 10 active subjects. We apply this random draws of this empirical distribution as the passive
risk shares. These are identical for subjects of the same group of passive subjects across all
treatments. “High-risk group” refers to a situation where the passive risk share is a random
draw from right end outside the 95 percent confidence interval of the empirical distribution of
risk shares of each lottery. “Low-risk group” refers to a situation where the passive risk share
is a random draw from the left end outside the 95 percent confidence interval of the empirical
distribution of risk shares of each lottery.
Table 4.7: Summary statistics for passive subjects
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Downside
probability mass
lotteries
Upside
probability mass
lotteries
(1) (2)
risk share risk share
Social
-0.191∗∗∗
(0.039)
-0.059
(0.053)
Social
×Idifferent gender
0.191∗∗
(0.074)
0.027
(0.069)
Constant
0.384∗∗∗
(0.034)
0.615∗∗∗
(0.032)
Individual
controls
No No
Time and sequence
fixed effects
No No
N 336 336
Clusters 84 84
Note: Random effects panel regression model. Dependent variable: Share of endowment invested
into the risky lottery. Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. Specifica-
tion (1) applies a subsample of lotteries with more downside probability mass while specification
(2) a subsample of lotteries with more upside probability mass. Idifferent gender is an indica-
tor variable that takes a value of 1 for participants grouped to another participant of
a different gender in treatment Social and a value of 0 for a pair of participants of the
same gender.
Table 4.8: Same-gender and different-gender pairs
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4.A.1 Results for uncorrelated lottery returns
All
asymmetric
lotteries
All
asymmetric
lotteries
More
asymmetric
lotteries
Less
asymmetric
lotteries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
risk share risk share risk share risk share
SocialUncorr
0.052
(0.034)
0.057
(0.050)
0.072
(0.064)
0.042
(0.049)
Iupside
0.258∗∗∗
(0.038)
0.407∗∗∗
(0.064)
0.190∗∗∗
(0.038)
SocialUncorr
× Iupside
-0.010
(0.060)
0.013
(0.086)
-0.034
(0.062)
risk aversioni
-0.034∗∗∗
(0.011)
-0.034∗∗∗
(0.011)
-0.038∗∗∗
(0.013)
-0.030∗∗∗
(0.008)
Constant
0.542∗∗∗
(0.123)
0.358∗∗∗
(0.127)
0.358∗∗
(0.170)
0.336∗∗∗
(0.126
Individual
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time and sequence
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 648 648 324 324
Clusters 81 81 81 81
Note: Random effects panel regression model. Dependent variable: Share of endowment invested
into the risky lottery. Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. Iupside is
an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for lotteries with more upside probability mass and
zero otherwise. SocialUncorr is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for observations
in treatment Social Uncorr and zero otherwise. Specifications (1) and (2) include all observations
of asymmetric lotteries (more downside or upside probability mass) from treatments Social and
Social Uncorr . Specification (3) includes the subsample of more asymmetric lotteries ( L5, L6,
L7, L8 in Table (4.1)). Specification (4) includes the subsample of less asymmetric lotteries ( L1,
L2, L3, L4 in Table (4.1)). “Individual controls” include gender, age, whether the field of study
is business related, risk aversion, impulsivness and patience, enviousness, a dummy whether
subjects participted in laboratory expermints before. “Time fixed effects” include round fixed
effects and a dummy for the sequence in which lotteries are shown.
Table 4.9: Comparisons and risk taking for correlated vs. uncorrelated lotteries
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All
asymmetric
lotteries
All
asymmetric
lotteries
More
asymmetric
lotteries
Less
asymmetric
lotteries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
risk share risk share risk share risk share
SocialUncorr
-0.010
(0.054)
-0.036
(0.054)
-0.052
(0.067)
-0.020
(0.058)
Iupside
0.231∗∗∗
(0.045)
0.216∗∗∗
(0.044)
0.324∗∗∗
(0.068)
0.173∗∗∗
(0.042)
SocialUncorr
× Iupside
0.031
(0.063)
0.033
(0.064)
0.080
(0.089)
-0.015
(0.064)
risk aversioni
-0.019
(0.012)
-0.014
(0.014)
-0.023∗
(0.013)
Constant
0.384∗∗∗
(0.034)
0.404∗∗∗
(0.099)
0.522∗∗∗
(0.141)
0.307∗∗∗
(0.104)
Individual
controls
No Yes Yes Yes
Time and sequence
fixed effects
No Yes Yes Yes
N 680 680 340 340
Clusters 85 85 85 85
Note: Random effects panel regression model. Dependent variable: Share of endowment invested
into the risky lottery. Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. Iupside is
an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for lotteries with more upside probability mass and
0 otherwise. SocialUncorr is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for observations
in treatment Social Uncorr and 0 otherwise. Specifications (1) and (2) include all observations
of asymmetric lotteries from treatments Alone and Social Uncorr (i.e. lotteries with relatively
more downside or upside probability mass). Specification (3) includes the subsample of more
asymmetric lotteries ( L5, L6, L7, L8 in Table 4.1). Specification (4) includes the subsample of
less asymmetric lotteries ( L1, L2, L3, L4 in Table 4.1). “Individual controls” include gender,
age, whether the field of study is business related, risk aversion, impulsivness and patience,
enviousness, a dummy whether subjects participted in laboratory expermints before. “Time
and sequence fixed effects” include round fixed effects and a dummy for the sequence in which
lotteries are shown.
Table 4.10: Comparisons and risk taking for uncorrelated lotteries
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Female
with
Female
Male
with
Male
Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
risk share risk share risk share risk share
SocialUncorr
-0.155∗∗
(0.076)
0.128
(0.095)
-0.130∗∗
(0.058)
0.061
(0.082)
Iupside
0.186∗∗∗
(0.065)
0.276∗∗∗
(0.063)
0.186∗∗∗
(0.064)
0.276∗∗∗
(0.063)
SocialUncorr
× Iupside
0.150
(0.168)
-0.076
(0.0956)
0.107
(0.093)
-0.032
(0.086)
Constant
0.389∗∗∗
(0.035)
0.379∗∗∗
(0.058)
0.389∗∗∗
(0.035)
0.379∗∗∗
(0.058)
Individual
controls
No No No No
Time and sequence
fixed effects
No No No No
N 216 280 296 384
Clusters 27 35 37 48
Note: Random effects panel regression model. Dependent variable: Share of endowment invested
into the risky lottery. Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. Iupside is
an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for lotteries with more upside probability mass and
zero otherwise. SocialUncorr is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for observations in
treatment Social Uncorr and zero otherwise. Gender-specific subsamples. Specifiations (1) and
(2) focus on subsamples in which grouped subjects are of the same gender in treatment Social
Uncorr and of the corresponding same gender in treatment Alone (female-female compared to
female and male-male compared to male). Specifications (3) and (4) focus on gender without
considering the gender of the other (reference) subject in treatment Social Uncorr.
Table 4.11: Subjects of the same gender and uncorrelated lottery returns
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4.B Mathematical appendix
4.B.1 Costs of deviating from the optimal investment with-
out income comparisons
Given an optimal investment allocation a∗1 for the consumption part of the utility
function u (y1 (a1)), we can define the constant U = u (y1 (a
∗
1)). Thus the cost
function defined in (4.5) of Section 4.2.1 can be stated as
C(a1) = U − E[u (y1 (a1))]
= U − [pG × u (θGa1 + (1− a1)) + (1− pG)× u (1− a1)] .
Taking the first derivative with resepct to a1 yields
(4.11)
∂C(a1)
∂a1
= −pG(θG − 1)× u′ (θGa1 + (1− a1)) + (1− pG)× u′ (1− a1) .
Considering the second derivative with respect to a1:
(4.12)
∂2C(a1)
∂a21
= −pG(θG − 1)2 × u′′ (θGa1 + (1− a1))− (1− pG)× u′′ (1− a1) .
From (4.12) we see that
∂2C(a1)
∂a21
> 0 if u′′ (·) < 0,
and thus, assuming that subjects are risk averse for the standard part of the
utility function (i.e. u (y1 (a1)) is strictly concave) is sufficient to ensure that the
cost function C(a1) is convex.
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4.B.2 Uncorrelated lotteries and income-rank comparisons
The following holds for all a1 and a2 but the corner case a1 = a2 = 0. Analog to
equation (4.6) in Section 4.2.1, the optimization problem for the situations when
returns of risky lotteries are uncorrelated becomes
max
a1
pi1 = p
2
G × [F (a1)W + (1− F (a1))L](4.13)
+ (1− pG)2 × [(1− F (a1))W + F (a1)L]− C(a1)
+pG (1− pG)W + pG (1− pG)L.
The last two terms of equation (4.13) refer to the comparison utility gain (loss)
when the lottery of one subject pays the “good-state” return θG while the lottery
of the other subjects pays 0 in the “bad-state”. In these situations, independent
of the subjects’ investment decisions, the subject receiving θG (0) will be ahead
(behind), and thus, will receive utility from comparisons equal to W (L). Solving
problem (4.13) yields the first-order condition
(4.14) f(a˜s1)[p
2
G (W − L) + (1− pG)2 (L−W )] = C ′(a˜s1),
in which we define a˜s1 as optimal investment when we incorporate social compar-
isons in case of uncorrelated lottery returns. We can further simplify (4.14) to
(4.15) f(a˜s1)[W − L][2pG − 1] = C ′(a˜s1).
Equation (4.15) is identical to equation (4.7) in Section 4.2.1 and it follows directly
that a˜s1 = a
s
1.
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4.C Experimental instructions
Welcome to the experiment!1
Please read this instruction carefully and completely. Thoroughly understanding
this instruction will help you to earn more money. In the experiment, your earnings
are measured in Taler. At the end of the experiment we will convert the Talers
you earned into Euros and pay you accordingly. The conversion rate is: 25 Talers
= 1 Euro. Additionally, each participant receives a show-up fee of 6 Euros.
We ensure your anonymity throughout the experiment. Please keep in mind that
you are not allowed to communicate with other participants during the experiment.
If you do not comply with this rule you will be asked to leave the laboratory
without getting paid. In case you have a question before the experiment begins
please raise your hand. Whenever you have a question at any time during the
experiment please press the “help button” and we will help you.
Your task:
You will observe Project A and Project B on a common screen. Each partici-
pant receives 175 Taler that are fully invested into Project A and Project B. One
participant decides for himself how he splits his endowment between Project A
and Project B (0 to 175 Talers can be invested into a project). A random draw of
the computer determines the split of the second participant’s endowment between
Project A and B. The roles of actively investing or of having the computer to
decide are randomly assigned before the experiment starts and remain unchanged
for the duration of the experiment.
Your earnings in the experiment depend on the investment decisions: each project
exhibits multipliers (i.e. returns) multiplying the invested Talers. The two projects
differ as follows:
• Project A offers two different multipliers of which just one will be chosen at
the end of the experiment. One of the two multipliers leads to a higher payoff
than the other. For each investment decision the common screen shows the
probabilities that the high or the low multiplier is chosen.(See a stylized
example for how project A works attached at the end of the instructions.)
• Project B offers a single multiplier of one; i.e. your investment into Project
B will be paid to you one-to-one.
1The experiment was conducted in German. This appendix contains a translated version of
the instructions for the treatment Social.
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The realization of Project A (that is, whether the high or the low multiplier applies)
will be simultaneously decided for all participants by the same dice rolls at the
end of the experiment.
After the investment decision (the random investment by the computer, respec-
tively) each participant will answer the following question on their private screen:
How satisfied are you with your current Project A/ Project B-combination on a
scale 0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (highly satisfied)?
Procedure
Overall, you will repeat this task several times, and thus, invest several times
in a Project A and Project B. At each point in time the active participant will
decide on the investment anew and independent of the pervious decisions while the
computer randomly draws a new investment decision for the passive participant.
In order to proceed to the next Project A / Project B combination, a “Done”
button appears on your screen after one minute. You do not need to click and
proceed immediately. It is important to take your time for each decision.
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select one Project A /
Project B combination for the payoff.
• The randomly selected Project A/ Project B combination will appear on the
common screen.
• The experimenter will roll dice clearly visible for all using a dice cup under
ample shaking. This dice roll determines the investment outcome for both
participants. The experimenter will enter the result into the common screen.
• The computer calculates the payoff of Project A according to your investment
decision and to the outcome of the dice rolls. Your final result for Project
A and Project B of the selected investment decision will be summed up and
displayed on your private screen.
Consequently, your earnings will be determined by the investment into Project A
and Project B and by the dice rolls.
After the experiment we ask you to provide some further information. As a matter
of course, all of your provided information will be treated anonymously.
Thank you very much for showing up and good luck!
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Practice round
Before the experiment starts you will participate in a practice round that will help
you to better understand the experiment. The practice round is not relevant for
the disbursement.
Figure 4.6: Example for illustration
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Chapter 5
Concluding remarks
The evidence of social comparisons under uncertainty and the behavioral implica-
tions for risk taking is remarkably sparse in the field of economics. The present
thesis contributes to filling this gap by applying experimental and empirical meth-
ods to investigate informational and comparison effects in chapters 2 and 3. Chap-
ter 4 investigates behavioral implications of social comparisons under uncertainty
and provides evidence of the effects of social comparisons on risk taking applying
an experimental analysis.
The experimental results of Chapter 2 provide causal evidence of the infor-
mational and comparison effects when income is uncertain. Informational effects
countervail and neutralize comparison effects if and only if uncertainty about fu-
ture income is large enough. The evidence on informational effects is established in
an environment when the informational value of signals from the income of other
individuals is unknown. Thus, stronger informational effects should be expected
when the relationship between the incomes of individuals is less ambiguous. Un-
expectedly, social comparison and informational effects are asymmetric. While
individuals react significantly to being behind in income and to observing bad
signals from the income development of others, I find neither a significant effect
for being ahead nor for good signals. I interpret this finding as individuals being
more reactive to “bad news” than to “good news.” An interesting implication of
both simultaneously working effects is that individuals may (ceteris paribus) ex-
perience lower acceptance of income inequality. Catching up to richer individuals
will be more important than the possible disutility resulting from other individu-
als catching up to oneself. At the same time, a significant response to bad signals
from the income development of others may reinforce Varian’s (1980) argument of
“redistributive taxation as a social insurance” in an uncertain environment.
Chapter 5. Concluding remarks
From an international perspective, the present thesis finds evidence in line
with social comparison and informational effects between residents of different
countries. Individual subjective well-being relates to the readily observable eco-
nomic growth of the reference countries. The results of this analysis should be
taken with a pinch of salt with respect to the limited data that is available on
a global scale. An analysis with (unavailable) panel survey data, instead of the
applied repeated cross-sectional data, would certainly improve the identification
of effects. Nonetheless, I make use of the data that is available to derive relevant
findings. The evidence on international comparison effects suggests that the the-
oretical investigations of Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2014, 2015) on the
provision of global public goods and international tax coordination are relevant.
What is more, informational effects that have not been considered in this branch
of literature turn out to be important and to even dominate comparison effects
when countries exhibit close economic ties. Not least, while social comparison
effects have the potential to impede international cooperation between countries,
countervailing informational effects might act as facilitating factors. Thus, the ev-
idence suggests that advances in economic integration between countries have the
potential to align the interests of these countries and might be socially beneficial
beyond the standard international-trade arguments.
The theory-guided evidence of Chapter 4 shows that social comparisons affect
risk taking behavior. While a possible interpretation of the evidence is that the
income-rank is relevant to individuals, I find no evidence of other forms of social
comparisons, such as an extension of the concept of loss aversion to the social
dimension. Furthermore, the results of Chapter 4 give guidance as to where we
should expect social comparison effects on risk taking: Comparison effects partic-
ularly emerge for lotteries with more downside than upside probability mass that
are commonly positively skewed. Skewed distributions are applicable in various
situations, such as in financial and insurance markets, a natural environment for
risk taking decisions. The findings of Chapter 4 further show that comparison
effects on risk taking are reinforced if individuals are of the same gender, and
thus, are more similar. This finding implies that, ceteris paribus, some industries
and occupational fields may be more prone to comparison effects on risk taking
than others. Effects can be expected to be stronger when managers and employ-
ees are predominantly of the same gender such as in the financial sector or in
human-resources-related positions.
The results of the present thesis underline that social comparison and informa-
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tional effects are empirically relevant factors in uncertain environments. While so-
cial comparisons are widely analyzed and understood, informational effects should
not be neglected. The countervailing nature of informational effects in various situ-
ations needs to be considered to understand the implications of social comparisons
under uncertainty. Finally, I hope that the findings with respect to risk taking
behavior not only improve our understanding of the matter but also stimulate
further work in this far from comprehensively researched branch of the literature.
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